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CHAPTER 3

Children and Wartime Sexual Violence

In 2006, in an analysis prepared for the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (UNDAW) and UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), Dyan Mazurana and Khristopher Carlson drew attention to sobering findings about the impact of war on children. The authors reported that some 2 million children had been killed in armed conflicts around the world over a 10-year period. An additional 6 million had been permanently disabled or injured, over 14 million had been displaced, and more than a million had been orphaned and separated from their parents. Over 250,000 children had been forced to serve in rebel, militia, or government forces.¹⁸⁸

While often drawn from official sources, these and similar claims are questionable, in large part because reliable cross-national data on how conflict affects children are rarely available.¹⁸⁹ But notwithstanding important caveats about the reliability of some of these findings, few would dispute that huge numbers of children—those least able to protect themselves—are at grave personal risk in wartime.

One of the many dangers that children confront in war-affected countries is sexual assault. This includes not just the gang rapes by rebel forces and militias that capture the media headlines, but also the largely invisible assaults by family members and acquaintances. Yet, despite growing attention to the plight of children in armed conflict, despite many horrific accounts of individual cases of child rape, remarkably little is known about the incidence or prevalence of wartime sexual violence against children.

In this chapter we examine the fragmentary evidence that exists on the extent of wartime sexual violence against children. We locate our discussion within the broader context of the UN’s Children and Armed Conflict policy agenda that has become increasingly politically

salient in the new millennium and addresses sexual violence against children along with other “grave violations.” We point out that the UN’s own system for tracking the incidence of conflict-related sexual violence against children is incapable of estimating either the extent or severity of the problem. The system ignores domestic sexual violence in wartime completely, even though the evidence suggests that it is far more prevalent than conflict-related sexual violence.

In the final section we examine some of the policy implications of our findings and ask if it is possible to generate data on wartime sexual violence that is reliable enough to create an evidence base for policy where none currently exists.

Key Findings

Many of our findings are similar to those that relate to sexual violence against adults. They include:

- Claims made by high-level UN reports that wartime sexual violence against children has been increasing lack any supporting evidence. The indirect evidence suggests that such violations are *decreasing* worldwide. At the same time, the UN’s own system for reporting violations against children in war-affected countries, the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM), grossly undercounts the incidence of conflict-related sexual violence against children.
- Even though most sexual violence against children in wartime is perpetrated by family members and acquaintances, not combatants, this form of sexual violence receives only minimal attention in UN, NGO (nongovernmental organization), and media analyses, and is not counted in the UN’s own reporting system.
- As is the case with adults, sexual violence rates against children vary substantially from region to region and from country to country around the world.
- Unless respondents in surveys are given the option of responding anonymously to questions about any sexual violations that occurred when they were children, their responses will underestimate the extent of the violations.

Determining the true global extent to which sexual violence affects children during wartime is currently impossible given the fragmentary and unreliable nature of the data. Not surprisingly, our knowledge of how war affects the incidence of sexual violence against children in wartime is even more limited than is the case for adults.¹⁹⁰

But one finding does emerge from the very limited data. As we argue below, the prevalence of sexual violence against children appears to be quite different from that against adults. Because children are clearly more vulnerable than adults, we might expect that they would be more likely to become victimized by sexual violence. Not only are they less able to defend themselves, but in the case of domestic sexual violence, children often live in a dependent relationship with their abusers, making it extremely unlikely that they will seek help. In some cases they may not even be aware at the time that they are being victimized.¹⁹¹

In fact, the prevalence rates of sexual violence against children appear to be significantly lower than against adults. Rates of abuse differ to a greater degree than can be explained

solely by the fact that sexual violence against children is under-reported. This suggests that normative constraints are providing children with protection from sexual predation—during wars as well as in peacetime.

The Children and Armed Conflict Narrative

What constitutes a child in today's world is contested, particularly with reference to armed conflicts. The UN and most humanitarian organizations hold that childhood does not end until the age of 18, a view that finds legal support in the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which states that:

a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.¹⁹²

But outside of international treaties there is little consensus about the age at which adulthood begins. In many countries, individuals of 17 and younger see themselves as adults and are treated as such. They marry, hold jobs, often lead independent lives, and are sometimes held legally responsible for their actions.

The research literature on children and sexual violence reflects this divergence in views about what constitutes childhood. Some research focuses on *young children*—those under 15 years old—and excludes the 15- to 17-year-olds. Other research and much of the advocacy is guided by the UN definition—i.e., all individuals under 18 years of age are considered children. We discuss the findings of both types of studies in this chapter.

The Children and Armed Conflict agenda, which began to emerge from the UN in the second half of the 1990s, has played a critical role in framing the narrative on how war-affected children are perceived in the international community and much of the media. In this narrative, children are typically presented as “increasingly becoming the direct targets of violence.”¹⁹³

The UN agenda was heavily influenced by a powerfully written 1996 report undertaken for the UN on the *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children* by Graça Machel.¹⁹⁴ Machel had been a member of FRELIMO, Mozambique's liberation movement against Portuguese colonial rule, and was subsequently a minister in the post-independence government. Her hugely influential report argued that the crisis facing children in war-affected countries had to be understood in terms of new modes of armed violence that were emerging in the post-Cold War era that were quite different from traditional forms of warfare. These “new wars,”¹⁹⁵ as they were later dubbed, were flourishing in a security environment that, as Machel put it, had become:

devoid of the most basic human values; a space in which children are slaughtered, raped, and maimed; a space in which children are exploited as soldiers; a space in which children are starved and exposed to extreme brutality. Such unregulated terror and violence speak of deliberate victimization. There are few further depths to which humanity can sink.¹⁹⁶

The atrocities to which this passage refers have certainly taken place in wartime, but the report presented a picture that was more than somewhat misleading. Similar to the reports on wartime sexual violence against women discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, Machel discussed particular—often extreme—cases as if they were representative of the situation for all children in all armed conflicts. They are not.

The mainstream narrative has remained largely the same since the publication of Machel's report in 1996. Although researchers and some officials are increasingly arguing the need to understand children as individuals with agency, not simply as passive victims, the website of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict currently notes that children are:

the primary victims of armed conflict ... [They] are killed or maimed, made orphans, abducted, deprived of education and health care, and left with deep emotional scars and trauma. They are recruited and used as child soldiers, forced to give expression to the hatred of adults.¹⁹⁷

But despite its partial and misleading nature, the depiction of the plight of children in armed conflict produced by the Machel and subsequent reports has been highly effective politically. Responding to pressure from advocacy organizations and the high-level official reports, the UN Security Council has become increasingly engaged over the past decade and a half with what has become a clearly defined Children and Armed Conflict policy agenda. Since 1999 it:

has greatly elevated the relevance of child protection concerns within its international peace and security agenda and has allowed for opportunities to improve efforts and actions for the protection of children.¹⁹⁸

Yet, despite the increased attention, and despite the fact that wartime sexual violence against children has become a major issue for the Security Council, some 16 years after the publication of the Machel report, the UN still has no real understanding of the scope or severity of the problem worldwide. Moreover, there is little evidence that UN policies to prevent sexual violence against children in wartime, or to bring its perpetrators to justice, are having any real impact.

The Knowledge Gaps

The remarkable absence of reliable information in this area is part of a much broader problem of inadequate data on almost all issues related to child protection in war-affected countries. As Alastair Ager and co-authors have pointed out, without:

coordinated and reliable data collection ... humanitarian action in support of children's protection will continue to be planned in a manner that is critically ignorant of scale, circumstance and effectiveness of response.¹⁹⁹

The authors focused on the situation in Darfur, but the problems they identified are common to most conflict- or crisis-affected countries.²⁰⁰ Among other things this means that the international community lacks access to any reliable data that can determine whether the incidence of sexual violence against children around the world is increasing or decreasing.

Official concern about the huge knowledge gaps in this area has, however, been growing among donors and international agencies that are increasingly demanding that policy be evidence-based. These pressures have given impetus to efforts at the UN to collect data on children affected by armed conflict.

In 2005 the UN Security Council, responding to a series of reports and advocacy efforts that drew attention to the plight of children in conflict-affected countries, established the MRM to report on grave violations of children's rights in wartime, to inform policy, and to help bring their perpetrators to justice.

In 2006, however, the UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) reported to the Security Council on the workings of the MRM. It noted major problems:

There is no systematic picture—in a statistical, aggregate sense—available on whether the extent to which [the situation of] CAAC [Children Affected by Armed Conflict], on a country by country basis, or as a global phenomenon, has improved or deteriorated. The cited estimates of two million children killed and continued existence of 250,000 or 300,000 global child soldiers, for instance, are entirely informal calculations that have not been derived from MRM aggregation.²⁰¹

Donors and international agencies are increasingly demanding that policy on child protection in war-affected countries be evidence-based.

The claims about the “300,000 global child soldiers” and “two million children killed in wars around the world” that are noted in the OIOS review are suspiciously similar to the unsubstantiated, but widely circulated UNICEF figures cited at the beginning of this chapter. They are typical of the pervasive “urban myths” about the effects of war that get endlessly recycled by NGOs and UN agencies.²⁰² (We examine some other challenges the MRM confronts below.)

Although there are no reliable data that support these claims, they have become widely accepted. This is not surprising. The assertions made are in line with the mainstream official and media reporting and analyses that focus largely on the worst affected countries. They are rarely questioned, in part because people assume that claims made by international organizations and major NGOs are reliable, and in part because there are no alternative sources of accessible and reliable data with which to challenge them. Last but not least—as we noted in Chapter 2—focusing on the worst cases is useful for advocacy and for directing public and donor attention towards the need to protect those who are most vulnerable in war-affected countries.

Is Wartime Violence against Children Increasing?

In 2009 a high-level follow-up study to Graça Machel's influential 1996 report was released.²⁰³ Published by the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and UNICEF with funding from 12 governments and several other UN agencies, the new study proclaimed that wars were having an "even more horrific impact on children, and on civilians generally" than in the early 1990s.²⁰⁴

There is no evidence to support claims that conflict-related violence, including sexual violence, is having an increasing impact on children.

