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CHAPTER 2

Getting It Wrong about Wartime Sexual Violence— And Why It Matters

In the previous chapter we argued that research findings on wartime sexual violence are often misunderstood and misreported, not only by the media and advocacy groups but also by the United Nations (UN) and its agencies. In this chapter we ask why this might be the case and look more closely at what implications this may have for policy.

No one doubts that the sexual violence experienced by countless individuals in countries is one of the grossest violations of human rights. It scars its survivors mentally, as well as physically; it rips families apart; and it inflicts humiliation, shame, enormous pain, psychological trauma, and frequently death on its victims.

And as LaShawn Jefferson points out, it is “the only crime for which the community’s reaction is often to stigmatize the victim rather than prosecute the perpetrator.”¹⁰¹

It is encouraging that the seriousness of these violations—which is not contested—is increasingly being recognized. What is less clear, however, is why the mainstream narrative should so persistently get it wrong about the sexual violence perpetrated by combatants. Moreover, why should the domestic sexual violence that takes place in wartime, which claims more victims than conflict-related sexual violence, be ignored almost completely?

Explaining the Biases

The pervasive biases that we described earlier are best understood in terms of the incentive structures that underpin both media coverage of wartime sexual violence, and the reporting, analysis, and advocacy of international agencies and NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), whose mission includes humanitarian advocacy and service delivery.¹⁰²

Dramatically high rates of sexual violence, victim narratives that depict gang rapes by armed groups, the savage physical violence perpetrated against victims, and the rape and mutilation of children are newsworthy precisely because they are shocking. A core news imperative of the global media business remains: “If it bleeds, it leads.”

The fact that there is little or no reported sexual violence perpetrated by armed groups in many armed conflicts should be good news, but these cases are not newsworthy—news-gatherers rarely focus on things that do not happen.

Similarly, domestic sexual violence in countries in conflict is of little interest to the media. It is not new, it takes place behind closed doors, and it is mostly invisible.

The Incentives That Drive Humanitarian Organizations

With respect to international agencies and NGOs whose mission includes humanitarian advocacy and service delivery, the misleading claims are driven by rather different incentives.

Those engaged in humanitarian advocacy and service delivery—including for victims of sexual violence—typically bring a strong, often passionate, commitment to providing assistance for those in need. But securing funding to address these needs is a continuing challenge. Humanitarian needs are great, but the demands on donors from UN agencies and international NGOs are always greater than the funds available to meet them.

This is so despite the fact that the absolute level of humanitarian assistance has risen significantly since the end of the Cold War, in part as a consequence of powerful advocacy campaigns waged by international humanitarian organizations. Between 2000 and 2010, humanitarian assistance almost doubled in value.¹⁰³ And between 2000 and 2009, the share of this aid concentrated in conflict-affected states had increased from about 40 percent to 65 percent.¹⁰⁴

But despite the increase in overall funding, there remains a large gap between what is *requested* via mechanisms like the UN’s Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and what is actually *allocated* by the donors.¹⁰⁵

With demand for humanitarian funding greatly exceeding supply, it is not surprising that competition for funding among UN agencies that play a major humanitarian role (such as UNICEF [United Nations Children’s Fund], UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees], and the World Food Program) between the agencies and NGOs, and between the NGOs themselves, is often rife.

In their critical 2004 analysis of contemporary humanitarian practice, *The Charity of Nations*, Ian Smillie and Larry Minear identified a dilemma that lies at the heart of today’s humanitarian enterprise:

In a highly competitive environment—made competitive by great needs and inadequate funding—exaggeration not only pays, it is sometimes the only thing that will dislodge funding from donors who themselves have too few resources and too many supplicants.¹⁰⁶

With funding never sufficient to meet humanitarian needs, UN agencies and NGOs have a powerful incentive to seek the media headlines that most effectively highlight the plight of those in need.

In this context, the so-called CNN effect can play an important role. The term refers to the impact of the media in bringing home to those living in donor countries the extent of a humanitarian crisis, the desperate plight of the survivors, and the moral and political imperatives to assist them. The CNN effect can help pressure donors to respond to crises and private individuals to give to appeals from humanitarian agencies and NGOs.

Fundraisers in humanitarian organizations well understand that emotive appeals for assistance have a greater impact than the statistics—hence the frequency with which shocking victim narratives of conflict-related sexual violence feature in major UN and NGO reports on wartime sexual violence. The problem is that the affecting narrative accounts, while true, are presented in such a way as to suggest that they are the norm. This is rarely the case and in this sense they are misleading.

On the other hand, there is no incentive for humanitarian agencies to focus on domestic sexual violence in wartime, even though it appears to result in far more victims than conflict-related sexual violence. The fact that domestic sexual violence occurs both in times of peace—as well as war—means that it is not seen as an emergency issue. As such, it is not a compelling candidate for humanitarian assistance.

A further source of potential bias lies in the fact that assessments of humanitarian need are rarely independent. Most requests to donors for humanitarian assistance are based on assessments by the very organizations that will be beneficiaries of any funding that is granted. This inevitably causes conflicts of interest to arise. As a 2003 report from the Overseas Development Institute put it, it is difficult to believe that analyses of humanitarian need are objective if the organization making the assessment has a vested interest in the result.¹⁰⁷

There is compelling evidence that many assessments of the gravity of humanitarian crises by NGOs and UN agencies are exaggerated.¹⁰⁸

Does Getting It Wrong Really Matter?

Few deny that the demand for resources to combat wartime sexual violence and to assist its victims is far greater than the supply, so why should it matter if the scope and incidence of sexual violence are exaggerated in order to secure the resources that everyone agrees are needed?

After all, as Tufts University's Kelly M. Greenhill and co-author Peter Andreas note:

large numbers often help stimulate and increase funding flows to agencies and organizations whose mission is dealing with the negative externalities of conflict (such as humanitarian crises).¹⁰⁹

The beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance have no reason to be concerned about its provenance. And humanitarian fundraisers can well argue that if protecting the vulnerable and

“MAGICAL NUMBERS” AND WARTIME SEXUAL VIOLENCE

Prize-winning *New York Times* columnist Nicholas Kristof has played a critically important role in drawing international attention to wartime sexual violence. But some of his widely cited claims have also spread misinformation about the extent of sexual violence in the worst-affected countries.

In a 2009 *New York Times* article, for example, Kristof claimed that, “as many as three-fourths of women” had been raped in Liberia’s civil war.¹¹⁰ The provenance of this much-publicized claim was not clear from the article, but Kristof was likely referring to a 2004 WHO (World Health Organization) report.¹¹¹

But even a cursory reading of the WHO survey report makes it clear that it could never support such an extraordinary claim.

The WHO figures did indeed show that 77 percent of women in the survey had been raped, but in fact all the respondents had been chosen precisely because they were *survivors of sexual violence*.¹¹² So the data revealed that three quarters of survivors of sexual violence had been raped rather than suffered other forms of sexual assault. This is hardly surprising. Yet the figure tells us absolutely nothing about the nationwide prevalence of rape.

The best estimate for the rate of sexual violence against females in Liberia in this period was very high, but nothing remotely like the figure cited by Kristof and endlessly recycled in the media by advocacy groups and even in UN publications.

In 2007, a major nationwide survey by the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) organization found that the lifetime prevalence rate of sexual violence among Liberian women aged 15 to 49 was 18 percent.¹¹³ As we pointed out earlier, this is the same as the prevalence rate for adult women in the United States.

While Kristof’s misleading claim has been reiterated countless times, the lower, and far more accurate, estimate has largely been ignored by the media. It simply wasn’t newsworthy.

If this type of error—and the media treatment of it—were exceptional, there would be little cause for concern. But it is far from exceptional. In fact, it is symptomatic of what Kelly M. Greenhill calls:

the resilience of conflict-related magical numbers ... that are deemed to be “true” simply because they are widely believed to be true.¹¹⁴

The problem of inflated “magical number” war statistics is also evident in claims about the global total of child soldiers, the number of children killed in modern wars, civilian deaths as a share of all violent war deaths, and the intense controversies over war death tolls in Darfur, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). We examine the incentive structures that drive such inflated claims—and why they matter for policy—in this chapter.

saving lives requires an overemphasis on the extent and gravity of the problem, so be it—the ends justify the means.

This attitude is understandable. But while inflated claims about the extent of wartime sexual violence may help mobilize support for international action in the short term, they cannot form the basis for effective policy in the long term.

As Greenhill points out, bad data can have a decidedly negative impact on policy:

at best, inaccurate numbers can lead to wasted resources and effort where such expenditures are unnecessary; at worst, they may result in too few supplies and personnel being deployed where they are required most acutely.¹¹⁵

Not only will funds be allocated inequitably—and not necessarily for the most pressing needs—but the competition for resources among advocacy organizations and service providers may generate a quest for ever more shocking statistics and victim narratives.¹¹⁶ The resulting distortion of evidence will likely increase the already considerable skepticism with which donors regard many of the claims made by humanitarian agencies and NGOs about the gravity of humanitarian emergencies.¹¹⁷ This “crying wolf” phenomenon may in turn affect donor willingness to respond to future crises.

Why “Getting It Right” Matters for Policy

In this section we consider the policy implications of accepting the five myths about wartime sexual violence identified in Chapter 1.

These myths, along with other misleading claims about wartime sexual violence, are driven by what Andreas and Greenhill refer to as the “politics of numbers.” This, they warn, “can help to perpetuate failing and flawed policies, distort funding, generate and support misleading indicators of policy ‘progress’ and ‘success,’ manipulate media coverage and cloud public debate.”¹¹⁸

The Bias towards the Extreme Cases of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence

In Chapter 1 we noted the disproportionate attention paid to those countries that are worst affected by conflict-related sexual violence. And we pointed out that a significant number of countries in conflict, which experience relatively little—or no—reported sexual violence, are largely ignored in the mainstream narrative.

This means that almost no attention is paid by policy-makers—and little by researchers—to the critical question of why some countries in conflict experience remarkably low levels of sexual violence, while others suffer greatly.

Yet, a better understanding of what causes the difference in wartime sexual violence rates could well help improve sexual violence prevention programs. Unfortunately, this issue is of almost no interest to policy communities and receives very little attention in the research community—the works of Elisabeth Wood, Dara Cohen, and Ragnhild Nordas being rare, but important, exceptions.¹¹⁹

The Policy Implications of the Unfounded Belief That Wartime Sexual Violence Is Increasing

The widely-held conviction that conflict-related sexual violence around the world is increasing means that there has been little policy interest in determining why it might be decreasing. Little scholarly research has been devoted to this question either.

In fact, there are reasons for believing that conflict-related sexual violence has declined since the end of the Cold War.

In Chapter 1 we argued that it was reasonable to expect that, all else equal, conflict-related sexual violence will decline if the number and deadliness of armed conflicts declines substantially. Given that wars have become less deadly and frequent over the past two decades—and in the absence of independent trend data on sexual violence—we should therefore assume that conflict-related sexual violence would have declined as well.¹²⁰

Policy-makers are unlikely to show interest in determining why sexual violence may be decreasing if they are convinced it is increasing.

If ending wars reduces conflict-related sexual violence, then, as we explain below, strategies to end wars—including *peacemaking* (seeking to stop ongoing wars via negotiations) and post-conflict *peacebuilding* (seeking to prevent wars that have stopped from starting again)—also become indirect strategies for reducing conflict-related sexual violence.

Given that there is little evidence thus far that any of the international strategies for preventing wartime sexual violence in war-affected societies have had more than marginal success,¹²¹ examining the potential for indirect strategies to achieve this end would make a lot of policy sense.

But policy-makers are unlikely to show any interest in determining why sexual violence might be decreasing if they are convinced that it is increasing, which is why seeking to “get it right” with respect to sexual violence trends is important for policy.

The Policy Implications of the Strategic Rape Thesis

If mass rape is strategic—e.g., if it has been initiated as part of a top-down policy intended to terrorize civilians, or as part of a campaign of ethnic cleansing—the international community may have some immediate leverage that can be used to pressure the leaders of the government or rebel forces to stop. These may include threats to withhold aid to governments, to impose sanctions,¹²² or to push for indictments in the International Criminal Court.

If, as studies suggest, rape perpetrated by soldiers and rebels is not part of a top-down strategic plan, but is due to the fact that the military command system is simply too weak to stop the abuse, there is relatively little that the international community can do in the short term. In the longer term, however, bringing perpetrators of rape to justice may provide a measure of deterrence against sexual violence in future wars.¹²³

We have argued that some of the claims that sexual violence is deployed as a “weapon of war” are based on little more than anecdotal accounts. Pushing for policy initiatives on the basis of false assumptions is clearly a recipe for bad policy. It underlines yet again the need for reliable data—the *sine qua non* of evidence-based policy.

The Failure to Address Sexual Violence against Males and Female Perpetration

In the mainstream narrative on wartime sexual violence, the overwhelming emphasis is on sexual violence directed against women and girls. The attention devoted to this issue is long overdue and wholly warranted—the impact of wartime sexual violence on women and girls has been ignored for centuries, and women are far more likely to be victimized than men.

Less understandable is the fact that sexual violence against men and boys has been largely ignored. While the UN continues to stress the importance of gender sensitivity, its policy prescriptions continue to treat wartime sexual violence as a phenomenon that affects only women or girls. Male victims are very rarely even mentioned in the reports related to the Security Council’s 1325 agenda, and the issue of female perpetration of sexual violence remains completely invisible.

The UN’s failure to address the issue of sexual violence against males in any meaningful manner has led to considerable criticism.¹²⁴ The Secretary-General’s 2012 report on *Conflict-Related Sexual Violence* belatedly acknowledges that men may be victimized by sexual violence,¹²⁵ but then notes that:

recent information underscores that the situation of male victims ... require[s] deeper examination. The issue must be understood from all perspectives and addressed at all levels as part of a *comprehensive approach to protecting civilians*.¹²⁶

The second sentence in the above quote is far from clear, but it likely means that sexual violence against men and boys will be dealt with as part of the UN’s broader Protection of Civilians agenda, and not the Security Council’s agenda on conflict-related sexual violence.¹²⁷

The omission of males from the mainstream analysis on conflict-related sexual violence not only distorts our understanding of the nature of wartime sexual violence, it also has negative policy consequences—namely that the needs of male victims are systematically ignored.

The lack of attention to the male survivors is remarkable:

4076 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) around the world address rape during wartime and other forms of political sexual violence. Of these, only 3% mention the experience of males in their informational materials, typically as a passing reference.¹²⁸

And, as Charli Carpenter has pointed out:

while the humanitarian assistance community has taken strides in addressing the physical and psycho-social needs of female rape survivors ... services for male survivors of such violence in conflict situations are nearly non-existent.¹²⁹

This is not to minimize the issue of sexual violence perpetrated by men against women—far from it. The point is simply that if the substantial amount of sexual violence against males is systematically neglected then policy responses are bound to be insufficient and inequitable.

While international agencies and NGOs are slowly beginning to address wartime sexual violence against males, the issue of female perpetration of sexual violence has attracted almost

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no attention. This is in spite of the fact that, as we noted in Chapter 1, findings from the few studies that ask about the gender of perpetrators indicate that conflict-related sexual violence perpetrated by women is more common than usually assumed.

Bringing female perpetrators to justice is unlikely to happen as long as national governments and the international community fail to recognize that female perpetration of conflict-related sexual violence is a reality.

Responding to Domestic Sexual Violence in Wartime

The focus on rape perpetrated by rebels, militias, and government troops has—understandably—been intensive, yet, as we pointed out in Chapter 1, the more pervasive threat to the rights and integrity of women posed by domestic sexual violence in wartime has been ignored almost completely.

Just how domestic sexual violence in wartime can be countered is a challenge that is both complex and lacking in any obvious short-term solutions. One thing is clear however: until the problem is taken more seriously, by both the international community and national governments, there will be little effective action to resolve it.

Lack of interest is not the only challenge in determining appropriate policy responses. Indeed, as we point out later in this chapter:

- The policy prescriptions that are advocated by the UN for preventing conflict-related rape have little relevance for domestic sexual violence.
- The fact that marital rape is neither a crime nor a priority for most governments in war-affected countries rules out many obvious domestic law and order responses to domestic sexual violence in war-affected states.
- The fact that domestic sexual violence is prevalent in peacetime as well as wartime means that it does not, by definition, qualify as an emergency issue. This may complicate the access that survivors of domestic violence have to medical and psychological support, since most assistance in conflict settings is *humanitarian*, i.e., it is specifically designed to bring assistance to those suffering as a consequence of emergencies—a term that includes wars as well as natural disasters.

The UN and Wartime Sexual Violence

The reason why the five myths outlined in Chapter 1 have had an impact on policy-making is that despite the increased attention that the issue of wartime sexual violence has received, little effort has gone into collecting reliable evidence. The systems in place to monitor patterns of sexual violence are clearly insufficient.

In October 2000 the UN Security Council passed the groundbreaking Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and took responsibility, among other things, for creating a policy framework and process for dealing with the manifold challenges of addressing conflict-related sexual violence.

The political and legal framework that has guided this process has been informed by a series of Security Council resolutions that included—and followed—Resolution 1325.¹³⁰

But while the Council had set itself—and UN member states—a large number of challenging goals, it has taken only perfunctory and inadequate steps towards monitoring progress to meet those goals.

What this lack of reliable statistics has meant in practice is that almost 12 years after the passage of Resolution 1325, which had flagged the need to “consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls,”¹³¹ neither the UN, nor any other international agency, has any idea whether wartime sexual violence is increasing or decreasing, either worldwide or in individual war-affected countries.

The same lack of the most basic data means that policy-makers have little idea whether or not their sexual violence prevention policies are having any impact. And it has permitted the misleading claims about the extent of conflict-related sexual violence noted in Chapter 1 to go largely unchallenged.

Things are, however, slowly beginning to change. The UN is finally addressing the need to acquire data on wartime sexual violence. It is far from clear, however, that what will be provided will be adequate to monitor whether or not wartime sexual violence is increasing or decreasing, or to determine the impact of UN and other sexual violence prevention programs.

In April 2010 the UN Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council that called for data to be collected on, among other things, the “incidence of sexual violence in conflict-affected countries.” The report stressed the importance of collecting data on quantitative indicators:

Indicators are signposts of change; a means for determining the status quo and the progress towards the intended goal. They indicate trends and ... are critical for effective monitoring and evaluation.¹³²

The Secretary-General’s report noted that indicator data on the incidence of sexual violence would be collected by population surveys.¹³³ But this, he cautioned, would require “specialized and careful technical and conceptual development.”¹³⁴ The pilot phase of data collection on the incidence of wartime sexual violence could take two to five years.¹³⁵

How the implementation of such surveys would be funded was unclear, and the past reluctance of donor governments to pay for data collection in this area suggests that lack of sufficient funding may pose a significant barrier to progress.

In December 2010 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1960, which formally requested the UN Secretary-General to establish monitoring, analysis, and reporting arrangements on conflict-related sexual violence.¹³⁶ But it is clear from the cautious language of the Secretary-General's January 2012 report on *Conflict-Related Sexual Violence* that data collection is seen as problematic:

Common information bases and methodologies for data collection for cases of conflict-related sexual violence are under discussion *and continue to remain a challenge owing to the varying mandates and responsibilities of partner institutions.*¹³⁷

It is extraordinary, though perhaps not surprising given political sensitivities among member states, that almost 12 years since the passage of Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, the collection of the most basic data on conflict-related sexual violence should still be "under discussion."

The Secretary-General's 2012 report noted that a "technical-level working group" was being established to:

review information, monitor and verify incidents of sexual violence, analyse data, trends and patterns, [and] prepare reports.¹³⁸

How this would be accomplished, or when the technical working group might start reporting on its findings, was not spelled out. Perhaps significantly, there was not a single reference in the Secretary-General's 2012 report to the use of population surveys, which had been stressed as the primary means of gathering sexual violence data in the 2010 report.

In fact, the 2012 report makes clear that the UN's primary mode of collecting data will be based, not on surveys, but on the "monitoring and verification of incidents."¹³⁹ The model here is the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) that the UN uses to collect data that is relevant to its mandate on children and armed conflict, and which is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. In collecting sexual violence incident data, the 2012 report emphasizes the need for coordination with the MRM's data collection exercises.

MRM-type data are useful for a variety of purposes, from identifying the perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence, to providing information on particular incidents, and recording government and UN efforts to stop and prevent rape. But they are not useful for measuring overall trends in rates of sexual violence.

Almost 12 years since the passage of Resolution 1325, the collection of the most basic data on conflict-related sexual violence is still "under discussion."

The MRM relies on counts of incidents of sexual violence that are reported to the UN. But this grossly understates the extent of wartime sexual violence, compared with the data derived from high-quality population surveys.

In other words, the methodology now being used by the UN to report on sexual violence in wartime cannot provide the reliable, objective, and comprehensive data that the Secretary-General's report claims is the goal of the new monitoring and reporting arrangements.

Some idea of the extent to which the UN's methodology undercounts the incidence of sexual violence is evident in a recent article by Tia Palermo and Amber Peterman in the *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* (WHO):

More than 15,000 rapes were reported each year to the United Nations mission in the DRC in both 2008 and 2009 ... The major limitation of this figure is that it is based only on cases reported to the United Nations mission. In contrast, a recent study using population estimates and data from the nationally representative Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) conducted from 2006–2007 showed that *the rate of rape among women aged 15 to 49 years in a 12-month period was 26 times higher than the estimates based on reports to United Nations authorities.*¹⁴⁰

The only way to access reasonably accurate and robust data on the nationwide incidence and prevalence of wartime sexual violence is via high-quality population surveys—like those used in the major international effort to track progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Nothing remotely like this effort currently exists for tracking trends in wartime sexual violence, and the January 2012 Secretary General's report, *Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*, suggests that little progress is likely on this front any time soon.

Combating Wartime Sexual Violence: The Key Challenges

Since the end of the 1990s, the protection of civilians in war-affected countries from "imminent threats of physical violence" (including sexual violence) has become an increasingly important policy focus within the UN—and a source of considerable debate. In 1999 a landmark report by then Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted that the protection of civilians:

is fundamental to the central mandate of the Organization. The responsibility for the protection of civilians cannot be transferred to others.¹⁴¹

The UN, the report argued, was the only international organization that could undertake this role. But in 2009 a major independent study commissioned by the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs noted that, a decade after the first peacekeeping mission was mandated to protect civilians, there was still considerable confusion within the UN as to what this meant:

Population surveys are the only way to access accurate and robust data on wartime sexual violence.

the UN Secretariat, troop- and police-contributing countries, host states, humanitarian actors, human rights professionals, and the missions themselves continue to struggle over what it means for a peacekeeping operation to protect civilians, in definition and in practice.¹⁴²

Stopping sexual violence in today's civil wars is perhaps the greatest challenge confronting the UN's protection of civilians agenda.

The report highlighted the shortcomings of the UN's current approach to protecting civilians, pointing to gaps in policy guidance, planning, and preparedness; lack of mission-wide strategy; inconsistent civilian and military leadership; resource constraints; and a lack of capacity to collect and analyze information on day-to-day threats and potential crises.¹⁴³

Given these challenges, it is not surprising that one of the report's authors subsequently wondered publicly whether the protection of civilians in volatile war-affected countries might not be an "impossible mandate."¹⁴⁴

Stopping sexual violence in today's civil wars is perhaps the greatest challenge confronting the UN's protection of civilians agenda. Indeed, Anne Marie Goetz of UN Women (or the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, UNIFEM) has suggested that stopping wartime sexual violence amounts to a "doubly impossible" mandate for UN peacekeepers.¹⁴⁵

Providing effective protection against conflict-related sexual violence is extraordinarily challenging. The taboos and sensitivities that relate to rape are associated with massive under-reporting, and the government security forces, including police and military, that have primary responsibility for protecting civilians from sexual attacks are often major perpetrators.¹⁴⁶ In most cases, UN peacekeepers are simply too few in number to provide adequate protection for civilians at risk.

At the UN there have been increasingly insistent calls to end the pervasive and enduring culture of impunity that continues to protect perpetrators—government forces as well as rebels—from prosecution. Bringing perpetrators to trial and punishing them would not only serve the cause of justice, but would also, so it is claimed, act as a deterrent to future violations.

There has been real progress at the normative level over the past decade. Specific acts of sexual violence have been designated as both war crimes and crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and a number of high-level officials have been indicted for crimes involving sexual violence.

There have been increasingly insistent calls to end the culture of impunity that protects perpetrators from prosecution.