In fact, there is *no* evidence to support claims that conflict-related violence, including sexual violence, was having a greater worldwide impact on children in the 2000s than during the 1990s.²⁰⁵ But it is not difficult to understand why such claims should have gained credibility.

In the years that followed the 1996 Machel report, a so-called new wars thesis flourished in the UN, as well as in parts of the research community.²⁰⁶ New wars theorists argued that

the nature of armed conflict had changed since the end of the Cold War. "Old wars" were fought for political ends by disciplined armies and paid heed to the proscription of deliberate attacks on civilians. New wars are very different—more akin to the anomic savagery depicted in the Machel report and described previously.²⁰⁷

New wars, it was claimed, are fought by undisciplined armed groups that lack popular support and whose members are prone to extreme violence, including ethnic cleansing, strategic rape, genocide, and other gross violations of human rights. New wars both occur in failed or failing states, and also cause them to fail. They are motivated more by predation and/or ethnic hatred than by the political or ideological ends that drove old wars.

And whereas the intentional killing of civilians was proscribed in theory, if not always in practice, in most old wars, in new wars the same civilians have become prime targets. To support this contention, new war analysts pointed to the widely cited claim that there has been a dramatic shift in the ratio of civilian to military deaths over the past 100 years. At the beginning of the 20th century, just 10–15 percent of war fatalities were civilian; by the late 1990s, it was claimed, the figure had ballooned to approximately 80 percent.²⁰⁸

If 80 percent of war victims are now civilians and if children under the age of 15 make up between 30 and 40 percent of civilians in poor countries where most wars are fought,²⁰⁹ then it follows logically that the threat to children must have increased considerably as a consequence of the emergence of new wars since the Cold War era.

Yet, as the 2005 *Human Security Report* noted, the claim that the percentage of civilian war deaths today is 80 or 90, while endlessly reiterated, including by the UN and its agencies, is yet another an urban myth, one unsupported by any compelling empirical evidence.²¹⁰

A 2009 study by Erik Melander and colleagues from Uppsala University points out that the best evidence from historians is that the claim that 10 to 15 percent of war deaths at the

beginning of the 20th century were civilians is wrong—the figure is far too low. There are in fact no clear long-term trends in civilian to military fatality ratios over time, though the average ratio would appear to have decreased since the end of the Cold War.²¹¹

As for the post-Cold War era, there is no evidence that warfare has become either more deadly, or more barbarically fought. Nor is there evidence that civilians—and hence children—are being increasingly victimized.

While post-conflict environments are far from risk-free for children, they are considerably less dangerous than war zones.

Critical assessments of the new wars thesis have pointed out that it greatly exaggerates the difference between Cold War and post-Cold War conflicts.²¹² Its proponents also failed to note that wars had become less numerous and less deadly in the post-Cold War period, and that the number of genocides and politicides had declined by some 80 percent since the late 1980s.²¹³

The best cross-national indicator that we have of the direct impact of war on noncombatants is the death toll from the targeted and unopposed killing of civilians by both non-state armed groups and government forces.

Here the data, which we review in Chapter 8 of this *Report*, is unequivocal: deadly violence against civilians, a large proportion of whom are children, did not increase after 1996 as the UN report claimed; indeed, the total death toll *declined by around half from the 1990s to the 2000s*.²¹⁴

As we noted in Chapter 1, and as Part II of the *Report* demonstrates, the number and deadliness of armed conflicts have dropped substantially since the 1990s. Given this, we have reasonable grounds to expect that the worldwide level of wartime violence against children, including conflict-related sexual violence, will have declined as well. While post-conflict environments are far from risk-free for children, they are considerably less dangerous than war zones.

Notwithstanding the indirect evidence that suggests that sexual violence against children may have declined, UN officials have persisted in claiming that it has increased. For example, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict asserts that:

The rape and sexual violation of children and women is *increasingly a characteristic of conflict*.²¹⁵

Typically, no evidence was provided to support this assertion.

Why should international agencies and NGOs believe that conflict-related sexual violence has been increasing while conflict numbers and battle deaths have declined substantially, as have deaths of civilians?

Part of the reason is that the statistical data that reveal these declines are little known outside the research community. Reports by and for the UN are often based on extrapolations from individual case studies, plus horrendous victim narratives on sexual violence from

countries that are worst affected by it. These narrative accounts are buttressed by statistical urban myths, like the false assertion discussed above that the vast majority of those killed in war since the end of the Cold War have been civilians, or the claim that three out of four women in Liberia were raped in the civil war noted in Chapter 1 of this *Report*.

But there is, as we suggested earlier, an additional factor. Since the end of the Cold War, the *reporting* of sexual violence by the media and advocacy organizations has greatly increased, which has created the impression that the violence itself has increased.²¹⁶ But, as Chapter 1 pointed out, increased reporting does not necessarily mean increased violations. The near-total lack of reliable reporting of wartime sexual violence in the Cold War period, contrasted with the explosion of reporting over the past decade, has made it *appear* that wartime rape has increased. Absent reliable and accessible data to act as a reality check, appearances can indeed be deceptive.

The UN's Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism

As noted earlier, in 2005 the UN established its own system of monitoring rights violations against children. MRM was intended to provide “timely, objective, accurate and reliable information”²¹⁷ on six major rights violations—including sexual violence—perpetrated against children affected by armed conflict.

MRM task forces in the field underestimate the extent of sexual violence against children.

The MRM initiative was an indication of growing UN awareness of the importance of monitoring and evaluation, and MRM reports contain much useful information on specific violations. But, in its present form, it is incapable of providing reliable data on the extent, or nationwide severity, of rights violations.

The reality is that the reports from the MRM task forces in the field severely underestimate the extent of sexual violence against children in war-affected countries, as a number of MRM Task Force reports to the Security Council have pointed out. In addition, the MRM does not have task forces in all countries in conflict.

The main problem is that the MRM relies on reports of violations from UN agency and other staff in the field. This approach, while useful for many purposes, notoriously under-reports the nationwide incidence of sexual violence against children—and indeed the incidence of other severe violations.

A 2008 Watchlist review of the workings of the MRM noted that in one 14-month period in Nepal, the MRM country Task Force recorded just 11 cases of sexual violence. In Sri Lanka, zero cases had been reported. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the MRM Task Force “faced challenges verifying the hundreds of cases it received between June 2006 and May 2007.”²¹⁸

Nationwide population surveys are the only instruments that can provide approximate estimates of the nationwide incidence of sexual violence, but the MRM does not include data

from such surveys.²¹⁹ Indeed, the 2010 MRM guidelines do not even mention surveys as a possible source of data.²²⁰

If comprehensive data on rights violations against children in war-affected countries were being collected by other parts of the UN or other international agencies, the MRM failure to do so would be of little consequence. But no such data is being collected elsewhere.

What Do We Know?

The most comprehensive information on the extent of sexual violence in poor war-affected countries comes from well-run population surveys. But as we noted earlier, few of these surveys have been undertaken, and of these only a handful have sought to estimate the prevalence of sexual violence against children.

Some of the major surveys discussed previously—those that examined the incidence of wartime sexual violence in Liberia and the DRC published in the *Journal of the American Medical Association*, for example—provided no data on sexual violence perpetrated against children.²²¹

The influential Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) organization has a domestic violence module that asks a series of questions about sexual violence, of which some answers can be disaggregated on the basis of age.²²² In principle, this module could be used to determine the prevalence of sexual violence against children—but it has not been included in many surveys in war-affected countries, and it collects no data on sexual violence against men or boys.

Moreover, in the very small number of war-affected countries where the violence module *has* been included in a DHS survey, the data in the public domain on sexual violence against children do not appear to have been disaggregated on the basis of age.

UNICEF also conducts major surveys focusing on women’s and children’s health. Unlike DHS, however, UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) do not collect any data on sexual violence perpetrated against children. This is somewhat remarkable since child protection, including protection from sexual violence, is central to UNICEF’s mandate.²²³

Only a handful of well-run population surveys have sought to estimate the prevalence of sexual violence against children.

Findings on the Prevalence of Sexual Violence against Children

The most comprehensive research effort to estimate the global prevalence of sexual abuse against children (here defined as individuals under 18 years old) published to date was based on a meta-analysis of the prevalence data from 217 studies published between 1980 and 2008.²²⁴ Most of these studies were undertaken in developed countries that were not war-affected.

The meta-analysis, whose key findings were published in 2011 in the journal *Child Maltreatment*, found that the prevalence of sexual abuse of all children (girls and boys) worldwide was 11.8 percent. For girls, the rate was 18 percent; for boys, 7.6 percent.²²⁵

If the definition of sexual violence included only acts that involved penile or other forms of penetration of the victim, the rate for girls under 18 drops to 15 percent. The rate for boys drops to approximately 7 percent.²²⁶

Reflecting the findings of other studies, the results of this study revealed significant differences between continents with respect to rates of sexual violence against children. North America (USA/Canada), Australia/New Zealand, and Africa had the highest prevalence rates; Asia, the lowest.²²⁷

A recent study found that there are significant differences in the rates of sexual violence against children between genders, and across continents.

This relatively new analysis has, as yet, attracted relatively little attention. The best known study to date that has cross-national data on sexual violence and also looks at girls aged 15 years and under is the WHO's (World Health Organization) *Multi-Country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence against Women* noted in Chapter 1.

The WHO research program was initiated in 1997 and drew on questionnaire data from 24,000 women respondents in 10 countries around the world.²²⁸ The fact that the WHO surveys, unlike many others referred to earlier, used a common methodology and definitions meant that the results are commensurable and can be used for comparative analysis.


One limitation of the WHO surveys is that in most of the countries the areas that were surveyed were not nationwide—although they are usually treated as if they were nationally representative both in media reporting, and by many researchers. In half of the countries two sizeable surveys were carried out, one taking place in a major city and the other taking place in a province with a mix of urban and rural populations. In four other countries, only a city or a province was surveyed, while there is only one country—Samoa—for which the survey was designed to be representative nationwide.

The countries surveyed were Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia, Japan, Namibia, Peru, Samoa, Serbia and Montenegro, Thailand, and Tanzania—a group that is both culturally and geographically diverse. Approximately half of these countries had been involved in conflict at some time in the lifetimes of many of the respondents.

Unusually, the WHO surveys collected data on prevalence rates of sexual abuse against girls—here defined as females under 15 years of age. Women respondents—the age group was 15 to 49 years—were asked not only if they had been sexually abused in their lifetime but also if they had been sexually abused before the age of 15. Figure 3.1 below shows the results.²²⁹

The WHO surveys, unlike many others, used a common methodology and definitions. Hence, the results can be used for comparative analysis.

Figure 3.1 Prevalence of Sexual Violence against Women before Age 15



Data Source: WHO,²³¹

Women are more likely to report that they were sexually abused as children if allowed to answer questions anonymously. The prevalence rates of sexual violence for children are still significantly lower than for adults.

Note: No anonymous reports were collected in Bangladesh.

There are three notable findings here. First, the data reveal the remarkable extent of cross-national—and sometimes also within-country—variation in the sexual violence prevalence rates of female children younger than 15. This is similar to the cross-national variation in the sexual violence prevalence rates for adult females noted in Chapter 2.

Second, the rates of sexual violence for girls under 15 are sharply lower than those for women aged 15–49 years. We discuss this further below.

Third, the WHO survey researchers gave women respondents the opportunity to respond anonymously to sensitive questions about their exposure to sexual violence as children.²³⁰ Where both face-to-face and anonymous data are available, the differences between the responses to the questions that could be answered anonymously (the red columns in Figure 3.1)

and those that were asked directly are striking. In all but two cases—one being Peru city and other being Thailand province—the anonymous responses recorded child sexual violence rates that were appreciably higher than the face-to-face responses.

The findings from the WHO survey provide compelling evidence that even well-run population surveys are likely to underestimate the true extent of sexual violence—unless they give respondents the opportunity of answering questions anonymously. Very few currently do so.

Sexual Violence against Girls Is Less Common Than against Adult Women

The above-cited 2009 report on children and armed conflict, co-published by the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and UNICEF, claimed that “almost half of all sexual assaults are against girls 15 years of age or younger.”²³² In spite of the fact that no evidence was ever produced to support this extraordinary—but quite incorrect—assertion, it has been repeatedly cited by advocacy groups, governments, and major international organizations.

Well-run surveys can still underestimate the extent of sexual violence if respondents are not given the chance to answer anonymously.

There are no reliable global data on the number of sexual assaults against children or adults. The prevalence data from the WHO multi-country study however, tell a story very different from the assertion that was made in the UNICEF report.

When we compare prevalence rates of sexual violence among adult women, on the one hand, and female children (under 15 years old), on the other, the WHO data show that far


smaller percentages of girls under 15 than adult women were victims of sexual violence.

Figure 3.2 reveals that across the 15 sites surveyed by the WHO, between 8 and 44 percent of female respondents experienced sexual violence as adults, i.e., from ages 15 to 49.²³³ The data on sexual violence against females before age 15 reveal much lower levels of sexual violence. Figure 3.1 above shows that prevalence rates recorded in the anonymous reports ranged from 4 to 21 percent.²³⁴ The total prevalence rate of sexual violence against adult women across all surveyed areas was 33 percent; three times higher than the average prevalence rate of sexual violence against children at just 11 percent for the anonymous reports and 5 percent for the face-to-face reports.²³⁵

The WHO study did not specifically address sexual violence against children during war-time, but as we will see below, there is evidence to suggest that the rate of sexual violence against children is also lower in the context of armed conflict.

There are no reliable global data on the number of sexual assaults against either children or adults.

Figure 3.2 Prevalence of Sexual Violence against Women since Age 15



Data Source: WHO.²³⁶

In the countries surveyed, one-third of women reported having been sexually abused as adults, with rates ranging from less than 10 percent to more than 40 percent in the worst affected areas.

Sexual Violence against Children in War-Affected Countries

Most studies on the impact of war on sexual violence ignore children, while most studies of child sexual violence ignore the impact of war. In the remainder of this chapter, we discuss the findings of the few surveys that can help us gain some understanding of the extent of sexual violence against children during wartime.

To the best of our knowledge, no researchers have examined differences in the overall prevalence (or incidence) rate of sexual violence against children as a country moves from peace to war. The very small number of quantitative studies that have collected data on children and sexual violence in wartime tend to confirm the findings of research on child sexual violence in peacetime and the findings on sexual violence against adults in wartime discussed in Chapter 1.

The neighbourhood-method surveys²³⁷ that collect data on sexual violence against children in war-affected countries are briefly reviewed below. Their results support general findings revealed by the WHO data—namely that there are very large variations between rates of sexual abuse from country to country, but that in all cases the rates at which children are victimized in war-affected countries are substantially lower than the rates at which adults are victimized.

Neighbourhood-method surveys indicate variations in rates of sexual abuse between countries, and lower rates of victimization for children than for adults.

Moreover, as is the case with the findings on sexual violence against adults in war, there is evidence to suggest that girls are more likely to be sexually abused by family members or someone known to the family than by combatants—rebels, militias, or government soldiers. Note, however, that there are only a few surveys that have collected and published data on perpetrators of sexual violence against children.


The much lower levels of reported sexual violence for children than for adults are also evident in studies of hospital and care centre patients in individual countries in conflict, such as the DRC, as a major study published in 2009 makes clear. Malteser International's relief program for rape victims in the DRC's South Kivu province registered some 20,500 female rape survivors between January 2005 and December 2007.²³⁸

Figure 3.3 below reveals that cases of child rape appear to constitute a very small percentage of female rape victims in one of the conflict areas in the DRC that is worst affected by war. Even if we assume that rape cases of children are less likely to be reported, there appears to be a clear difference between the victimization rates for adults and children—who constitute almost half of the population in the DRC and on average between 30 and 40 percent in developing nations generally.²³⁹

Girls aged 15 and under constituted 1.5 percent of the rape survivors for whom the survey collected age information.²⁴⁰ For every girl under 16 who is raped, the study finds that 66 adult women are raped. Even if we add the 16- to 20-year-olds, the share of the 20-year-olds and under is still only 13 percent of the total number of survivors.

It is important to note that because this sample of sexual violence victims is not randomly selected, the results of the study should be viewed with appropriate caution. But if the data are not completely misleading, it would appear that children—including teenagers—were at a much lower risk of being affected by sexual violence in South Kivu.

Child rape constitutes a very small percentage of female rape cases in South Kivu, one of the worst-affected conflict regions of the DRC.

Figure 3.3 Age Distribution among Rape Survivors in South Kivu

Data Source: Birthe Steiner et al.²⁴⁴

Sexual violence against children is much less common than against adults. In one of the regions of the DRC worst affected by war, those under 16 made up only 1.5 percent of rape survivors.

This may suggest that even in severely war-affected areas children receive a considerable degree of protection from sexual violence simply by virtue of being children. If the data from the WHO multi-country study and the Malteser study in the DRC are indicative of overall patterns, there appears to be a norm against engaging in sex with children, even those who are sexually mature. Like all norms, this would be far from being universally respected, but it may serve to reduce the risk of young children being directly assaulted.

A second study based on hospital data on the sexual abuse of children in the war-affected eastern region of the DRC found that 81 percent of the perpetrators were civilians, while only 13 percent were described as wearing a military uniform. Records about the reported relationship between the victim and the assailant revealed that 74 percent of the perpetrators were known to the family of the victim while 26 percent were strangers.²⁴¹ We know this pattern to be the case for adults, but this study, and some of the neighbourhood-method surveys discussed below, are among the very few that indicate that even in areas highly affected by warfare, most sexual violence against children is perpetrated by family members or acquaintances, not members of armed groups.²⁴²

The Neighbourhood Survey Method

One of the few sources of data on sexual violence against children in war-affected countries comes from a series of surveys of sexual violence in a number of countries using the novel low-cost neighbourhood methodology developed by Columbia University's Program on Forced Migration and Health.²⁴³

The findings of surveys using the neighbourhood method are subject to a considerably greater degree of uncertainty than surveys that use a more conventional data collection methodology and a larger number of respondents. The survey results are robust enough to detect major differences in rates of sexual violence, however.

The data from these surveys do in fact confirm other research that finds that while the incidence of sexual violence against female children varies greatly between countries, it is almost always much less than for adult females. In these studies, children are conventionally defined as being less than 18 years old.