But while few doubt that these international legal developments are important, particularly for the long term, there is little evidence that they have—thus far—had a major impact in terms of deterring sexual violence in countries.

This is not surprising. Those ultimately responsible for acts of sexual violence are unlikely to be deterred from sanctioning rape or other forms of sexual violence unless they believe that there is a finite possibility that they may be arrested, tried, and punished.

There is some statistical evidence that the deterrent effect of national human rights trials can be effective over time in reducing violations, but that evidence does not yet include deterrence of crimes of sexual violence.¹⁴⁷

A second approach to preventing conflict-related sexual violence, one that has a more immediate impact and that has been adopted by the UN in its peace operations, focuses on the direct physical protection of women and girls in war-affected countries. Here a range of tactics are already being used to a greater or lesser extent in peacekeeping missions. These include:

- Using peacekeepers to escort women who are attending markets, looking after crops or livestock, or collecting water, firewood, or animal fodder away from home.
- The creation of mobile stand-by Rapid Reaction Force units that can be deployed rapidly to deal with threats to the peace—including rape.
- The establishment of protected safe havens.
- Gender-sensitive design and management of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and refugee camps.¹⁴⁸

These and other physical protection measures can make an important difference in particular situations, but no one in the UN believes that they are sufficient. As the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) points out:

- We often protect civilians in harsh conditions, with limited or insufficient resources, and with partners who sometimes lack the will or capacity to do their part.
- Peacekeeping operations often deploy amidst the unrealistic expectation that they will be able to protect all civilians at all times.

The problem is that in the countries worst affected by conflict-related sexual violence the UN simply has too few resources for its physical protection measures to provide adequate security for all civilians that are at risk.¹⁴⁹

Although there is currently little evidence that either deterrence or physical protection measures are having an impact on the incidence of conflict-related sexual violence, this does not mean that there are no other prospects for improvement.

Currently, the most effective strategies for substantially reducing the worldwide incidence of conflict-related sexual violence appear to be international action to end the wars in which it flourishes—and to prevent wars that have ended from starting again. There is now considerable

The UN often has too few resources to provide adequate security for all civilians that are at risk.

evidence that what the UN calls *peacemaking*—the use of mediation to negotiate peace agreements between the warring parties—has played an important role in stopping conflicts since the end of the Cold War.¹⁵⁰ And the evidence suggests that post-conflict peacebuilding programs that seek to stabilize post-conflict settings and prevent wars from recurring also have a positive effect.¹⁵¹

And as we have noted previously, we have good reason to assume that when conflicts end, the incidence of sexual violence perpetrated by soldiers and rebels will also decline, though it may not cease entirely.

Domestic Sexual Violence in War-Affected Countries

The UN's policies for addressing wartime sexual violence focus almost entirely on abuses that are conflict-related. The domestic sexual violence in war-affected countries, which the evidence suggests claims far more victims than that perpetrated by combatants, is ignored completely in the mainstream narrative.

Note that we are not arguing that domestic sexual violence *in general* is ignored by the international community. It is, in fact, the central focus of numerous programs around the world undertaken by the UN and its agencies, as well as countless NGOs, all of which seek to prevent all forms of violence against women and bring assistance to its victims.¹⁵² The majority of these efforts take place in peacetime, but because today's conflicts rarely encompass all of the national territory of war-affected countries, some programs will likely continue during periods of conflict in parts of the country not directly affected by the fighting.

However, the fact that the mainstream narrative on wartime sexual violence ignores domestic sexual violence completely, while the UN has excluded it from its Women, Peace and Security agenda, means that it has become invisible politically in wartime. This in turn means that it receives little or no high-level political attention and few of the resources that are devoted to addressing the far more highly publicized challenges of conflict-related sexual violence.

Key officials have, however, made it explicit that the UN's focus lies elsewhere. In her opening address to the much-cited 2008 Wilton Park conference on the role of peacekeepers in dealing with conflict-related sexual violence, the UN's Anne Marie Goetz described three types of sexual violence that occur in today's war-affected countries. They are:

- *Widespread and systematic rape*—i.e., organized campaigns of sexual violence during wartime.
- *Widespread and opportunistic rape*—i.e., large-scale unorganized sexual violence in war-affected countries.
- *Isolated and random rape*—“rape that occurs at all times, in all societies and that is unrelated to political strategy (*widespread and systematic sexual violence*) or the chaos of armed conflict (*widespread and opportunistic sexual violence*).”¹⁵³

Goetz does not mention domestic sexual violence *per se*, but it is likely included in the latter category. Domestic political violence in wartime is, however, far from being “isolated and random.” Indeed, as we have pointed out, the limited evidence we have indicates that it is far

more pervasive than conflict-related sexual violence, even in cases like the DRC where the level of conflict-related rape rates are extremely high.

It is clear that domestic sexual violence is *not* an issue that the UN believes that the Women, Peace and Security agenda should address. It follows that, like isolated and random rape, it should be treated as “a domestic criminal matter warranting a *domestic law and order response*, quite distinct from sexual violence as a matter of international peace and security.”¹⁵⁴

But in many war-affected countries, domestic sexual violence *cannot* be dealt with via a national or international law and order response. First, as we flagged earlier, in the large majority of poor countries where most wars take place, marital rape is not illegal. Indeed, less than 60 countries in the world have legislation explicitly criminalizing marital rape.¹⁵⁵ And even in those countries where it is illegal, the perpetrators are often protected by a *de facto* culture of impunity.

Second, domestic sexual violence is neither a war crime nor a crime against humanity under international law, and cannot thus be prosecuted by national governments under the terms of the Rome Statute—nor, indeed, by the International Criminal Court itself.

This is not all. The physical measures intended by the UN to provide protection against conflict-related sexual violence—like firewood patrols and escorting women to markets—are wholly irrelevant when it comes to protecting women and girls from sexual violence within the home.

The neglect of domestic sexual violence is not restricted to the Security Council’s agenda on wartime sexual violence. UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict, which was launched in March 2007, is a concerted effort by 13 UN entities to end sexual violence in war and its aftermath by:

improving coordination and accountability, amplifying advocacy and supporting country efforts to prevent conflict-related sexual violence and respond more effectively to the needs of survivors.¹⁵⁶

But there is no high-level multi-agency effort that is remotely comparable to UN Action that addresses the pervasive problem of domestic sexual violence in wartime.

The UN’s reluctance to address domestic sexual violence in wartime under its Women, Peace and Security agenda is understandable. Peacekeepers lack the resources to tackle conflict-related sexual violence effectively, let alone the more pervasive problem of wartime domestic sexual violence. And, as noted earlier, because domestic sexual violence is a persistent and endemic problem, it is difficult to characterize it as an emergency issue requiring humanitarian assistance.

Fewer than 60 countries have laws against marital rape. Even where it is illegal, perpetrators are often protected by a *de facto* culture of impunity.

There remains, however, a real inequity in the current situation. Domestic sexual violence may appear less serious than conflict-related rape—it certainly is not associated with the well-known savageries of mass gang rapes that have been common in some war zones. However, domestic sexual violence is not only more pervasive than conflict-related sexual violence but it also tends to be more persistent. Unlike conflict-related sexual violence, it can, and often does, continue over many years.

But whatever the relative seriousness of the two types of sexual violence, the reality is that conflict-related sexual violence is receiving long overdue attention from the UN, particularly the Security Council, and its survivors have been receiving greatly increased assistance from the international community. At the same time, however, the plight of the survivors of domestic sexual violence in wartime has been excluded from the Security Council's policy agenda on wartime sexual violence. And although more pervasive and persistent than conflict-related sexual violence, it has become virtually invisible in the mainstream narrative.

There are legal and practical reasons for this exclusion—it is difficult, for example, to claim that domestic sexual violence in wartime is a threat to international peace and security. The result, however, is the same—the victims/survivors of domestic sexual violence in wartime are rendered effectively invisible at the highest level in the UN and their plight is ignored.

Domestic sexual violence is both more pervasive and persistent than conflict-related sexual violence. It can, and often does, continue over many years.


Focusing on Normative Change

Preventing either conflict-related or wartime domestic sexual violence is extraordinarily difficult. It is true that growing numbers of states are introducing legislation to provide women with legal protection from domestic sexual abuse, but translating new laws into effective policy on the ground is likely to be a very lengthy process. Progress requires not just new legislation but major changes in popular and official attitudes.

A major impediment to reducing the level of sexual violence in many developing countries—in conflict situations as well as in peacetime—is that substantial percentages of women believe that their partners have the right to have sex with them, even if they do not want to—and that it is acceptable for their male partners to punish them physically if they refuse. In Sierra Leone, for example, the 2002 Physicians for Human Rights survey found that:

Despite 80 percent of women expressing that there should be legal protection for the rights of women, more than half of women reported that their husbands had the right to beat them and that it was a wife's duty to have sex with her husband even if she did not want to.¹⁵⁷

As Figure 2.1 from a WHO multi-country study, shown below, makes clear, the attitudes of women in Sierra Leone are far from being exceptional. In many of the surveyed areas, especially those with rural populations, a significant proportion of the interviewed women—and sometimes the large majority—did not believe that refusing sex with a husband is acceptable if a woman does not want to have sex.



Since marital rape is not illegal in the large majority of poor countries where most wars take place, it is unlikely that the often dramatic cross-national variation in the rates of domestic sexual violence is a function of legislation and law and order policies—though these may make a difference in particular cases. The variation is, however, strongly associated with differences in popular norms and beliefs about the acceptability of sexual violence—beliefs that are held not only by perpetrators but sometimes by their victims as well.

It is probably no coincidence that the WHO study recorded low levels of domestic violence in areas where women's rights norms are more entrenched. In the nine surveyed areas where a majority of women believed they had a right to refuse sex with their husbands, the prevalence of intimate-partner sexual violence was 19 percent on average, just over half the average for the remaining regions.¹⁵⁹

WHO has pointed to other norms and beliefs that help perpetuate sexual violence:

- "Family responses to sexual violence that blame women without punishing men, and concentrate instead on restoring 'lost' family honour."¹⁶⁰
- "Sexual violence committed by men is to a large extent rooted in ideologies of male sexual entitlement. These belief systems grant women extremely few legitimate options to refuse sexual advances."¹⁶¹
- Weak legal sanctions for sexual violence send the message that such violence is condoned, and may even exclude certain forms of sexual violence from the legal definition.¹⁶²

The large degree of variation in levels of sexual violence, both within and between countries, demonstrates that such violence is not an immutable consequence of "human nature."¹⁶³ And the fact that widely held norms and attitudes about sexual behaviour have made domestic sexual violence appear "acceptable" in many countries makes changing such norms an obvious prevention strategy.

Changing norms via policy interventions has been successful in other contexts. In fact, there is a long history of national- and community-level public health education campaigns that have sought to change norms and attitudes that are associated with social behaviours that have a negative impact on health—notably those against smoking, drinking and driving, drinking while pregnant, not wearing seatbelts, and practicing unsafe sex. Some of these campaigns, which have often been undertaken in conjunction with legislative change and stress on penalties for noncompliance, have been notably successful.

Low levels of domestic violence tend to occur where women's rights are more entrenched.

During the past two decades, there has also been increasing interest among public health professionals, as well as human rights advocacy groups, in initiatives that seek to change the social norms and attitudes that have normalized and legitimized sexual violence and other violations, even in countries where it is legally proscribed.¹⁶⁴ Few of these interventions have

been rigorously evaluated,¹⁶⁵ but some community interventions to reverse long-established practices that put women at risk appear to have been remarkably successful. One such practice is female genital cutting, which is widely practiced in Muslim communities in parts of Africa.