The principal findings of the surveys include the following:

- In 2008 a neighbourhood survey of an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp in Trincomalee, Sri Lanka, found that less than 1 percent of girls (one out of 483) had become rape victims over an 18-month period—a remarkably low figure. In a village-based survey, the incidence of rape was even lower—a single rape victim under 18 in the sample of 1,022 girls.²⁴⁵ The proportion of adult women in both samples who had been raped was also low—just over 3 percent—but still much higher than the rate for children.²⁴⁶
- A 2008 survey of Somali refugees in the Aw Barre camp in the Somali region of Ethiopia found that 2 percent of females under 18 were raped over an 18-month period. For females 18 years or over, the rate was 40 percent—20 times higher. In the Kebribeyah refugee camp, 3 percent of girls under 18 were victims of rape, while 35 percent of women who were 18 or over were raped.²⁴⁷ In all sites, the most common perpetrators of rape against females under 18 were—unusually—strangers (32 out of 63 cases in total).²⁴⁸
- A neighbourhood survey undertaken in two war-affected counties in Liberia in 2007 examined, among other things, rates at which women and girls experienced rape outside marriage over an 18-month period. In Montserrado County, 13 percent of girls under 18, and 23 percent of women aged 18 or over were identified as having experienced rape or sexual abuse outside of marriage. In Nimba County, the rate for girls under 18 was 11 percent, for women 18 or over, it was 32 percent.²⁴⁹ The survey report includes information about the perpetrators of rape, but it does not distinguish between women and children in this regard. Overall, the vast majority of rape and sexual abuse was perpetrated by family members and acquaintances, while a maximum of 2 percent was attributed to strangers.²⁵⁰
- A 2009 neighbourhood survey taken in the Central African Republic found that the *annual* rape rate for girls between five and 17 in the severely war-affected north was 1.7 percent; for women 18 and over it was 3.4 percent.²⁵¹ In the south of the country, which was less affected by war, the annual rape rate for girls was approximately 0.75 percent; for women 1.8 percent. Almost half of all reported rapes in the war-torn north were committed by family members and neighbours, while only 26.5 percent were attributed to armed groups. In the south, there was only one case (1.6 percent) of rape by a member of an armed group. Note, however, that again the perpetrator data were not listed for women and girls separately.²⁵²

The fact that these surveys include large numbers of individuals from neighbouring households who are not questioned directly presents a particular challenge when dealing with sensitive topics like sexual violence. For this and other reasons, the findings of these surveys are subject to considerable uncertainty.²⁵³

Conclusion

As we have shown, the available data suggest that sexual violence is committed against children to a much lesser extent than against adults, but sexual violence against both adults and children is very similar in other respects. Most of the findings—and related policy implications—that derive from our analysis of the impact of war on sexual violence against adults are also relevant to wartime sexual violence against children.

First, the large cross-national variations in wartime sexual violence rates that are evident for adults are also evident with respect to children.

In the case of children, it is—in principle at least—possible that the variation in rates between countries could be due to differences in the efficacy of child protection policies.²⁵⁴ But since effective protection policies are extremely rare in war-affected poor countries, this is not very likely.

Second, there is compelling evidence to suggest that for children as well as adults, the greatest threat of sexual violence in wartime comes from family members, friends, and acquaintances, not from armed combatants. Yet, as is the case for adult survivors, the child victims of domestic sexual violence receive a disproportionately small share of attention—and assistance—from the international community.

Third, as indicated in Chapter 1, the issue of sexual violence against men in wartime is rarely dealt with—not least by the UN. The same is true with respect to boys. The landmark Security Council Resolution on conflict-related sexual violence, Resolution 1325 on “Women, Peace and Security,” and subsequent documents that determine UN policy on sexual violence, ignore boys completely. Yet, if the worldwide peacetime ratio of sexual violence prevalence rates among girls to those among boys (found in the meta-analysis discussed earlier)²⁵⁵ prevails during periods of conflict as well as peace, then the Security Council is ignoring the plight of a significant proportion of children victimized by wartime sexual violence.

Finally, we noted that every survey we have examined indicates that sexual violence prevalence rates among children are substantially lower than those among adults, despite the fact that children are more vulnerable than adults. This suggests that there may be normative constraints in place that provide children, particularly young children, with a greater degree of protection from sexual violence than is the case for adults.

Most of the findings and policy implications on the impact of war on sexual violence against adults are also relevant to sexual violence against children.

Policy Implications

The policy implications of these findings are similar to those for adults:

- Understanding if, how, and why societal norms protect children from sexual violence in wartime to a much greater degree than adults could provide important insights for child protection policies.
- If policy-makers and researchers—wrongly—believe that sexual and other violations against children are increasing in war-affected countries, effective evidence-based policy becomes impossible.
- Not knowing whether or not the incidence of sexual violence against children is increasing or decreasing means that national governments in war-affected countries, international agencies, and donor governments have no way of determining the overall impact of their policies to prevent or reduce such violence.
- The absence of reliable information on the extent of sexual violence against children in war-affected countries greatly hampers the task of needs assessment and equitable resource allocation for assisting the survivors. As noted earlier in this chapter, the data collected by the UN's MRM on conflict-related sexual violence and other human rights violations against children severely underestimate the true extent of the problem.²⁵⁶ Insofar as these data are used for needs evaluation, the amount of assistance needed will be severely underestimated. And if only a very small fraction of cases of sexual violence are reported—a necessary condition for bringing their perpetrators to justice—this will do little to break down the culture of impunity that protects sexual predators in so many war-affected countries.

Addressing the Knowledge Gaps

A key lesson from this review is that the absence of reliable cross-national data on the extent of sexual violence against children—and adults—means that the aspiration of donor governments and international agencies for policy in this area to be evidence-based cannot be realized.

Evidence-based policy needs evidence.

The UN's current approach to collecting data on wartime sexual violence—with respect to both children as well as adults—cannot, by its very nature, provide reliable nationwide data on the extent of sexual violence, domestic or conflict-related.

The population surveys reviewed in this *Report* can, in principle, provide far more realistic estimates of the extent of sexual violence in wartime than the reporting methods used by the UN and human rights organizations.

As we have pointed out, however, very few such surveys have been carried out—and almost all have been undertaken in the last decade, which means that conflicts of previous periods are rarely covered. And aside from the series of neighbourhood-method surveys cited above, both methodology and definitions (e.g., the definition of “children” and “sexual violence”) vary to a considerable degree between surveys in different war-affected countries. As a result, the findings are rarely directly comparable.

Only sensitively implemented population surveys that are specifically designed for the purpose can determine the nationwide extent of sexual violence in war-affected countries with a degree of accuracy sufficient to usefully inform policy.

As the UN Statistics Division noted in a 2009 report on using surveys to estimate the extent of violence—including sexual violence—against women:

Compared to the two other sources of statistics—censuses and administrative records—statistical sample surveys have the advantage of being less costly; more flexible in terms of the depth of investigation of certain—survey instruments can accommodate a larger number of more detailed questions; producing statistics of better quality as a consequence of the fact that interviewers can be better trained and prepared compared to census enumerators.²⁵⁷

Ideally, the incidence and prevalence of sexual violence in war-affected countries would be estimated by surveys dedicated wholly to this issue. In reality, despite the cost advantages of surveys compared to censuses and administrative records, they may be too expensive. The alternative is to incorporate a sexual violence module in general-purpose surveys. As noted earlier, the DHS organization has a violence module that can be incorporated into one of its standard surveys. The module includes questions about sexual violence—though not against males.

In the last *Human Security Report*, we addressed the more general information deficit that confronts international agencies and policy-makers embarked on peacebuilding and development programs in post-conflict societies. These actors rarely have access to timely and reliable nationwide data on livelihoods, health, education, security, and human rights violations—including sexual violence.

The mandate of new UN peace operations should require nationwide retrospective population surveys to create an evidence base for policy.

We proposed that the mandate of new UN peace operations should therefore include a requirement to undertake a nationwide retrospective population survey addressing the knowledge gaps noted above. Such a survey would have a violence module—including questions on sexual violence against males as well as females. Data on sexual violence perpetrated against children could be gathered, as we saw with the multi-country WHO survey,

by asking respondents whether or not they had been subject to sexual violence as a child. Children would not be questioned directly.

The data thus collected could be used for needs assessment and policy formation, and the baseline data collected would provide benchmarks measuring progress, given follow-up impact evaluation surveys at appropriate intervals.

Such surveys would, in other words, create an evidence base for policy where none currently exists.

PART I

ENDNOTES

OVERVIEW

- 1 References for all statistics and quotations in the Overview are found in the main body of the *Report* unless otherwise indicated.
- 2 Note that while conflict-related sexual violence declines when wars end, it may take significantly longer to stop completely.
- 3 For women aged 18 and above, the CDC found the rate for women was 18.3 percent—meaning that nearly one in five women had been victimized by sexual violence in their lifetimes. See Michele Black et al., *The National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey: 2010 Summary Report* (Atlanta: National Center for Injury Prevention and Control; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011), 18, http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/NISVS_Report2010-a.pdf (accessed 3 September 2012).
- 4 Scott Gates et al., “Development Consequences of Armed Conflict,” *World Development* 40, no. 9 (2012): 1713–1722, 1718, doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.04.031 (accessed 2 September 2012).
- 5 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), “The Difficulty and Perils of Education in Afghanistan,” http://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/focus_on/afghanistan/afghanistan_3.html (accessed 3 September 2012).
- 6 The particular measure of fragility that the PRIO researchers used did not, as do others, include conflict as one of its elements.

CHAPTER 1

- 7 Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, *Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts’ Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role in Peace Building* (New York: UNIFEM, 2002), 9, <http://www.ucm.es/cont/descargas/documento7201.pdf> (accessed 8 June 2012).
- 8 For a detailed description of the “narrative” concept, see Severine Autesserre, “Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and Their Unintended Consequences,” *African Affairs* (2012): 6–9, doi: 10.1093/afraf/adr080 (accessed 8 June 2012).
- 9 Anne M. Goetz, “Introduction” (presented at the Wilton Park Conference, *Women Targeted or Affected by Armed Conflict: What Role for Military Peacekeepers?*, Sussex, UK, 27 May 2008), 1, http://www.unifem.org/attachments/events/WiltonParkConference_Presentations_200805.pdf (accessed 29 January 2012).
- 10 Wood’s definition is based on that used by the International Criminal Court, see Elisabeth J. Wood, “Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare?” *Politics & Society* 37, no. 1 (2009): 5, doi: 10.1177/0032329208329755 (accessed 8 June 2012).
- 11 We do not include female genital cutting under this rubric since its motivation is very different.

- 12 Wynne Russell, who studies sexual violence against males, notes that although obtaining reliable data remains a major challenge, “the greatest difference between the male and female experiences appears to revolve around whether sexual violence is perpetrated with the body of the perpetrator, or with an object. The homosexuality taboo means that many captors of men will use objects to penetrate their victims, while captors of women are more likely to engage in penile penetration. Both are rape, by Wood’s definition; both are also torture ... Also, men appear to be more likely to be subjected to pain to the genitals or genital mutilation that does not involve a sexual assault, but that is designed to interfere with future sexual function or reproduction.” Personal e-mail communication with Andrew Mack, 19 February 2012.
- 13 Because many studies do not clearly identify perpetrators as combatants, this will sometimes also include other cases of stranger rape perpetrated by civilians unknown to the victim. We note throughout the chapter where this is the case.
- 14 When presenting survey results, standard statistical practice is to provide not only the single best estimate but also some measure that indicates the degree of certainty about its accuracy. The conventional approach is to provide *95-percent confidence intervals* for the point estimate. Put simply, this means that if one were to sample the same population repeatedly, then the range within which 95 percent of the samples fall would constitute the confidence interval.
- 15 Dara Cohen, “Causes of Rape During Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009),” University of Minnesota, 29 January 2012, unpublished manuscript, 50, table S1.
- 16 As we argue below, there is compelling evidence that reporting of human rights violations in general has increased over the last two decades, but no compelling independent evidence exists that actual violations have increased in this period.
- 17 United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, “Beijing and its Follow-up,” <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/> (accessed 15 March 2012).
- 18 Domestic sexual violence that is perpetrated by intimate partners is sometimes treated as a separate category and referred to as intimate-partner sexual violence.
- 19 Domestic sexual violence is prevalent in wartime as well as in peacetime; indeed, it is often argued that its incidence increases in conflict and post-conflict environments. Such war-exacerbated rates of domestic sexual violence could, in principle, be included in a very broad definition of *conflict-related sexual violence*. However, since it would be very difficult to identify elevated levels of domestic sexual violence in war-affected countries or attribute them to armed conflict given the dearth of data, our discussion of conflict-related sexual violence is limited to that perpetrated by combatants.
- 20 Note that by using the term “war-affected,” we do *not* limit the analysis to only those countries that experience *war* as defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), whose data we use in this report, i.e., a conflict with 1,000 or more battle deaths per year. We specify wherever we refer to a particular battle-death threshold.

- 21 As a recent study by the International Peace Research Institute Oslo, notes:
 “In the first five post-conflict years, there were reports of sexual violence by one-quarter of state armies and about one-third of all rebel groups and militias.”
 See Ragnhild Nordås, “Sexual Violence in African Conflicts,” Peace Research Institute Oslo, January 2011, <http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-1641546546/SVAC-CSCW-Policy-Brief-01-2011.pdf> (accessed 13 August 2012).
- 22 In many surveys only women between 15 and 49 were questioned.
- 23 The lifetime prevalence rate of sexual violence is not a measure of the *wartime* prevalence, because it includes individuals that have experienced sexual violence in peacetime. The lifetime prevalence rate is, however, often the only available measure to estimate the extent of sexual violence in war-affected countries.
 In some surveys, respondents are asked if they have been victimized in the past 12 months—providing data to compute *annual* prevalence rates. This is not particularly useful with respect to understanding wartime sexual violence, however, since surveys are very rarely taken *during* a war. Post-war retrospective surveys could, in principle, ask respondents if they had been victimized by sexual violence during the conflict and if so in what year. But responses are likely to be affected by recall bias, and questions that require respondents to indicate in which year they were violated are rarely asked.
- 24 Claudia García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-Country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence against Women: Initial Results on Prevalence, Health Outcomes and Women’s Responses* (Geneva: WHO Press, 2005), http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_study/en/ (accessed 18 July 2012).
- 25 United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations Statistical Division, *Indicators to measure violence against women: Report of the Expert Group Meeting* (Geneva: United Nations, 2007), 21, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/IndicatorsVAW/IndicatorsVAW_EGM_report.pdf (accessed 14 August 2012). This report notes, “There are different understandings associated with prevalence and incidents of violence against women. There is no difference between them if each victim suffers just one incident in the given time period” (21). Many surveys include estimates of lifetime prevalence and prevalence over the past 12 months. Since the surveys are rarely taken during a conflict, the latter measure is of little value for measuring prevalence in wartime.
- 26 See, for example, the results of a survey in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) for data on the number of times that married, separated, or divorced women had been victims of physical or sexual violence in the 12 months preceding the survey. Ministère du Plan and Macro International, *Enquête Démographique et de Santé: République Démocratique du Congo 2007* (Calverton, MD: Ministère du Plan and Macro International, 2008), 308, <http://www.minisanterdc.cd/fr/documents/eds.pdf> (accessed 14 August 2012).

- 27 See World Health Organization (WHO), *WHO Ethical and Safety Recommendations for Researching, Documenting and Monitoring Sexual Violence in Emergencies* (Geneva, Switzerland: WHO, 2007), http://www.who.int/gender/documents/OMS_Ethics&Safety10Aug07.pdf (accessed 15 March 2012) and Shana Swiss and Peggy J. Jennings, "Documenting the Impact of Conflict on Women Living in Internally Displaced Persons Camps in Sri Lanka: Some Ethical Considerations," Women's Rights International, 2007, http://www.womens-rights.org/Publications/Ethics_IDPSurvey.pdf/ (accessed 16 March 2012).
- 28 Indeed, as we point out in Chapter 3, unless surveys can provide respondents with the option of anonymously answering highly sensitive questions about being victimized by sexual violence, their responses can substantially underestimate the actual prevalence of sexual violence.
- 29 Dara Cohen, "The Incidence and Intensity of Wartime Sexual Violence," 6 March 2010, unpublished background paper prepared for the Human Security Report Project (HSRP), 3.
- 30 Jeanne Ward, Jackie Kirk, and Lisa Ernst, *Broken Bodies, Broken Dreams: Violence against Women Exposed* (Nairobi, Kenya: OCHA/IRIN, 2005), <http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=59&ReportId=72831> (accessed 16 March 2012).
- 31 Cohen, "Causes of Rape During Civil War."
- 32 *Ibid.*, 20.
- 33 The four levels were:
- Level 0: no reported cases of rape related to the conflict.
 - Level 1: "some" reports, "isolated" reports of conflict-related rape.
 - Level 2: "widespread," "extensive," "common" reports of conflict-related rape.
 - Level 3: "systematic" and "massive" reports of sexual violence and references to rape being used as a "weapon," "tactic," or "tool" of war.
- See *ibid.*, 50, table S1. As with all datasets, this one is subject to a number of limitations. These are discussed on pages 21–23 of the paper.
- 34 The data are provided by Dara Cohen. The dataset covers the years 1980–2009 and the respective figures for the entire period are 5 percent (Level 3), 19 percent (Level 2), 25 percent (Level 1), and 51 percent (Level 0). We, however, chose figures from the most recent decade because the Cohen data indicate that in the earlier years covered, especially the 1980s, there was little or no reported sexual violence in the large majority of years of active conflict, despite the fact that conflicts were far deadlier than in the 2000–2009 period. We believe that there is a strong possibility that the low levels of reported sexual violence in this period were almost certainly a function of low levels of reporting, *not* low levels of sexual violence. For this reason, we believe that the 2000–2009 period, where there is no doubt that reporting of wartime sexual violence had been far higher than in earlier periods, is likely to provide a more accurate picture of the cross-national variation in the intensity of sexual violence than the data from the 1980s and 1990s.

- 35 See Elisabeth Wood, "Variation in Sexual Violence during War," *Politics & Society* 34, no. 3 (2006): 307–341, doi: 10.1177/0032329206290426 (accessed 8 June 2012); Wood, "Armed Groups and Sexual Violence"; and Cohen, "Causes of Rape During Civil War."
- 36 Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf, *Women, War and Peace*, 10.
- 37 Ward, Kirk, and Ernst, *Broken Bodies, Broken Dreams*.
- 38 Office of the SRSG (Special Representative of the Secretary-General) for Children and Armed Conflict and UNICEF, "Ending Gender-Based Violence and Sexual Exploitation," in *Children and Conflict in a Changing World: Machel Study 10-Year Strategic Review* (New York: Office of the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict and UNICEF, 2009), <http://www.un.org/children/conflict/machel/english/811-ending-gender-based-violence-and-sexual-exploitation.html> (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 39 Jan Egeland, "International Responsibilities," in "Sexual Violence: Weapon of War, Impediment to Peace," ed. Marion Couldrey and Tim Morris, special issue, *Forced Migration Review* 27 (January 2007): 8, <http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR27/full.pdf> (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 40 Wilton Park Conference, ed., *Women Targeted or Affected by Armed Conflict: What Role for Military Peacekeepers? Conference Summary* (2008).
- 41 For a broad discussion of global trends in state-based armed conflict, see Chapter 5 of this *Report*.
- 42 Ward, Kirk, and Ernst, *Broken Bodies, Broken Dreams*.
- 43 Cohen, "Causes of Rape During Civil War," 31.
- 44 A third possibility is that both have increased.
- 45 Amber Peterman et al., "Rape Reporting During War: Why the Numbers Don't Mean What You Think They Do," *Foreign Affairs*, 1 August 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68008/amber-peterman-dara-kay-cohen-tia-palermo-and-amelia-hoover-gree/rape-reporting-during-war?page=show> (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 46 Howard Ramos, James Ron, and Oskar N.T. Thoms, "Shaping the Northern Media's Human Rights Coverage, 1986–2000," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 4 (2007): fig. 1, 387, doi: 10.1177/0022343307078943 (accessed 6 March 2012). Reporting on human rights showed significant increases in other papers as well, ranging from 20 percent to 200 percent over the same period.
- 47 Ann Marie Clark and Kathryn Sikkink, "Information Effects and Human Rights Data: Is the Good News about Increased Human Rights Information Bad News for Human Rights Measures?" January 2011, unpublished manuscript.
- 48 *Ibid.*, 24. The PTS relies in large part on the US State Department's human rights reporting, which Dara Cohen also uses in her study.
- 49 Clark and Sikkink, "Information Effects and Human Rights Data," 23–27.
- 50 *Ibid.*, 27.