In Senegal, for example, a movement to end the prevalent practice of female genital cutting has been spreading "through the very ties of family and ethnicity that used to entrench it."¹⁶⁶ In the past 15 years, the movement has gained such momentum that "a majority of Senegalese villages where genital cutting was commonplace have committed to stop it."¹⁶⁷

This remarkable change was not achieved by legislation or domestic law enforcement—in fact, police had put little effort into enforcing the ban on female genital cutting imposed by the Senegalese parliament in 1999. Rather, the change in this previously widely accepted practice has been driven by relatively low-cost community-level activism directed at changing norms and attitudes.¹⁶⁸ Community activists stressed both the health risks of the practice and the fact that there is no religious requirement for genital cutting in Islam. In fact, the practice predates Islam's arrival by centuries.¹⁶⁹

The Senegal case is far from unique. Findings from similar campaigns in Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya, and the Sudan suggest that in all cases there have been:

substantial reductions in FGC [female genital cutting] and accompanying shifts in the norms that undergird the practice.¹⁷⁰

Included in the successful campaigns to reduce genital cutting were the following:

- Programs that encouraged “community deliberation, collective reflection and changes in social attitudes and norms.”
- Appeals for change that were “value-centred” and involved, “some process of consciousness raising and deliberation on values, rights and gender-based discrimination.”
- Approaches that built on local traditions and “introduced rights-based concepts, without necessarily using human rights language.”¹⁷¹

Interestingly, a 2004 study of the Senegal campaign against genital cutting found that it also reduced the incidence of intimate-partner violence.¹⁷²

While these campaigns are not necessarily blueprints for reducing domestic sexual violence, they demonstrate that it is possible to make major changes in norms that relate to highly sensitive sexual practices that harm women.

Gender Inequality and Wartime Sexual Violence

Underpinning much of current discussion in UN agencies and elsewhere about the causes of sexual violence is the widely held conviction that, as WHO puts it, “gender inequalities increase the risk of violence by men against women and inhibit the ability of those affected to seek protection.”¹⁷³ This thesis applies to sexual, as well as physical, violence and should in principle apply to sexual violence in wartime.

There is some indirect statistical evidence to support the idea that gender inequality increases the probability of conflict-related sexual violence, notably econometric studies by Mary Caprioli of the University of Minnesota–Duluth and by Uppsala University's Erik Melander, both published in 2005.¹⁷⁴

Caprioli found, “The higher the level of gender inequality within a state, the greater the likelihood that such a state will experience internal conflict.”¹⁷⁵

Melander, who examined the impact of gender equality on the deadliness of conflict, rather than on the risk of conflict onsets, found that more gender-equal societies “are associated with lower levels of intrastate armed conflict.”¹⁷⁶

In 2010 Stanford University's James Fearon reviewed both studies and found generally weaker associations when using additional data. But he also noted that:

overall there is some indication that higher levels of gender equality associate with a lower propensity for conflict.¹⁷⁷

If the findings are correct, this would mean that as the risk of conflict drops, greater gender equality should also be, indirectly, associated with less conflict-related sexual violence.

It is important, however, to note that none of these studies had particularly robust results. Moreover, there may not be a clear causal link between increasing gender equality and decreasing the risk and deadliness of armed conflict. Fearon argues that the finding may simply indicate that societies that endorse the idea of gender equality "are the sort of societies that are less likely to have civil wars."¹⁷⁸

Cross-national evidence shows that where women have higher levels of income and education, they tend to be at lower risk of sexual violence.

Increasing gender equality is, of course, important in its own right and during the past decade there has been a huge expansion in efforts to achieve change in this area. These have included legislative action, education programs in schools, media interventions—including media advertising and "edutainment" campaigns—and interventions at the community level.¹⁷⁹ Data collected to measure progress towards achieving MDGs indicate that there has

been an overall improvement in gender equality during this period.¹⁸⁰

WHO has reviewed a number of individual case studies of efforts to reduce domestic sexual violence by reducing gender inequality. A major WHO report points out that while some of these efforts have indeed been associated with reductions in sexual violence, few of the programs have been subject to any kind of scientific impact evaluation.¹⁸¹ This is important because there is some cautionary evidence that campaigns intended to promote gender equality, and thus reduce sexual violence, can have perverse effects—i.e., they can lead to a backlash that can actually worsen domestic sexual violence.¹⁸²

During one such campaign in Nicaragua, for example, the reported incidence of sexual violence doubled over a period of a year and a half.¹⁸³ Researchers evaluating the program noted that while some of the increase was simply a function of more reporting of sexual violence, it was also due to a violent male backlash against the growing resistance of women to male hegemony.

This and other cases serve as a reminder of the possible unintended consequences of policy initiatives in this field.¹⁸⁴ Just how great a threat such backlash reactions are to gender equality and empowerment programs is currently impossible to say.

There is cross-national evidence to support the thesis that where women have higher levels of income and education they tend to be at lower—not negligible—risk of sexual violence.

But overall the evidence is inconclusive thus far and the very limited data that exists suggest that the process of achieving greater gender equality can threaten traditional male roles, which in turn may be associated with increased risks of intimate-partner violence.¹⁸⁵

Conclusion

The first two chapters of this *Report* have presented a critical analysis of the assumptions that underpin the mainstream narrative on wartime sexual violence.

We have argued that this narrative—which has become increasingly prominent since the passage of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in 2000—is misleading in two important ways. First, the level of conflict-related sexual violence is overstated in a number of different ways. Second, domestic sexual violence, sexual violence against males in wartime, and the role of women in perpetrating sexual violence have been largely ignored.

We also argued that these misleading assumptions have negative implications for policies aimed at preventing wartime sexual violence and bringing assistance to its survivors and justice to its perpetrators.

The mainstream narrative we suggested is driven in large part by the very different—but complementary—incentive structures that shape media reporting and the humanitarian advocacy and service delivery imperatives of international agencies and major NGOs. But it is also the case that the misleading claims we have identified have been able to flourish largely unchallenged in large part because there are no reliable cross-national data that could be used as a corrective.

With respect to reducing wartime sexual violence, the challenges remain daunting.

In the long term, ending the culture of impunity that protects combatants who perpetrate sexual violence during periods of war should make a difference. But while impunity has become an issue of increased concern and debate, particularly among international lawyers, there has thus far been little concerted action on the ground where it counts the most. The number of perpetrators brought to justice remains extraordinarily small compared with the number of sexual violence crimes that are perpetrated in wartime.

The UN's goal of providing women and children with physical protection from conflict-related sexual violence in peace operations continues to be an "impossible mandate," largely because peacekeeping forces lack the resources needed to undertake this hugely demanding task effectively.

The governments of countries in conflict have an important potential protection role to play here, but government forces and militias are often the major perpetrators of the very sexual

Misleading assumptions affects policies to prevent sexual violence and bring assistance to survivors and justice to perpetrators.

violence they are supposed to prevent. Where this is the case they are part of the problem, not the solution.

These somewhat bleak realities do not mean that the prospects for reducing conflict-related sexual violence are minimal, however.

We argued previously that it was reasonable to assume that sexual violence perpetrated by soldiers and rebels will decline when conflicts come to an end. We further argued that given that there has been a substantial decline in the number and deadliness of wars since the end of the Cold War, there is good reason to believe that the worldwide incidence of conflict-related sexual violence will also have declined.

The evidence presented in the last *Human Security Report* indicates that this decline is due in considerable part to initiatives by the international community to end wars and prevent them from starting again—"peacemaking" and "post-conflict peacebuilding" in UN-speak.¹⁸⁶ Insofar as this is true, then such initiatives are also important indirect strategies for reducing conflict-related sexual violence.

Reducing domestic sexual violence in wartime presents an even greater challenge, not least because the problem remains largely unacknowledged in the many poor countries where marital rape is not a criminal offence, and in part because the UN Security Council ignores the problem completely in its high-profile Women, Peace and Security mandate.

But here, too, there are grounds for cautious optimism about the future. There is evidence from campaigns to reduce female genital cutting that indicates that carefully crafted policies engaging local communities can greatly reduce harmful practices.¹⁸⁷ Similar approaches could potentially yield success regarding domestic sexual violence in wartime.

In Chapter 3 we turn to examine the impact of conflict on the incidence of sexual violence against children. Here the challenge of policy analysis is even greater, because reliable cross-national data are almost nonexistent.

PART I

ENDNOTES

OVERVIEW

- 1 References for all statistics and quotations in the Overview are found in the main body of the *Report* unless otherwise indicated.
- 2 Note that while conflict-related sexual violence declines when wars end, it may take significantly longer to stop completely.
- 3 For women aged 18 and above, the CDC found the rate for women was 18.3 percent—meaning that nearly one in five women had been victimized by sexual violence in their lifetimes. See Michele Black et al., *The National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey: 2010 Summary Report* (Atlanta: National Center for Injury Prevention and Control; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011), 18, http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/NISVS_Report2010-a.pdf (accessed 3 September 2012).
- 4 Scott Gates et al., “Development Consequences of Armed Conflict,” *World Development* 40, no. 9 (2012): 1713–1722, 1718, doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.04.031 (accessed 2 September 2012).
- 5 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), “The Difficulty and Perils of Education in Afghanistan,” http://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/focus_on/afghanistan/afghanistan_3.html (accessed 3 September 2012).
- 6 The particular measure of fragility that the PRIO researchers used did not, as do others, include conflict as one of its elements.

CHAPTER 1

- 7 Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, *Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts’ Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role in Peace Building* (New York: UNIFEM, 2002), 9, <http://www.ucm.es/cont/descargas/documento7201.pdf> (accessed 8 June 2012).
- 8 For a detailed description of the “narrative” concept, see Severine Autesserre, “Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and Their Unintended Consequences,” *African Affairs* (2012): 6–9, doi: 10.1093/afraf/adr080 (accessed 8 June 2012).
- 9 Anne M. Goetz, “Introduction” (presented at the Wilton Park Conference, *Women Targeted or Affected by Armed Conflict: What Role for Military Peacekeepers?*, Sussex, UK, 27 May 2008), 1, http://www.unifem.org/attachments/events/WiltonParkConference_Presentations_200805.pdf (accessed 29 January 2012).
- 10 Wood’s definition is based on that used by the International Criminal Court, see Elisabeth J. Wood, “Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare?” *Politics & Society* 37, no. 1 (2009): 5, doi: 10.1177/0032329208329755 (accessed 8 June 2012).
- 11 We do not include female genital cutting under this rubric since its motivation is very different.

- 12 Wynne Russell, who studies sexual violence against males, notes that although obtaining reliable data remains a major challenge, “the greatest difference between the male and female experiences appears to revolve around whether sexual violence is perpetrated with the body of the perpetrator, or with an object. The homosexuality taboo means that many captors of men will use objects to penetrate their victims, while captors of women are more likely to engage in penile penetration. Both are rape, by Wood’s definition; both are also torture ... Also, men appear to be more likely to be subjected to pain to the genitals or genital mutilation that does not involve a sexual assault, but that is designed to interfere with future sexual function or reproduction.” Personal e-mail communication with Andrew Mack, 19 February 2012.
- 13 Because many studies do not clearly identify perpetrators as combatants, this will sometimes also include other cases of stranger rape perpetrated by civilians unknown to the victim. We note throughout the chapter where this is the case.
- 14 When presenting survey results, standard statistical practice is to provide not only the single best estimate but also some measure that indicates the degree of certainty about its accuracy. The conventional approach is to provide *95-percent confidence intervals* for the point estimate. Put simply, this means that if one were to sample the same population repeatedly, then the range within which 95 percent of the samples fall would constitute the confidence interval.
- 15 Dara Cohen, “Causes of Rape During Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009),” University of Minnesota, 29 January 2012, unpublished manuscript, 50, table S1.
- 16 As we argue below, there is compelling evidence that reporting of human rights violations in general has increased over the last two decades, but no compelling independent evidence exists that actual violations have increased in this period.
- 17 United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, “Beijing and its Follow-up,” <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/> (accessed 15 March 2012).
- 18 Domestic sexual violence that is perpetrated by intimate partners is sometimes treated as a separate category and referred to as intimate-partner sexual violence.
- 19 Domestic sexual violence is prevalent in wartime as well as in peacetime; indeed, it is often argued that its incidence increases in conflict and post-conflict environments. Such war-exacerbated rates of domestic sexual violence could, in principle, be included in a very broad definition of *conflict-related sexual violence*. However, since it would be very difficult to identify elevated levels of domestic sexual violence in war-affected countries or attribute them to armed conflict given the dearth of data, our discussion of conflict-related sexual violence is limited to that perpetrated by combatants.
- 20 Note that by using the term “war-affected,” we do *not* limit the analysis to only those countries that experience *war* as defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), whose data we use in this report, i.e., a conflict with 1,000 or more battle deaths per year. We specify wherever we refer to a particular battle-death threshold.