- 51 Severine Autesserre, "Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and their Unintended Consequences," *African Affairs* (2012): 13, doi: 10.1093/afraf/adr080 (accessed 15 March 2012).
- 52 Ibid., 13.
- 53 Tara Gingerich and Jennifer Leaning have described some of the factors that may motivate strategic rape:
- It creates a sense of fear in the civilian population and restricts freedom of movement and economic activity.
 - It can instill flight which facilitates the capture of land and killing of male civilians who are left more vulnerable to attack when fleeing.
 - It demoralises the population and reduces their will to resist and prolongs their forced exit from the land.
 - It tears apart communities by breaking family and community bonds (thus diminishing the reproductive capacity of the community) and by "polluting" the blood line.
- See Gingerich and Leaning, "The Use of Rape as a Weapon of War in the Conflict in Darfur, Sudan" (Boston, MA: Program on Humanitarian Crises and Human Rights, Harvard School of Public Health, 2004), 17–18, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/B119C9EFB7DCAA2DC1256F5F004FBEA9-hu-sud-31oct.pdf> (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 54 See Kofi A. Annan, *Women, Peace and Security: Study Submitted by the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)* (New York: UN, 2002), 2, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/eWPS.pdf> (accessed 26 February 2012). Emphasis added.
- 55 Tsjeard Bouta, Georg Frerks, and Ian Bannon, *Gender, Conflict, and Development* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), 35, http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/11/15/000090341_20041115142901/Rendered/PDF/30494.pdf (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 56 Cited in Stephanie Nebehay, "Rape Used as Weapon in Libya and Elsewhere: U.N.," *Reuters Health News*, 10 June 2011, http://reuters_th.adam.com/content.aspx?productId=16&pid=16&gid=45497 (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 57 See Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed., *Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011).
- 58 The 20 countries were not randomly selected, which means that the findings are not necessarily representative of all of sub-Saharan Africa, let alone the rest of the world. See Ragnhild Nordås, "Sexual violence in African conflicts," in *CSCW Policy Brief 01* (Oslo, Norway: Centre for the Study of Civil War, PRIO, 2011), 3, http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-782981433/SVAC_policy_brief_Sexual%20Violence%20in%20African%20Conflicts.pdf (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 59 See *ibid.*, 3.

- 60 Dara Cohen, for example, notes that in Sierra Leone many NGOs argued that wartime rape was an integral part of the military and political campaigns pursued by the rebels, particularly the notorious Revolutionary United Front (RUF). But in her own extensive interviews she found that while former rebels were quite frank about the fact that they had perpetrated sexual violence, there was little evidence of strategic rape. See Dara Kay Cohen, "Explaining Sexual Violence During War" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 2010), 95.
- 61 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, "The Complexity of Violence: A Critical Analysis of Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)" (working paper, Uppsala: Nordika Afrikainstitutet, 2010), 15–16, <http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?page=statistics&pid=diva2:319527> (accessed 27 February 2012). See also Maria E. Baaz and Maria Stern, "Why Do Soldiers Rape? Masculinity, Violence, and Sexuality in the Armed Forces in the Congo (DRC)," *International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 2 (2009), doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00543.x (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 62 Baaz and Stern, "The Complexity of Violence," 14.
- 63 Ibid., 17–24.
- 64 Wynne Russell, "A Silence as Deep as Death: Sexual Violence against Men and Boys During Armed Conflicts" (background paper prepared for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Expert Meeting, "Use of Sexual Violence in Conflict," New York, 26 June 2008), 1. This paper provides a concise overview of the key issues and a lengthy bibliography.
- 65 UN Security Council, S/RES/1820(2008), <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/391/44/PDF/N0839144.pdf> (accessed 18 May 2012). The resolution often referred to "civilians," which of course includes males, but in various instances limited the focus specifically to women and girls.
- 66 UN Security Council, S/RES/1325 (2000), http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf (accessed 16 May 2012).
- 67 Ibid., 619. See also Russell, "A Silence as Deep as Death."
- 68 See Lara Stemple, "Male Rape and Human Rights," *Hastings Law Journal* 60 (2009): 605–647.
- 69 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "The Nature, Scope and Motivation for Sexual Violence against Men and Boys in Armed Conflict" (background paper prepared for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Expert Meeting, "Use of Sexual Violence in Conflict," New York, 26 June 2008), <http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1092305> (accessed 16 March 2012).
- 70 See, for example, UN Population Fund, *The State of World Population 2010: From Conflict and Crisis to Renewal: Generations of Change* (New York: UN Population Fund, 2010), Chapter 4, http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2010/web/en/pdf/EN_SOWP10.pdf (accessed 27 February 2012); and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *The Nature, Scope and Motivation for Sexual Violence*.

- 71 Michele Leiby, "Principals, Agents, and Wartime Sexual Violence," (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 2 September, 2010), 17. See also Pauline Oosterhoff, Prisca Zwanikken, and Evert Ketting, "Sexual Torture of Men in Croatia and Other Conflict Situations: An Open Secret," *Reproductive Health Matters* 12, no. 23 (2004), http://pramudithrupasinghe.weebly.com/uploads/4/2/1/8/4218922/sexual_torture_of_men_in_croatia_and_other_conflict.pdf (accessed 16 March 2012).
- 72 Lara Stemple points out that the abuse of males in wartime often takes place in prisoner of war camps and interrogation centres. The UN, for example, "reported that out of 5,000 male concentration camp detainees held near Sarajevo during the Bosnian conflict, 80 percent acknowledged having been abused sexually. In El Salvador 76 percent of male political prisoners told researchers they had experienced sexual torture." Lara Stemple, "The Hidden Victims of Wartime Rape," *New York Times*, 1 March 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/opinion/02stemple.html?_r=1 (accessed 27 February 2012). For more details, see Stemple, "Male Rape and Human Rights."
- 73 Kirsten Johnson et al., "Association of Combatant Status and Sexual Violence With Health and Mental Health Outcomes in Postconflict Liberia," *JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association* 300, no. 6 (2008): 680, doi: 10.1001/jama.300.6.676, <http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/300/6/676.full.pdf+html?sid=ae0751d1-ac0b-4f88-b7c7-2ced65a80382> (accessed 27 February 2012).
- 74 This extraordinarily high number may reflect the fact that many individuals served with government or rebel forces for a relatively short period of time—it does not mean that one-third of the population were serving as fighters or supporters all the time.
- 75 If only those who participated in combat are considered, the figure would be 14 percent. Note that in none of these figures, the combatants would be all serving at the same time, of course.
- 76 Johnson et al., "Association of Combatant Status and Sexual Violence," 681. The term *combatant* includes roles in the military that do not necessarily involve fighting—cooks, porters, messengers, etc.
- 77 These included "being forced to undress or being stripped of clothing." See *ibid.*, 680.
- 78 *Ibid.*, 683.
- 79 *Ibid.*
- 80 K. Johnson et al., "Association of Sexual Violence and Human Rights Violations With Physical and Mental Health in Territories of the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo," *JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association* 304, no. 5 (2010): 557 doi: 10.1001/jama.2010.1086, <http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/304/5/553.full.pdf+html?sid=3b1ab62a-616d-4232-816a-073af2b5a505>, 557 (accessed 6 March 2012). The rape category excluded lesser forms of sexual violence, but the most commonly reported type of sexual violence was rape. Almost two-thirds of the male cases of sexual violence and three-fourths of the female cases of sexual violence were conflict-related, but the authors do not specify how this is measured.

- 81 This is beginning to change. A major new study on this issue is being undertaken by University of Florida, Laura Sjoberg. Entitled *Rape Among Women: Genocidal Rape and Sex Subordination*, it will be published by New York University Press.
- 82 Cohen, "Explaining Sexual Violence During War," 165.
- 83 Johnson et al., "Association of Sexual Violence and Human Rights Violations," 557.
- 84 Dara Cohen, "Female Combatants and the Perpetration of Violence: The Case of Wartime Rape in the Sierra Leone Civil War," (unpublished manuscript), 2, 30.
- 85 The *neighbourhood method* uses household interviews to ask women not only about their own experiences of sexual violence but also those of others in their home and among their immediate neighbours. This method creates what is effectively a bigger sample size than is possible by questioning a single respondent about her own household. One obvious potential problem with the neighbourhood method is that the primary respondent may be misinformed about the prevalence of sexual violence among her neighbours. There is evidence from some of the surveys that this is in fact the case. See Ann Warner, "Incidence of Violence against Women and Girls in Liberia: A Quantitative Study Using the 'Neighborhood Method,'" International Rescue Committee and the Program on Forced Migration and Health, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, 4, 19, http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/IRCRReportonNeighborhoodStudy_10-1-07.pdf (accessed 27 February 2012).
- 86 Care and Protection of Children in Crisis-Affected Countries (CPC) Learning Network, "Rethinking Gender-Based Violence," 7, http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/GBV_Brief_winter_2010.pdf (accessed 27 February 2012).
- 87 Ibid.
- 88 Lindsay Stark et al., "Measuring Violence against Women Amidst War and Displacement in Northern Uganda Using the 'Neighborhood Method,'" Program on Forced Migration and Health, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University; ChildFund International, 10–11, <http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/StarkRobertsAchamBoothbyAger2009MeasuringVioAgainstWomenJEpidemiolCommunityHealth.pdf> (accessed 27 February 2012).
- 89 The rate at the national level was 12 percent. See Amber Peterman, Tia Palermo, and Caryn Bredenkamp, "Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence against Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *American Journal of Public Health* 101, no. 6 (2011): 1060–1067, doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2010.300070 (accessed 1 March 2012). The data for this study came from a 2007 study by the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). See DRC Ministry of Planning (MoP) and Macro International Inc., *Democratic Republic of the Congo Demographic and Health Survey 2007: Key Finding* (Calverton, MD: DRC MoP and Macro International Inc., 2007), <http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/SR141/SR141.pdf> (accessed 1 March 2012); UN Women, *Violence against Women Prevalence Data: Surveys by Country* (New York: UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, 2011), http://www.endvawnow.org/uploads/browser/files/vaw_prevalence_matrix_15april_2011.pdf (accessed 1 March 2012).

- 90 Inter Press Service News Agency, "Q&A: 'There Is Almost Total Impunity for Rape in Congo,'" 28 June 2010, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/06/qa-there-is-almost-total-impunity-for-rape-in-congo/> (accessed 1 March 2012).
- 91 Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) and Macro International Inc., *Uganda Demographic and Health Survey 2006* (Calverton, MD: UBOS and Macro International Inc., 2007), 290, <http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR194/FR194.pdf> (accessed 1 March 2012).
- 92 Unpublished data provided by the WHO (World Health Organization) based on Claudia García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-Country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence against Women: Initial Results on Prevalence, Health Outcomes and Women's Responses*, (Geneva: WHO Press, 2005), http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_study/en/ (accessed 15 August 2012). The survey undertaken in Ethiopia as part of the WHO's multi-country global survey of sexual violence was carried out in a largely rural district deemed "broadly representative of the country as a whole." See Yemane Berhane, "Ending Domestic Violence against Women in Ethiopia," *Ethiopian Journal of Health Development* 18, no. 4 (2004), 131–132.
- 93 UBOS and Macro International Inc., *Uganda Demographic and Health Survey 2006*, 290, 292.
- Even the notoriously violent Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) that abducted large numbers of girls and young women had a strictly enforced code governing sexual behaviour among its fighters. Sex was only permitted in forced "marriages" arranged between female abductees and LRA fighters. Sexual violence against other abductees and nonabducted civilians was strictly prohibited and rare, "and violations were severely punished, often with death." From Jeannie Annan et al., "Women and Girls at War: 'Wives,' Mothers, and Fighters in the Lord's Resistance Army," 10–11, <http://www.prio.no/sptrans/185286780/blattman-women@war.1009.pdf> (accessed 1 March 2012).
- 94 Unpublished data provided by the WHO based on Claudia García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-Country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence against Women: Summary Report of Initial Results on Prevalence, Health Outcomes and Women's Responses* (Geneva: WHO, 2005), 12, http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_study/summary_report/summary_report_English2.pdf (accessed 29 January 2012). A 2009 survey undertaken in seven regions of Ethiopia by the Population Council and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) of some 8,000 women aged 15 and 49 asked who the perpetrators were when a woman's first experience of sexual intercourse was forcefully coerced. It found that "92 percent were husbands, 6 percent were boyfriends or fiancés, and 2 percent were acquaintances or classmates."
- See Population Council and UNFPA, *Ethiopia Gender Survey: A Study in Seven Regions* (New York: Population Council, 2010), 60, http://www.popcouncil.org/pdfs/2010PGY_EthiopiaGenderSurvey.pdf (accessed 6 May 2012).
- 95 Amber Peterman, Tia Palermo, and Caryn Bredenkamp, "Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence against Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *American Journal of Public Health* 101, no. 6 (2011), 1060–1067, doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2010.300070 (accessed 1 March 2012).

- 96 Pan African News Agency, "UN Chief Says Sexual Violence a Threat to Peace, Security," 23 September 2011, <http://www.panapress.com/UN-chief-says-sexual-violence-a-threat-to-peace,-security--12-796358-25-lang2-index.html> (accessed 1 March 2012).
- 97 Care and Protection of Children in Crisis-Affected Countries (CPC) Learning Network, "Rethinking Gender-Based Violence," 3.
- 98 Amber Peterman, Tia Palermo, and Caryn Bredekamp, "Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence against Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *American Journal of Public Health* 101, no. 6 (2011): 1065. This stands in contrast to the results of the JAMA study cited above, which found that in 72 (females) and 86 (males) percent of the cases, combatants were reported as perpetrators. The study was, however, based on a much smaller sample than the DHS data and undertaken in some of the regions worst affected by the civil war.
- 99 Dara Cohen, for example, stresses that gang rapes are used to build cohesion among combatants, something that obviously has little relevance for explaining domestic violence. Cohen, "Causes of Rape During Civil War," 4.
- 100 Peterman, Palermo, and Bredekamp, "Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence." Lori Handrahan, "Conflict, Gender, Ethnicity and Post-Conflict Reconstruction," *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 4 (2004): 429–445.

CHAPTER 2

- 101 LaShawn R. Jefferson, "In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and Women's Status," in *Human Rights and Armed Conflict: Human Rights Watch World Report 2004* (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2004), 324–350, <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/download/wr2k4.pdf> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 102 For a more comprehensive analysis of how these incentive structures shape narratives and, as a result, policy-making, see Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill, eds., *Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).
- 103 According to OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and UN data, \$6.7 billion was raised from governments around the world in 2000; by 2010 this had risen to an estimated \$12.4 billion. Development Initiatives, *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2011* (Wells, U.K.: Development Initiatives, 2011), fig. 3, 12, <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/gha-report-2011.pdf> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 104 *Ibid.*, fig. 3, 55.

- 105 In 2010, for example, only 63 percent of the CAP request was actually allocated. Since the beginning of the new millennium, on average, 33 percent of annual requests have gone unfunded. *Ibid.*, figs. 8–9, 60–61. The CAP is not the only source of humanitarian funding, of course, but the pattern it exhibits—of demand exceeding supply—is typical of almost all funding exercises.
- 106 Ian Smillie and Larry Minear, *The Charity of Nations: Humanitarian action in a calculating world* (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2004), 207.
- 107 Humanitarian Policy Group, “According to Need? Needs Assessment and Decision-Making in the Humanitarian Sector,” *Overseas Development Institute Report* (London, U.K.: Overseas Development Institute, 2003), 56, <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/285.pdf> (accessed 7 June 2012). Also cited in Smillie and Minear, *The Charity of Nations*, 204.
- 108 See Smillie and Minear, *The Charity of Nations*, 207. See also David Rieff, “Millions May Die ... Or Not: How Disaster Hype Became a Big Global Business,” *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/millions_may_die_or_not?page=full (accessed 14 April 2012), and Human Security Report Project (HSRP), *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 126.
- 109 Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill, “Conclusion: The Numbers in Politics,” in *Sex, Drugs and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict*, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 265.
- 110 Nicholas D. Kristof, “After Wars, Mass Rapes Persist,” *New York Times*, 20 May 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/opinion/21kristof.html> (accessed 16 August 2012). Kristof was not the first to cite a prevalence rate in the order of 75 percent for Liberia. A paper by Dara Cohen and Amelia Hoover Green investigates the questionable claim made by Kristof and others in more detail. See Dara Kay Cohen and Amelia Hoover Green, “Dueling Incentives: Sexual Violence in Liberia and the Politics of Human Rights Advocacy,” *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 3 (2012): 445–458, doi: 10.1177/0022343312436769 (accessed 16 August 2012). See also the review posted on the blog *Feminist Critics*, “Have 75% of Women in Liberia Been Raped? (NoH),” 8 June 2012, <http://www.feministcritics.org/blog/2009/06/08/have-75-of-women-in-liberia-been-raped-noh/> (accessed 31 July 2012).
- 111 Marie-Claire O. Omanyondo, “Sexual Gender-Based Violence and Health Facility Needs Assessment,” WHO, September 2004, http://www.who.int/hac/crises/lbr/Liberia_GBV_2004_FINAL.pdf (accessed 15 August 2012). There are a number of other possible sources for Kristof’s extraordinary claim, but none can be used to support it.
- 112 *Ibid.*, 6, 16.
- 113 Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services (LISGIS), Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, National AIDS Control Program, Macro International, *Liberia Demographic and Health Survey 2007*, 230, <http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/fr201/fr201.pdf> (accessed 16 August 2012).

- 114 Kelly M. Greenhill, "Counting the Cost: The Politics of Numbers in Armed Conflict," in *Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts*, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 128. Greenhill argues that unreliable statistics can prove counterproductive from "political, humanitarian, juridical and scholarly perspectives" (127).
- 115 Kelly M. Greenhill, "Counting the Cost: The Politics of Numbers in Armed Conflict," in *Sex, Drugs and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict*, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 136.
- 116 See Rieff, "Millions May Die," (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 117 For a discussion of donor skepticism towards inflated humanitarian claims, see Smillie and Minear, *The Charity of Nations*.
- 118 Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill, "Conclusion: The Numbers in Politics," *Sex, Drugs and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict*, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 268.
- 119 See, for example, Elisabeth Wood, "Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare?" *Politics & Society* 37, no. 1 (2009): 131–161, doi: 10.1177/0032329208329755 (accessed 13 July 2012); Dara Cohen, "Causes of Rape During Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009)," University of Minnesota, January 2012: 1–45; and Ragnhild Nordas, "Sexual Violence in African Conflicts," in *CSCW Policy Brief 01* (Oslo, Norway: Centre for the Study of Civil War, Peace Research Institute Oslo [PRIO], 2011): 1–4, http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-782981433/SVAC_policy_brief_Sexual%20Violence%20in%20African%20Conflicts.pdf (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 120 We pointed out that this assumption is at odds with the data on reported sexual violence compiled by Dara Cohen, based on US State Department reports and other reports. These data do indeed show that reported conflict-related sexual violence has increased over the past three decades. But, as we argued in Chapter 1, this increase is likely a function of better and more extensive reporting, rather than an increase in sexual violence.
- 121 In 2010 Jordan Ryan, assistant administrator of the United Nations Development Programme and director of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, stated, with what was an uncharacteristic candour for a senior UN official, that "we have not anywhere prevented sexual violence." See United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), "Chapter Eight: And the Next 10 Years?" *State of the World Population 2010: From Conflict and Crisis to Renewal: Generations of Change* (New York, NY: United Nations, 2010), 82, <http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2010/web/en/ch8.shtml> (accessed 18 June 2012).
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- 123 Kathryn Sikkink argues that this may be an effective strategy for reducing rights abuses over the long term. Kathryn Sikkink, *The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics*, 1st ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2011).
- 124 For a comprehensive review of the UN's neglect of sexual violence against males, see Sandesh Sivakumaran, "Lost in Translation: UN Responses to Sexual Violence against Men and Boys in Situations of Armed Conflict," *International Review of the Red Cross* 92, no. 877 (2010): 259–277, doi: 10.1017/S1816383110000020 (accessed 13 July 2012).
- 125 United Nations, *Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Report of the Secretary-General*, United Nations General Assembly and Security Council (New York, NY: United Nations, 2012), 2, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/UNSC_ReportoftheSecretaryGeneral_ConflictRelatedSexualViolence_A66657.pdf (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 126 *Ibid.*, 3. Emphasis added.
- 127 The omission of males from the Women, Peace and Security agenda 1325 is not surprising given that senior UN officials have argued strongly against including sexual violence against males as part of the 1325 policy agenda. See Anne M. Goetz, "Introduction" (paper presented at the Wilton Park Conference, *Women Targeted or Affected by Armed Conflict: What Role for Military Peacekeepers?* Steyning, UK, 27 May 2008), 3–4, http://www.unifem.org/attachments/events/WiltonParkConference_Presentations_200805.pdf (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 128 Study cited in Lara Stemple, "Male Rape and Human Rights," *Hastings Law Journal* 60, no. 3 (2009): 612, http://devhector.uchastings.edu/hlj/archive/vol60/Stemple_60-HLJ-605.pdf (accessed 27 February 2012). See also Wynne Russell et al., "Care and Support of Male Survivors of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence," Sexual Violence Research Initiative, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/SVRI_CareandSupportofMaleSurvivorsofConflictRelatedSV.pdf (accessed 27 February 2012).
- 129 R. Charli Carpenter, "Recognizing Gender-Based Violence against Civilian Men and Boys in Conflict Situations," *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 1 (2006): 95, doi: 10.1177/0967010606064139 (accessed 27 February 2012).
- 130 The subsequent Council resolutions were 1820 (2008); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2009); and 1960 (2010). See UN Women, "Resolutions & Instruments," http://www.unifem.org/gender_issues/women_war_peace/resolutions_instruments.php (accessed 19 June 2012).
- 131 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1325 (2000)," United Nations, 31 October 2000, 2, http://www.unfpa.org/women/docs/res_1325e.pdf (accessed 19 June 2012).
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- 133 *Ibid.*, 4.
- 134 *Ibid.*, 14.