- 21 As a recent study by the International Peace Research Institute Oslo, notes:
“In the first five post-conflict years, there were reports of sexual violence by one-quarter of state armies and about one-third of all rebel groups and militias.”
See Ragnhild Nordås, “Sexual Violence in African Conflicts,” Peace Research Institute Oslo, January 2011, <http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-1641546546/SVAC-CSCW-Policy-Brief-01-2011.pdf> (accessed 13 August 2012).
- 22 In many surveys only women between 15 and 49 were questioned.
- 23 The lifetime prevalence rate of sexual violence is not a measure of the *wartime* prevalence, because it includes individuals that have experienced sexual violence in peacetime. The lifetime prevalence rate is, however, often the only available measure to estimate the extent of sexual violence in war-affected countries.

In some surveys, respondents are asked if they have been victimized in the past 12 months—providing data to compute *annual* prevalence rates. This is not particularly useful with respect to understanding wartime sexual violence, however, since surveys are very rarely taken *during* a war. Post-war retrospective surveys could, in principle, ask respondents if they had been victimized by sexual violence during the conflict and if so in what year. But responses are likely to be affected by recall bias, and questions that require respondents to indicate in which year they were violated are rarely asked.
- 24 Claudia García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-Country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence against Women: Initial Results on Prevalence, Health Outcomes and Women's Responses* (Geneva: WHO Press, 2005), http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_study/en/ (accessed 18 July 2012).
- 25 United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations Statistical Division, *Indicators to measure violence against women: Report of the Expert Group Meeting* (Geneva: United Nations, 2007), 21, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/IndicatorsVAW/IndicatorsVAW_EGM_report.pdf (accessed 14 August 2012). This report notes, “There are different understandings associated with prevalence and incidents of violence against women. There is no difference between them if each victim suffers just one incident in the given time period” (21). Many surveys include estimates of lifetime prevalence and prevalence over the past 12 months. Since the surveys are rarely taken during a conflict, the latter measure is of little value for measuring prevalence in wartime.
- 26 See, for example, the results of a survey in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) for data on the number of times that married, separated, or divorced women had been victims of physical or sexual violence in the 12 months preceding the survey. Ministère du Plan and Macro International, *Enquête Démographique et de Santé: République Démocratique du Congo 2007* (Calverton, MD: Ministère du Plan and Macro International, 2008), 308, <http://www.minisanterdc.cd/fr/documents/eds.pdf> (accessed 14 August 2012).

- 27 See World Health Organization (WHO), *WHO Ethical and Safety Recommendations for Researching, Documenting and Monitoring Sexual Violence in Emergencies* (Geneva, Switzerland: WHO, 2007), http://www.who.int/gender/documents/OMS_Ethics&Safety10Aug07.pdf (accessed 15 March 2012) and Shana Swiss and Peggy J. Jennings, "Documenting the Impact of Conflict on Women Living in Internally Displaced Persons Camps in Sri Lanka: Some Ethical Considerations," Women's Rights International, 2007, http://www.womens-rights.org/Publications/Ethics_IDPSurvey.pdf/ (accessed 16 March 2012).
- 28 Indeed, as we point out in Chapter 3, unless surveys can provide respondents with the option of anonymously answering highly sensitive questions about being victimized by sexual violence, their responses can substantially underestimate the actual prevalence of sexual violence.
- 29 Dara Cohen, "The Incidence and Intensity of Wartime Sexual Violence," 6 March 2010, unpublished background paper prepared for the Human Security Report Project (HSRP), 3.
- 30 Jeanne Ward, Jackie Kirk, and Lisa Ernst, *Broken Bodies, Broken Dreams: Violence against Women Exposed* (Nairobi, Kenya: OCHA/IRIN, 2005), <http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=59&ReportId=72831> (accessed 16 March 2012).
- 31 Cohen, "Causes of Rape During Civil War."
- 32 *Ibid.*, 20.
- 33 The four levels were:
- Level 0: no reported cases of rape related to the conflict.
 - Level 1: "some" reports, "isolated" reports of conflict-related rape.
 - Level 2: "widespread," "extensive," "common" reports of conflict-related rape.
 - Level 3: "systematic" and "massive" reports of sexual violence and references to rape being used as a "weapon," "tactic," or "tool" of war.
- See *ibid.*, 50, table S1. As with all datasets, this one is subject to a number of limitations. These are discussed on pages 21–23 of the paper.
- 34 The data are provided by Dara Cohen. The dataset covers the years 1980–2009 and the respective figures for the entire period are 5 percent (Level 3), 19 percent (Level 2), 25 percent (Level 1), and 51 percent (Level 0). We, however, chose figures from the most recent decade because the Cohen data indicate that in the earlier years covered, especially the 1980s, there was little or no reported sexual violence in the large majority of years of active conflict, despite the fact that conflicts were far deadlier than in the 2000–2009 period. We believe that there is a strong possibility that the low levels of reported sexual violence in this period were almost certainly a function of low levels of reporting, *not* low levels of sexual violence. For this reason, we believe that the 2000–2009 period, where there is no doubt that reporting of wartime sexual violence had been far higher than in earlier periods, is likely to provide a more accurate picture of the cross-national variation in the intensity of sexual violence than the data from the 1980s and 1990s.

- 35 See Elisabeth Wood, "Variation in Sexual Violence during War," *Politics & Society* 34, no. 3 (2006): 307–341, doi: 10.1177/0032329206290426 (accessed 8 June 2012); Wood, "Armed Groups and Sexual Violence"; and Cohen, "Causes of Rape During Civil War."
- 36 Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf, *Women, War and Peace*, 10.
- 37 Ward, Kirk, and Ernst, *Broken Bodies, Broken Dreams*.
- 38 Office of the SRSG (Special Representative of the Secretary-General) for Children and Armed Conflict and UNICEF, "Ending Gender-Based Violence and Sexual Exploitation," in *Children and Conflict in a Changing World: Machel Study 10-Year Strategic Review* (New York: Office of the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict and UNICEF, 2009), <http://www.un.org/children/conflict/machel/english/811-ending-gender-based-violence-and-sexual-exploitation.html> (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 39 Jan Egeland, "International Responsibilities," in "Sexual Violence: Weapon of War, Impediment to Peace," ed. Marion Couldrey and Tim Morris, special issue, *Forced Migration Review* 27 (January 2007): 8, <http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR27/full.pdf> (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 40 Wilton Park Conference, ed., *Women Targeted or Affected by Armed Conflict: What Role for Military Peacekeepers? Conference Summary* (2008).
- 41 For a broad discussion of global trends in state-based armed conflict, see Chapter 5 of this *Report*.
- 42 Ward, Kirk, and Ernst, *Broken Bodies, Broken Dreams*.
- 43 Cohen, "Causes of Rape During Civil War," 31.
- 44 A third possibility is that both have increased.
- 45 Amber Peterman et al., "Rape Reporting During War: Why the Numbers Don't Mean What You Think They Do," *Foreign Affairs*, 1 August 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68008/amber-peterman-dara-kay-cohen-tia-palermo-and-amelia-hoover-gree/rape-reporting-during-war?page=show> (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 46 Howard Ramos, James Ron, and Oskar N.T. Thoms, "Shaping the Northern Media's Human Rights Coverage, 1986–2000," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 4 (2007): fig. 1, 387, doi: 10.1177/0022343307078943 (accessed 6 March 2012). Reporting on human rights showed significant increases in other papers as well, ranging from 20 percent to 200 percent over the same period.
- 47 Ann Marie Clark and Kathryn Sikkink, "Information Effects and Human Rights Data: Is the Good News about Increased Human Rights Information Bad News for Human Rights Measures?" January 2011, unpublished manuscript.
- 48 *Ibid.*, 24. The PTS relies in large part on the US State Department's human rights reporting, which Dara Cohen also uses in her study.
- 49 Clark and Sikkink, "Information Effects and Human Rights Data," 23–27.
- 50 *Ibid.*, 27.

- 51 Severine Autesserre, "Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and their Unintended Consequences," *African Affairs* (2012): 13, doi: 10.1093/afraf/adr080 (accessed 15 March 2012).
- 52 Ibid., 13.
- 53 Tara Gingerich and Jennifer Leaning have described some of the factors that may motivate strategic rape:
- It creates a sense of fear in the civilian population and restricts freedom of movement and economic activity.
 - It can instill flight which facilitates the capture of land and killing of male civilians who are left more vulnerable to attack when fleeing.
 - It demoralises the population and reduces their will to resist and prolongs their forced exit from the land.
 - It tears apart communities by breaking family and community bonds (thus diminishing the reproductive capacity of the community) and by "polluting" the blood line.
- See Gingerich and Leaning, "The Use of Rape as a Weapon of War in the Conflict in Darfur, Sudan" (Boston, MA: Program on Humanitarian Crises and Human Rights, Harvard School of Public Health, 2004), 17–18, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/B119C9EFB7DCAA2DC1256F5F004FBEA9-hu-sud-31oct.pdf> (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 54 See Kofi A. Annan, *Women, Peace and Security: Study Submitted by the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)* (New York: UN, 2002), 2, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/eWPS.pdf> (accessed 26 February 2012). Emphasis added.
- 55 Tsjeard Bouta, Georg Frerks, and Ian Bannon, *Gender, Conflict, and Development* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), 35, http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/11/15/000090341_20041115142901/Rendered/PDF/30494.pdf (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 56 Cited in Stephanie Nebehay, "Rape Used as Weapon in Libya and Elsewhere: U.N.," *Reuters Health News*, 10 June 2011, http://reuters_th.adam.com/content.aspx?productId=16&pid=16&gid=45497 (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 57 See Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed., *Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011).
- 58 The 20 countries were not randomly selected, which means that the findings are not necessarily representative of all of sub-Saharan Africa, let alone the rest of the world. See Ragnhild Nordås, "Sexual violence in African conflicts," in *CSCW Policy Brief 01* (Oslo, Norway: Centre for the Study of Civil War, PRIO, 2011), 3, http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-782981433/SVAC_policy_brief_Sexual%20Violence%20in%20African%20Conflicts.pdf (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 59 See *ibid.*, 3.

- 60 Dara Cohen, for example, notes that in Sierra Leone many NGOs argued that wartime rape was an integral part of the military and political campaigns pursued by the rebels, particularly the notorious Revolutionary United Front (RUF). But in her own extensive interviews she found that while former rebels were quite frank about the fact that they had perpetrated sexual violence, there was little evidence of strategic rape. See Dara Kay Cohen, "Explaining Sexual Violence During War" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 2010), 95.
- 61 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, "The Complexity of Violence: A Critical Analysis of Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)" (working paper, Uppsala: Nordika Afrikainstitutet, 2010), 15–16, <http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?page=statistics&pid=diva2:319527> (accessed 27 February 2012). See also Maria E. Baaz and Maria Stern, "Why Do Soldiers Rape? Masculinity, Violence, and Sexuality in the Armed Forces in the Congo (DRC)," *International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 2 (2009), doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00543.x (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 62 Baaz and Stern, "The Complexity of Violence," 14.
- 63 Ibid., 17–24.
- 64 Wynne Russell, "A Silence as Deep as Death: Sexual Violence against Men and Boys During Armed Conflicts" (background paper prepared for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Expert Meeting, "Use of Sexual Violence in Conflict," New York, 26 June 2008), 1. This paper provides a concise overview of the key issues and a lengthy bibliography.
- 65 UN Security Council, S/RES/1820(2008), <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/391/44/PDF/N0839144.pdf> (accessed 18 May 2012). The resolution often referred to "civilians," which of course includes males, but in various instances limited the focus specifically to women and girls.
- 66 UN Security Council, S/RES/1325 (2000), http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf (accessed 16 May 2012).
- 67 Ibid., 619. See also Russell, "A Silence as Deep as Death."
- 68 See Lara Stemple, "Male Rape and Human Rights," *Hastings Law Journal* 60 (2009): 605–647.
- 69 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "The Nature, Scope and Motivation for Sexual Violence against Men and Boys in Armed Conflict" (background paper prepared for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Expert Meeting, "Use of Sexual Violence in Conflict," New York, 26 June 2008), <http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1092305> (accessed 16 March 2012).
- 70 See, for example, UN Population Fund, *The State of World Population 2010: From Conflict and Crisis to Renewal: Generations of Change* (New York: UN Population Fund, 2010), Chapter 4, http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2010/web/en/pdf/EN_SOWP10.pdf (accessed 27 February 2012); and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *The Nature, Scope and Motivation for Sexual Violence*.

- 71 Michele Leiby, "Principals, Agents, and Wartime Sexual Violence," (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 2 September, 2010), 17. See also Pauline Oosterhoff, Prisca Zwanikken, and Evert Ketting, "Sexual Torture of Men in Croatia and Other Conflict Situations: An Open Secret," *Reproductive Health Matters* 12, no. 23 (2004), http://pramudithrupasinghe.weebly.com/uploads/4/2/1/8/4218922/sexual_torture_of_men_in_croatia_and_other_conflict.pdf (accessed 16 March 2012).
- 72 Lara Stemple points out that the abuse of males in wartime often takes place in prisoner of war camps and interrogation centres. The UN, for example, "reported that out of 5,000 male concentration camp detainees held near Sarajevo during the Bosnian conflict, 80 percent acknowledged having been abused sexually. In El Salvador 76 percent of male political prisoners told researchers they had experienced sexual torture." Lara Stemple, "The Hidden Victims of Wartime Rape," *New York Times*, 1 March 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/opinion/02stemple.html?_r=1 (accessed 27 February 2012). For more details, see Stemple, "Male Rape and Human Rights."
- 73 Kirsten Johnson et al., "Association of Combatant Status and Sexual Violence With Health and Mental Health Outcomes in Postconflict Liberia," *JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association* 300, no. 6 (2008): 680, doi: 10.1001/jama.300.6.676, <http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/300/6/676.full.pdf+html?sid=ae0751d1-ac0b-4f88-b7c7-2ced65a80382> (accessed 27 February 2012).
- 74 This extraordinarily high number may reflect the fact that many individuals served with government or rebel forces for a relatively short period of time—it does not mean that one-third of the population were serving as fighters or supporters all the time.
- 75 If only those who participated in combat are considered, the figure would be 14 percent. Note that in none of these figures, the combatants would be all serving at the same time, of course.
- 76 Johnson et al., "Association of Combatant Status and Sexual Violence," 681. The term *combatant* includes roles in the military that do not necessarily involve fighting—cooks, porters, messengers, etc.
- 77 These included "being forced to undress or being stripped of clothing." See *ibid.*, 680.
- 78 *Ibid.*, 683.
- 79 *Ibid.*
- 80 K. Johnson et al., "Association of Sexual Violence and Human Rights Violations With Physical and Mental Health in Territories of the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo," *JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association* 304, no. 5 (2010): 557 doi: 10.1001/jama.2010.1086, <http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/304/5/553.full.pdf+html?sid=3b1ab62a-616d-4232-816a-073af2b5a505>, 557 (accessed 6 March 2012). The rape category excluded lesser forms of sexual violence, but the most commonly reported type of sexual violence was rape. Almost two-thirds of the male cases of sexual violence and three-fourths of the female cases of sexual violence were conflict-related, but the authors do not specify how this is measured.

- 81 This is beginning to change. A major new study on this issue is being undertaken by University of Florida, Laura Sjoberg. Entitled *Rape Among Women: Genocidal Rape and Sex Subordination*, it will be published by New York University Press.
- 82 Cohen, "Explaining Sexual Violence During War," 165.
- 83 Johnson et al., "Association of Sexual Violence and Human Rights Violations," 557.
- 84 Dara Cohen, "Female Combatants and the Perpetration of Violence: The Case of Wartime Rape in the Sierra Leone Civil War," (unpublished manuscript), 2, 30.
- 85 The *neighbourhood method* uses household interviews to ask women not only about their own experiences of sexual violence but also those of others in their home and among their immediate neighbours. This method creates what is effectively a bigger sample size than is possible by questioning a single respondent about her own household. One obvious potential problem with the neighbourhood method is that the primary respondent may be misinformed about the prevalence of sexual violence among her neighbours. There is evidence from some of the surveys that this is in fact the case. See Ann Warner, "Incidence of Violence against Women and Girls in Liberia: A Quantitative Study Using the 'Neighborhood Method,'" International Rescue Committee and the Program on Forced Migration and Health, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, 4, 19, http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/IRCRReportonNeighborhoodStudy_10-1-07.pdf (accessed 27 February 2012).
- 86 Care and Protection of Children in Crisis-Affected Countries (CPC) Learning Network, "Rethinking Gender-Based Violence," 7, http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/GBV_Brief_winter_2010.pdf (accessed 27 February 2012).
- 87 Ibid.
- 88 Lindsay Stark et al., "Measuring Violence against Women Amidst War and Displacement in Northern Uganda Using the 'Neighborhood Method,'" Program on Forced Migration and Health, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University; ChildFund International, 10–11, <http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/StarkRobertsAchamBoothbyAger2009MeasuringVioAgainstWomenJEpidemiolCommunityHealth.pdf> (accessed 27 February 2012).
- 89 The rate at the national level was 12 percent. See Amber Peterman, Tia Palermo, and Caryn Bredenkamp, "Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence against Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *American Journal of Public Health* 101, no. 6 (2011): 1060–1067, doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2010.300070 (accessed 1 March 2012). The data for this study came from a 2007 study by the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). See DRC Ministry of Planning (MoP) and Macro International Inc., *Democratic Republic of the Congo Demographic and Health Survey 2007: Key Finding* (Calverton, MD: DRC MoP and Macro International Inc., 2007), <http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/SR141/SR141.pdf> (accessed 1 March 2012); UN Women, *Violence against Women Prevalence Data: Surveys by Country* (New York: UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, 2011), http://www.endvawnow.org/uploads/browser/files/vaw_prevalence_matrix_15april_2011.pdf (accessed 1 March 2012).

- 90 Inter Press Service News Agency, "Q&A: 'There Is Almost Total Impunity for Rape in Congo,'" 28 June 2010, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/06/qa-there-is-almost-total-impunity-for-rape-in-congo/> (accessed 1 March 2012).
- 91 Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) and Macro International Inc., *Uganda Demographic and Health Survey 2006* (Calverton, MD: UBOS and Macro International Inc., 2007), 290, <http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR194/FR194.pdf> (accessed 1 March 2012).
- 92 Unpublished data provided by the WHO (World Health Organization) based on Claudia García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-Country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence against Women: Initial Results on Prevalence, Health Outcomes and Women's Responses*, (Geneva: WHO Press, 2005), http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_study/en/ (accessed 15 August 2012). The survey undertaken in Ethiopia as part of the WHO's multi-country global survey of sexual violence was carried out in a largely rural district deemed "broadly representative of the country as a whole." See Yemane Berhane, "Ending Domestic Violence against Women in Ethiopia," *Ethiopian Journal of Health Development* 18, no. 4 (2004), 131–132.
- 93 UBOS and Macro International Inc., *Uganda Demographic and Health Survey 2006*, 290, 292.
- Even the notoriously violent Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) that abducted large numbers of girls and young women had a strictly enforced code governing sexual behaviour among its fighters. Sex was only permitted in forced "marriages" arranged between female abductees and LRA fighters. Sexual violence against other abductees and nonabducted civilians was strictly prohibited and rare, "and violations were severely punished, often with death." From Jeannie Annan et al., "Women and Girls at War: 'Wives,' Mothers, and Fighters in the Lord's Resistance Army," 10–11, <http://www.prio.no/sptrans/185286780/blattman-women@war.1009.pdf> (accessed 1 March 2012).
- 94 Unpublished data provided by the WHO based on Claudia García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-Country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence against Women: Summary Report of Initial Results on Prevalence, Health Outcomes and Women's Responses* (Geneva: WHO, 2005), 12, http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_study/summary_report/summary_report_English2.pdf (accessed 29 January 2012). A 2009 survey undertaken in seven regions of Ethiopia by the Population Council and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) of some 8,000 women aged 15 and 49 asked who the perpetrators were when a woman's first experience of sexual intercourse was forcefully coerced. It found that "92 percent were husbands, 6 percent were boyfriends or fiancés, and 2 percent were acquaintances or classmates."
- See Population Council and UNFPA, *Ethiopia Gender Survey: A Study in Seven Regions* (New York: Population Council, 2010), 60, http://www.popcouncil.org/pdfs/2010PGY_EthiopiaGenderSurvey.pdf (accessed 6 May 2012).
- 95 Amber Peterman, Tia Palermo, and Caryn Bredenkamp, "Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence against Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *American Journal of Public Health* 101, no. 6 (2011), 1060–1067, doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2010.300070 (accessed 1 March 2012).

- 96 Pan African News Agency, "UN Chief Says Sexual Violence a Threat to Peace, Security," 23 September 2011, <http://www.panapress.com/UN-chief-says-sexual-violence-a-threat-to-peace,-security--12-796358-25-lang2-index.html> (accessed 1 March 2012).
- 97 Care and Protection of Children in Crisis-Affected Countries (CPC) Learning Network, "Rethinking Gender-Based Violence," 3.
- 98 Amber Peterman, Tia Palermo, and Caryn Bredekamp, "Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence against Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *American Journal of Public Health* 101, no. 6 (2011): 1065. This stands in contrast to the results of the JAMA study cited above, which found that in 72 (females) and 86 (males) percent of the cases, combatants were reported as perpetrators. The study was, however, based on a much smaller sample than the DHS data and undertaken in some of the regions worst affected by the civil war.
- 99 Dara Cohen, for example, stresses that gang rapes are used to build cohesion among combatants, something that obviously has little relevance for explaining domestic violence. Cohen, "Causes of Rape During Civil War," 4.
- 100 Peterman, Palermo, and Bredekamp, "Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence." Lori Handrahan, "Conflict, Gender, Ethnicity and Post-Conflict Reconstruction," *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 4 (2004): 429–445.

CHAPTER 2

- 101 LaShawn R. Jefferson, "In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and Women's Status," in *Human Rights and Armed Conflict: Human Rights Watch World Report 2004* (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2004), 324–350, <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/download/wr2k4.pdf> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 102 For a more comprehensive analysis of how these incentive structures shape narratives and, as a result, policy-making, see Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill, eds., *Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).
- 103 According to OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and UN data, \$6.7 billion was raised from governments around the world in 2000; by 2010 this had risen to an estimated \$12.4 billion. Development Initiatives, *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2011* (Wells, U.K.: Development Initiatives, 2011), fig. 3, 12, <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/gha-report-2011.pdf> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 104 *Ibid.*, fig. 3, 55.

- 105 In 2010, for example, only 63 percent of the CAP request was actually allocated. Since the beginning of the new millennium, on average, 33 percent of annual requests have gone unfunded. *Ibid.*, figs. 8–9, 60–61. The CAP is not the only source of humanitarian funding, of course, but the pattern it exhibits—of demand exceeding supply—is typical of almost all funding exercises.
- 106 Ian Smillie and Larry Minear, *The Charity of Nations: Humanitarian action in a calculating world* (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2004), 207.
- 107 Humanitarian Policy Group, “According to Need? Needs Assessment and Decision-Making in the Humanitarian Sector,” *Overseas Development Institute Report* (London, U.K.: Overseas Development Institute, 2003), 56, <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/285.pdf> (accessed 7 June 2012). Also cited in Smillie and Minear, *The Charity of Nations*, 204.
- 108 See Smillie and Minear, *The Charity of Nations*, 207. See also David Rieff, “Millions May Die ... Or Not: How Disaster Hype Became a Big Global Business,” *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/millions_may_die_or_not?page=full (accessed 14 April 2012), and Human Security Report Project (HSRP), *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 126.
- 109 Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill, “Conclusion: The Numbers in Politics,” in *Sex, Drugs and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict*, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 265.
- 110 Nicholas D. Kristof, “After Wars, Mass Rapes Persist,” *New York Times*, 20 May 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/opinion/21kristof.html> (accessed 16 August 2012). Kristof was not the first to cite a prevalence rate in the order of 75 percent for Liberia. A paper by Dara Cohen and Amelia Hoover Green investigates the questionable claim made by Kristof and others in more detail. See Dara Kay Cohen and Amelia Hoover Green, “Dueling Incentives: Sexual Violence in Liberia and the Politics of Human Rights Advocacy,” *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 3 (2012): 445–458, doi: 10.1177/0022343312436769 (accessed 16 August 2012). See also the review posted on the blog *Feminist Critics*, “Have 75% of Women in Liberia Been Raped? (NoH),” 8 June 2012, <http://www.feministcritics.org/blog/2009/06/08/have-75-of-women-in-liberia-been-raped-noh/> (accessed 31 July 2012).
- 111 Marie-Claire O. Omanyondo, “Sexual Gender-Based Violence and Health Facility Needs Assessment,” WHO, September 2004, http://www.who.int/hac/crises/lbr/Liberia_GBV_2004_FINAL.pdf (accessed 15 August 2012). There are a number of other possible sources for Kristof’s extraordinary claim, but none can be used to support it.
- 112 *Ibid.*, 6, 16.
- 113 Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services (LISGIS), Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, National AIDS Control Program, Macro International, *Liberia Demographic and Health Survey 2007*, 230, <http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/fr201/fr201.pdf> (accessed 16 August 2012).

- 114 Kelly M. Greenhill, "Counting the Cost: The Politics of Numbers in Armed Conflict," in *Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts*, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 128. Greenhill argues that unreliable statistics can prove counterproductive from "political, humanitarian, juridical and scholarly perspectives" (127).
- 115 Kelly M. Greenhill, "Counting the Cost: The Politics of Numbers in Armed Conflict," in *Sex, Drugs and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict*, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 136.
- 116 See Rieff, "Millions May Die," (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 117 For a discussion of donor skepticism towards inflated humanitarian claims, see Smillie and Minear, *The Charity of Nations*.
- 118 Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill, "Conclusion: The Numbers in Politics," *Sex, Drugs and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict*, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 268.
- 119 See, for example, Elisabeth Wood, "Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare?" *Politics & Society* 37, no. 1 (2009): 131–161, doi: 10.1177/0032329208329755 (accessed 13 July 2012); Dara Cohen, "Causes of Rape During Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009)," University of Minnesota, January 2012: 1–45; and Ragnhild Nordas, "Sexual Violence in African Conflicts," in *CSCW Policy Brief 01* (Oslo, Norway: Centre for the Study of Civil War, Peace Research Institute Oslo [PRIO], 2011): 1–4, http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-782981433/SVAC_policy_brief_Sexual%20Violence%20in%20African%20Conflicts.pdf (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 120 We pointed out that this assumption is at odds with the data on reported sexual violence compiled by Dara Cohen, based on US State Department reports and other reports. These data do indeed show that reported conflict-related sexual violence has increased over the past three decades. But, as we argued in Chapter 1, this increase is likely a function of better and more extensive reporting, rather than an increase in sexual violence.
- 121 In 2010 Jordan Ryan, assistant administrator of the United Nations Development Programme and director of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, stated, with what was an uncharacteristic candour for a senior UN official, that "we have not anywhere prevented sexual violence." See United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), "Chapter Eight: And the Next 10 Years?" *State of the World Population 2010: From Conflict and Crisis to Renewal: Generations of Change* (New York, NY: United Nations, 2010), 82, <http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2010/web/en/ch8.shtml> (accessed 18 June 2012).
- 122 In practice, however, the Security Council has shown little enthusiasm for imposing sanctions on known perpetrators of sexual violence in armed conflict. Security Council Report, "Cross-cutting Report on Women, Peace and Security," 2010, 25, 28, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/XCutting%20WPS%202010.pdf> (accessed 27 February 2012).

- 123 Kathryn Sikkink argues that this may be an effective strategy for reducing rights abuses over the long term. Kathryn Sikkink, *The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics*, 1st ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2011).
- 124 For a comprehensive review of the UN's neglect of sexual violence against males, see Sandesh Sivakumaran, "Lost in Translation: UN Responses to Sexual Violence against Men and Boys in Situations of Armed Conflict," *International Review of the Red Cross* 92, no. 877 (2010): 259–277, doi: 10.1017/S1816383110000020 (accessed 13 July 2012).
- 125 United Nations, *Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Report of the Secretary-General*, United Nations General Assembly and Security Council (New York, NY: United Nations, 2012), 2, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/UNSC_ReportoftheSecretaryGeneral_ConflictRelatedSexualViolence_A66657.pdf (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 126 *Ibid.*, 3. Emphasis added.
- 127 The omission of males from the Women, Peace and Security agenda 1325 is not surprising given that senior UN officials have argued strongly against including sexual violence against males as part of the 1325 policy agenda. See Anne M. Goetz, "Introduction" (paper presented at the Wilton Park Conference, *Women Targeted or Affected by Armed Conflict: What Role for Military Peacekeepers?* Steyning, UK, 27 May 2008), 3–4, http://www.unifem.org/attachments/events/WiltonParkConference_Presentations_200805.pdf (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 128 Study cited in Lara Stemple, "Male Rape and Human Rights," *Hastings Law Journal* 60, no. 3 (2009): 612, http://devhector.uchastings.edu/hlj/archive/vol60/Stemple_60-HLJ-605.pdf (accessed 27 February 2012). See also Wynne Russell et al., "Care and Support of Male Survivors of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence," Sexual Violence Research Initiative, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/SVRI_CareandSupportofMaleSurvivorsofConflictRelatedSV.pdf (accessed 27 February 2012).
- 129 R. Charli Carpenter, "Recognizing Gender-Based Violence against Civilian Men and Boys in Conflict Situations," *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 1 (2006): 95, doi: 10.1177/0967010606064139 (accessed 27 February 2012).
- 130 The subsequent Council resolutions were 1820 (2008); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2009); and 1960 (2010). See UN Women, "Resolutions & Instruments," http://www.unifem.org/gender_issues/women_war_peace/resolutions_instruments.php (accessed 19 June 2012).
- 131 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1325 (2000)," United Nations, 31 October 2000, 2, http://www.unfpa.org/women/docs/res_1325e.pdf (accessed 19 June 2012).
- 132 UN Security Council, *Women and Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General* (New York, NY: United Nations, 2010), 1, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/173 (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 133 *Ibid.*, 4.
- 134 *Ibid.*, 14.

- 135 Ibid., 11.
- 136 UN Security Council, "Resolution 1960 (2010)," 4, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/698/34/PDF/N1069834.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 137 UN, *Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*, 2. Emphasis added.
- 138 Ibid., 3.
- 139 Ibid. Aside from the information that UN field offices gather about incidents, the data collected may also include reports from rape survivors who present at clinics and hospitals.
- 140 Tia Palermo and Amber Peterman, "Undercounting, overcounting and the longevity of flawed estimates: statistics on sexual violence in conflict," *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 89, no. 12 (2011), 925, doi: 10.2471/BLT.11.089888, <http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/89/12/11-089888/en/index.html> (accessed 14 April 2012). Emphasis added. Note that the DHS data on the number of rapes over a 12-month period likely include some cases of intimate-partner sexual violence (which are also measured separately with specific questions). But even with this caveat, the rate of rape indicated by the DHS data was clearly many times higher than that which the UN reported.
- 141 UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: S/1999/957* (New York, NY: United Nations, 1999), paragraph 68, <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/sanctions/s99957.pdf> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 142 Victoria Holt, Glyn Taylor, and Max Kelly, "Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges," (New York, NY: United Nations, 2009), 4, <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Protecting%20Civilians%20in%20the%20Context%20of%20UN%20PKO.pdf> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 143 Ibid., 8–9.
- 144 See Victoria Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), 12, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Complete_Document-TheImpossible_Mandate-Holt_Berkman.pdf (accessed 14 April 2012). It took three years for this report to go through the UN's vetting process and be published as the Holt, Taylor, and Kelly paper cited above.
- 145 Goetz, "Introduction," 5. Emphasis added. UN peacekeepers have themselves been guilty of sexual abuse of civilians. But the UN states that reports of such cases have declined. UN News Centre, "Sexual Abuse Allegations Decline against UN Peacekeepers in DR Congo and Liberia," 27 July 2011, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39164&Cr=peacekeeping&Cr1> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 146 The Cohen data, for example, indicate that government forces are reported as perpetrators in more than three-quarters of the coded conflicts. In roughly 15 percent of conflicts government actors were reported to be solely responsible for very high levels of sexual violence. See Cohen, "Causes of Rape During Civil War," 51–52.

- 147 In her new book, *The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics*, Kathryn Sikkink discusses statistical data to support her claims that prosecutions of past human rights violations deter future violations.
- 148 For further details, see UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict, and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), *Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice* (New York: United Nations, 2010), http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/Analytical_Inventory_of_Peacekeeping_Practice_online.pdf (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 149 UN DPKO, "Protection of Civilians," <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/civilians.html> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 150 See Chapter 4 in HSRP, *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), <http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/text.aspx> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 151 Ibid.
- 152 See, for example, Say NO—UNiTE to End Violence against Women, a social mobilization platform on ending violence against women and girls launched by UN Women. Say NO—UNiTE, "About Say NO," <http://saynotoviolence.org/about-say-no> (accessed 19 June 2012); WHO, *Addressing Violence against Women and Achieving the Millennium Development Goals* (Geneva, Switzerland: WHO, 2005), <http://www.who.int/gender/documents/MDGs&VAWSept05.pdf> (accessed 19 June 2012); and WHO, "Violence against Women: Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence against Women," factsheet, September 2011, <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs239/en/> (accessed 19 June 2012).
- 153 Goetz, "Introduction," 3. Emphasis in original.
- 154 Ibid., Emphasis added.
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CHAPTER 3

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- 202 See Greenhill, "Counting the Cost," 128–130.
- 203 See UNICEF, *Machel Study 10-Year Strategic Review: Children and Conflict in a Changing World* (New York: Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict; UNICEF, 2009), http://www.un.org/children/conflict/_documents/machel/msr2_en.pdf (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 204 *Ibid.*, 8.
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- 206 For example, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict continues to refer to the "new wars" on its website. See "The Changing Nature of Conflict," (accessed 13 July 2012).
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- 229 *Ibid.*, 50.
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- 233 Unpublished data provided by the WHO based on García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-Country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence against Women*.

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- 249 Ann Warner, "Incidence of Violence against Women and Girls in Liberia: A Quantitative Study Using the 'Neighborhood Method,'" International Rescue Committee; Program on Forced Migration and Health, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, 7, http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/IRCReportonNeighborhoodStudy_10-1-07.pdf (accessed 18 June 2012).
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CHAPTER 4

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- 269 Econometric studies may choose to exclude select countries where including them in the analysis would distort the results. The PRIO study, for example, excluded a number of developed countries, such as the UK, which experienced a small conflict in Northern Ireland. Development indicators in such highly industrialized countries are unlikely to improve significantly. See Scott Gates et al., “Consequences of Civil Conflict,” 5.
- 270 *Regression analysis* seeks to determine associations between different phenomena, with the assumption usually being that the association indicates an “average” causal effect.
- 271 Gates et al., “Consequences of Civil Conflict,” 13.
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- 282 World Bank, *Reshaping the Future*, 17.
- 283 Bede Sheppard and Kyle Knight, "Disarming Schools: Strategies for Ending the Military Use of Schools during Armed Conflict," *Disarmament Forum* 2011, no. 3 (2011): 23, http://unidir.org/bdd/fiche-periodique.php?ref_periodique=1020-7287-2011-3-en#biblio (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 284 Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan, "The Consequences of Child Soldiering," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 92, no. 4 (2010): 882–898, doi: 10.1162/REST_a_00036 (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 285 World Bank, *Reshaping the Future*, 18–19.
- 286 UN, "Millennium Development Goals: Goal 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education—Fact Sheet," http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG_FS_2_EN.pdf (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 287 Julia Paulson and Jeremy Rappleye, "Education and Conflict: Essay Review," *International Journal of Educational Development* 27, no. 3 (2007): 341, doi: 10.1016/j.ijedudev.2006.10.010 (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 288 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education."
- 289 Note that the study does not measure directly a country's overall national attainment rate but rather the educational attainments of cohorts of 15-year-olds at given points in time. We describe this indicator more fully below.
- 290 See UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," 13, for a detailed description of the methodology used by the UIS researchers—and some cautions about the conclusions that can be drawn from the data analysis. The conflict data come from PRIO and the Uppsala University Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The graphics in the study show periods of both minor conflict (in yellow) and major conflict (referred to as "war" here). *Major conflicts* or *wars* are those that incur 1,000 or more battle deaths in a calendar year.
- 291 In addition, the researchers also grouped the respondents in cohorts of 13- to 17-year-olds to smooth year-to-year fluctuations.
- 292 The data used in the UIS report can serve as an indicator of the effect of conflict on education, but as the authors note, they do not directly "reveal the educational attainment of 15 year-olds... at any time in the past." See UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," 13 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 293 Ibid., 7.
- 294 Ibid.

- 295 The figures derived from the UIS study that are presented here do not extend as far in time as the UIS graphics. This is because, as the UIS report's authors explain, data immediately prior to the time of the survey are distorted. This is very evident in the UIS graphics, which all reveal a sharp decline in educational outcomes prior to, and following, the survey date. To avoid misinterpretation, the graphics used here only extend the year that is nine years *prior* to the year in which the survey was undertaken. This is the maximum period over which the UIS researchers believe the distortion will be evident.
- 296 To be more precise, the Kurdish areas had a greater percentage of individuals with no formal education than the rest of Turkey.
- 297 By the time the conflict started, only a very small percentage of those living in the areas of Turkey not directly affected by war had received no education at all, which means that there was little room for improvement on this measure. But the counterintuitive process of educational attainments improving more rapidly in war-affected areas than in those that are not directly affected is evident in other graphs in the UIS study.
- 298 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," 27 (Figure 4.6) (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 299 The UIS study did not examine the differences between war-affected and non-war-affected areas in all the countries it reviewed.
- 300 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," UIS technical paper no. 7 (Montreal: UIS, 2011), <http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/tp7-quantitative-armed-conflict-impact-education-2011-en.pdf> (accessed 18 July 2012).
- 301 Attainment rates for women were broadly similar but from a lower base than males, and the attainment rate for women in the conflict zones, unlike for males, lagged somewhat behind the attainment rate for women in the non-conflict zones. UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," 38–40 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 302 Exceptions were periods of violence in the 1960s and 1980s, during which the average years of education followed an unsteady, but largely stagnant, pre-war trend.
- 303 See UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," 45 (Figure 8.5) (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 304 The data for the male population without formal education represented an exception here, as it deteriorated during the 1970s but then caught up again with the trend in the rest of the country.
- 305 It could also mean that the negative impact of conflict on the rate of educational attainment is being offset by the positive impact of some other factor—e.g., rising incomes or improved educational attainment among girls.

- 306 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), “The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education,” UIS technical paper no. 7 (Montreal: UIS, 2011), <http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/tp7-quantitative-armed-conflict-impact-education-2011-en.pdf> (accessed 18 July 2012).
- 307 Andrew Mack, “Armed Conflicts,” Perspective Paper, Copenhagen Consensus 2012, http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/Files/Filer/CC12%20perspective%20papers/Armed%20Conflicts__Mack.pdf (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 308 See UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education,” 66 (Figure 9.20) (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 309 EPDC, “How Do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment?”
- 310 This refers to 10 countries that experienced conflict in 2010 and for which conflict-affected as well as peaceful regions could be identified. See *ibid.*, 2 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 311 *Ibid.*, 1 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 312 *Ibid.* (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 313 *Ibid.*, 2 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 314 See the methodology section of *ibid.*, 6–8 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 315 The countries in question are Burma, Burundi, Chad, Indonesia, Liberia, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. In the case of Sierra Leone, there was trend data but no period of conflict; in the case of Chad, trend data existed only for the nonconflict region.
- 316 Note that for most of these countries, only two data points are available, or there are only data for the conflict period, which means that we cannot compare values for all periods, i.e., before, after, and during the conflict.
- 317 EPDC, “How Do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment?” 27 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 318 In addition, Ethiopia also shows increases in attendance rates. The EPDC does not show conflict periods in its Ethiopia graph covering the years 2000–2009. According to UCDP/PRIODATA, however, the country continuously experienced conflict during that time period.
- 319 The countries in question are Burma, Burundi, Chad, Indonesia, Liberia, the Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Uganda.
- 320 Gross attendance rates can be more than 100 percent, because in addition to the regular cohort of children, they include children older than the cohort who previously missed a year or more of education.
- 321 Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC), *How do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment? Analysis of Sub-National Evidence from 19 Countries* (Geneva: UNESCO, 2010), Background paper prepared for the *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011—The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 12, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001912/191248e.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012); Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/Center for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute Oslo, (PRIO).

- 322 See Ray Rivera and Taimoor Shah, "Taliban Attacks on Afghan Schools Lessen," *SFGate*, 9 June 2011, <http://www.sfgate.com/world/article/Taliban-attacks-on-Afghan-schools-lesser-2368869.php> (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 323 Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC), *How do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment? Analysis of Sub-National Evidence from 19 Countries* (Geneva: UNESCO, 2010), Background paper prepared for the *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011 - The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 21, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001912/191248e.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012); Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/Center for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute Oslo, (PRIO).
- 324 World Bank, "In Afghanistan, Out of Conflict and Into School," <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTEDUCATION/0,,contentMDK:20279607~menuPK:617572~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:282386,00.html> (accessed 30 August 2012).
- 325 However, as we pointed out previously, the limited evidence we have suggests that these outcomes usually precede the conflict.
- 326 Adding deaths caused by the intentional killing of civilians for the period covered by the survey does not significantly alter the average. If death tolls in minor conflicts are so low that the impact that they make on educational outcomes is not discernible, it might be useful to focus on high-intensity conflicts only. This is what we did in our analysis of under-five mortality in the last *Human Security Report*, where only *wars*—conflicts in which there were a reported 1,000 or more battle deaths in a calendar year—were included. The findings were very similar for both intensity levels. This time we include minor conflicts, primarily because the UIS and EPDC studies that we review include minor conflicts as well as wars in their analyses.
- 327 Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC), *How do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment? Analysis of Sub-National Evidence from 19 Countries* (Geneva: UNESCO, 2010), Background paper prepared for the *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011—The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 15, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001912/191248e.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012); Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/Center for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute Oslo, (PRIO).
- 328 Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC), *How do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment? Analysis of Sub-national Evidence from 19 Countries*, (Geneva: UNESCO, 2010), Background paper prepared for the *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011—The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 15, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001912/191248e.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012); Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/ Human Security Report Project, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada.

- 329 Gratien Mokonzi Bambanota and Mwindi Kadongo, *Democratic Republic of Congo: Effective Delivery of Public Services in the Education Sector: A Study* (Johannesburg, South Africa: Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 2010), 4, doi: 10.1177/00223433030405006 (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 330 Bambanota and Kadongo, *Democratic Republic of Congo: Effective Delivery of Public Services in the Education Sector*, 19 (accessed 30 August 2012).
- 331 Ibid. (accessed 30 August 2012).
- 332 The light blue South Kivu trend line is that which has the highest attendance rate in 2007 of the three secondary conflict region trend lines.
- 333 Lisa Bender, *Innovations in Emergency Education: The IRC in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Geneva: UNESCO, 2009), commissioned background report prepared for the *Global Monitoring Report*, 3, <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/EdStats/ZARgmrap10.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 334 IDMC, "Democratic Republic of Congo: IDPs Need Further Assistance in Context of Continued Attacks and Insecurity," <http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/drcongo> (accessed 22 July 2012).
- 335 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," 7 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 336 EPDC, "How Do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment?" 31 (accessed 4 September 2012). Emphasis added.
- 337 See *ibid.*, 6–8 (accessed 4 September 2012) for a discussion of all EPDC's methodological concerns.
- 338 *Ibid.*, 7 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 339 In the Central African Republic there are only data for the two secondary conflict regions. In 2006 the primary conflict region was not surveyed. It is possible that the primary conflict region saw a decline, but both of the secondary conflict areas witnessed an appreciable *improvement* in educational outcomes in this period, as seems to be the case for all the other regions. In Uganda parts of the Northern and Western regions were omitted from the survey in 2001. However, this is unlikely to change the main finding much, since the data already show a decline in educational attainments for most of the period. Several areas of Indonesia were missed from the survey, but there were only data for one year on Indonesia so they are not discussed here. The same is the case with Sudan. In the cases of Pakistan and Colombia, there were missing data, but the EPDC states that the omission is unlikely to have affected the overall results in either case.
- 340 EPDC, "How Do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment?" 6 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 341 The terms *effect* and *impact*—which imply causality—are used both in this *Report* and in most other studies. Strictly speaking, we should be referring to an *association* between conflict and educational outcomes.

- 342 The PRIO study uses both cross-section and fixed-effects models, but the authors believe the latter are more appropriate (HSRP correspondence with Håvard Mogleiv Nygård, 29 May 2012). See Gates et al., “Consequences of Civil Conflict,” 1. Cited earlier in the chapter, the updated Gates et al., “Development Consequences of Armed Conflict” corrects a minor error in the version that is cited here.
- 343 Gates et al., “Consequences of Civil Conflict,” 40.
- 344 Ibid., 43.
- 345 Scott Gates et al., “Consequences of Civil Conflict,” *World Development Report 2011* Input Paper (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2010): 41, <http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/PRIO> (accessed 19 July 2012).
- 346 Siyan Chen, Norman V. Loayza, and Marta Reynal-Querol, “The Aftermath of Civil War,” *The World Bank Economic Review* 22, no. 1 (2008): 63–85, doi: 10.1093/wber/lhn001 (accessed 14 September 2012). In this study, conflict periods sometimes included shorter interwar peace periods (fewer than 10 years).
- 347 Lai and Thyne, “The Effect of Civil War on Education,” 277 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 348 Ibid., 284 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 349 EPDC, “How Do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment?” 6 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 350 The *World Bank Economic Review* study has a considerable smaller number of countries than the PRIO and Lai and Thyne studies, meaning that its findings are likely a less reliable guide of the overall effect of war on education.
- 351 There is also the possibility, canvassed by Lai and Thyne themselves, that the positive relationship that they find between conflict and low educational outcomes is affected by the omitted variable bias discussed above—i.e., that the association between war and educational outcomes that they report could be caused by factors that were not included in their statistical models. See Lai and Thyne, “The Effect of Civil War on Education,” 277 (accessed 4 September 2012) 289.
- 352 For a discussion of the differences in results in the literature on civil war onset, see Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 4 (2006): 508–535, doi: 10.1177/0022002706289303 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 353 We reiterate a cautionary note here. The trends that we have been describing are averages—what is *generally* the case and certainly not what is *always* the case. The averages will, of course, include many cases where war does indeed have disastrous impacts on educational outcomes. These cases are the ones that receive the most attention from policy-makers, that generate the headlines, and that inform the mainstream narrative. Those cases where educational outcomes improve in conflicts at a more rapid rate than the average get no attention.
- 354 UNESCO EFA Global Monitoring Report Team, *The Hidden Crisis*, 126.

- 355 Ibid., 159.
- 356 Ibid.
- 357 However, even if conflict is *not* the primary cause of low educational outcomes in war-affected countries, it may well exacerbate them.
- 358 The nonconflict fragile states in the PRIO study have consistently lower educational attainments than those in conflict. See Gates et al., “Consequences of Civil Conflict,” 41.
- 359 See INEE, <http://www.ineesite.org/> (accessed 4 September 2012) and INCAF, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflictandfragility/44282247.pdf> (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 360 Some of the research of the INEE focuses on fragility in explaining educational and other development outcomes. See INEE, <http://www.ineesite.org/> (accessed 4 September 2012). For an overview of the concept of state fragility as it applies to education, see Jacqueline Mosselson, Wendy Wheaton, and Paul St. John Frisoli, “Education and Fragility: A Synthesis of the Literature,” *Journal of Education for International Development* 4, no. 1 (2009).
- 361 Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, *Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility* (Vienna, VA: CSP, 2011), 21, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/GlobalReport2011.pdf> (accessed 4 September 2012). The total global fragility score hides considerable variation between individual countries, of course. The CSP’s 2011 *Global Report* points out that from 1995 to 2010, state fragility ratings improved for 115—or 72 percent—of the 161 countries on its list. For 27 countries (17 percent), the ratings stayed the same, while 19 (12 percent) showed a deterioration (23). Different fragility measures provide somewhat different results. The CSP index includes OECD countries, as well as developing states. On the other hand, Carleton University’s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) shows data for developing countries only and finds that fragility increased from 1980 to 1997 and then stopped rising and stayed at about the same level until 2006. See David Carment and Yiagadeesen (Teddy) Samy, “Extent and Sources of State Fragility and Failure: Core Factors in Fragility and Failure,” PowerPoint presentation, <http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1243.pdf> (accessed 4 September 2012). Over an overlapping period (1995 to 2010), the CSP dataset shows a global decline in fragility of some 20 percent.
- 362 Note that the implications of the descriptive statistics in the PRIO study are not exactly the same as the findings of the econometric analysis. In the former case, the PRIO graphics simply show the net trend for a range of development indicators. These graphs—like Figure 4.7 above, for example—show how development outcomes differ between countries affected by conflict and nonconflict countries. But they do *not* tell us whether conflict has an impact on these development indicators that may be overridden by other factors.