- 135 Ibid., 11.
- 136 UN Security Council, "Resolution 1960 (2010)," 4, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/698/34/PDF/N1069834.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 137 UN, *Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*, 2. Emphasis added.
- 138 Ibid., 3.
- 139 Ibid. Aside from the information that UN field offices gather about incidents, the data collected may also include reports from rape survivors who present at clinics and hospitals.
- 140 Tia Palermo and Amber Peterman, "Undercounting, overcounting and the longevity of flawed estimates: statistics on sexual violence in conflict," *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 89, no. 12 (2011), 925, doi: 10.2471/BLT.11.089888, <http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/89/12/11-089888/en/index.html> (accessed 14 April 2012). Emphasis added. Note that the DHS data on the number of rapes over a 12-month period likely include some cases of intimate-partner sexual violence (which are also measured separately with specific questions). But even with this caveat, the rate of rape indicated by the DHS data was clearly many times higher than that which the UN reported.
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- 142 Victoria Holt, Glyn Taylor, and Max Kelly, "Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges," (New York, NY: United Nations, 2009), 4, <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Protecting%20Civilians%20in%20the%20Context%20of%20UN%20PKO.pdf> (accessed 14 April 2012).
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- 144 See Victoria Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), 12, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Complete_Document-TheImpossible_Mandate-Holt_Berkman.pdf (accessed 14 April 2012). It took three years for this report to go through the UN's vetting process and be published as the Holt, Taylor, and Kelly paper cited above.
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- 147 In her new book, *The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics*, Kathryn Sikkink discusses statistical data to support her claims that prosecutions of past human rights violations deter future violations.
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- 158 WHO (World Health Organization), Claudia García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence against Women*, (Geneva: WHO, 2005), 40, http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_study/en/ (accessed 23 August 2012).

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- 161 Ibid.
- 162 For more detail, see *ibid.*, 30–31.
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- 184 Heise, "What Works to Prevent Partner Violence?"
- 185 Heise, "What Works to Prevent Partner Violence?" 57–58; and Seema Vyas and Charlotte Watt, "How does economic empowerment affect women's risk of intimate partner violence in low and middle income countries? A systematic review of published evidence," *Journal of International Development* 21, no. 5, 577–602, doi: 10.1002/jid.1500 (accessed 14 July 2012).
- 186 See Chapter 4 in HSRP, *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), <http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/text.aspx> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 187 For a wide-ranging and comprehensive analysis of other campaigns to reduce partner violence, including sexual violence, see Heise, "What Works to Prevent Partner Violence?"

CHAPTER 3

- 188 Dyan Mazurana and Khristopher Carlson, “The Girl Child and Armed Conflict: Recognizing and Addressing Grave Violations of Girls’ Human Rights,” United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) in collaboration with UNICEF, 3, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/elim-disc-viol-girlchild/ExpertPapers/EP.12%20Mazurana.pdf> (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 189 Note that Mazurana and Carlson claimed that their figures were for the “last decade,” when the source of their data—a UNICEF report—actually refers to the time period 1986–1996. Kelly Greenhill, in her revealing essay that we cited in the previous chapter, refers to similar figures as one example of the kinds of myths that surround the impact of armed conflict. See Kelly M. Greenhill, “Counting the Cost: The Politics of Numbers in Armed Conflict,” in *Sex, Drugs and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict*, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 128–130.
- 190 Definitions of sexual violence against children are, in principle, the same as those against adults. We use the same definition for sexual violence used in Chapter 1 (see the box on page 23). But in some instances, particularly in advocacy reports, it is not always clear which definition is being used.
- 191 Jeanne Ward, Jackie Kirk, and Lisa Ernst, *Broken Bodies, Broken Dreams: Violence against Women Exposed* (Nairobi, Kenya: OCHA/IRIN, 2005), 19, <http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=59&ReportId=72831> (accessed 16 March 2012).
- 192 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Convention on the Rights of the Child, Part I, Article 1, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm> (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 193 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, “The Changing Nature of Conflict,” <http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/the-changing-nature-of-conflict.html> (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 194 United Nations Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development (DPCSD), *Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of War on Children*, Note by the Secretary-General United Nations DPCSD, http://www.unicef.org/graca/a51-306_en.pdf (accessed 18 June 2012). The formal title of the Machel report was *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Report of the expert of the Secretary-General, Ms. Graça Machel, submitted pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 48/157*, UN document A/51/306, New York, 26 August 1996.
- 195 The term “new war” derived from Mary Kaldor’s *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge [England]; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2006).
- 196 DPCSD, “Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children,” 5. The Machel report foreshadowed the claims of so-called new war scholars that there had been a fundamental change in the nature of armed conflict.

- 197 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, "Introduction," <http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/issues.html> (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 198 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, "Engagement of Security Council on Children and Armed Conflict," <http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/security-council.html> (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 199 Alastair Ager, Neil Boothby, and Megan Bremer, "Using the 'protective environment' framework to analyse children's protection needs in Darfur," *Disasters* 33, no. 4 (2009): 567, doi: 10.1111/j.0361-3666.2008.01087.x (accessed 20 August 2012).
- 200 See Care and Protection of Children in Crisis Affected Countries Initiative Program on Forced Migration and Health, *Care and Protection of Children in Crisis Affected Countries: A Good Practice—Policy Change Initiative* (New York: CPC, 2006), 17, <http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/CPCSynthesisReport2008.pdf> (accessed 22 August 2012).
- 201 Cited in *ibid.*, 17.
- 202 See Greenhill, "Counting the Cost," 128–130.
- 203 See UNICEF, *Machel Study 10-Year Strategic Review: Children and Conflict in a Changing World* (New York: Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict; UNICEF, 2009), http://www.un.org/children/conflict/_documents/machel/msr2_en.pdf (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 204 *Ibid.*, 8.
- 205 The overall level of violence declined substantially, which—all else equal—should result in a lesser impact on children. From the 1990s to the 2000s, total death tolls from state-based conflict, non-state conflict, and one-sided violence decreased by 45, 24, and 49 percent, respectively (we exclude one-sided violence in Rwanda here to avoid skewing the result).
- 206 For example, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict continues to refer to the "new wars" on its website. See "The Changing Nature of Conflict," (accessed 13 July 2012).
- 207 Kaldor, *New & Old Wars*.
- 208 *Ibid.*, 107.
- 209 UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision*, <http://esa.un.org/wpp/Excel-Date/population.htm> (accessed 11 June 2012).
- 210 Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 75, <http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/2005/text.aspx> (accessed 7 June 2012).

- 211 Erik Melander, Magnus Oberg, and Jonathan Hall, "Are 'New Wars' More Atrocious? Battle Severity, Civilians Killed and Forced Migration before and after the End of the Cold War," *European Journal of International Relations* 15, no. 3 (2009), 529, doi: 10.1177/1354066109338243 (accessed 22 August 2012).
- 212 Notable critiques of the new wars thesis include Mats Berdal, "How 'New' are 'New Wars'? Global Economic Change and the Study of Civil War," *Global Governance* 9 (2003); Stathis N. Kalyvas, "'New' and 'Old' Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?" *World Politics* 54, no. 01 (2001), doi: 10.1353/wp.2001.0022 (accessed 7 June 2012); and Edward Newman, "The 'New Wars' Debate: A Historical Perspective Is Needed," *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 2 (2004), doi: 10.1177/0967010604044975 (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 213 For data on the decline in genocides, see Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report 2005*, 41.
- 214 See endnote 18.
- 215 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, "Rape and Other Grave Sexual Violence against Children," <http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/sexualviolence.html> (accessed 7 June 2012). Emphasis added.
- 216 There will clearly be individual conflicts in which levels of sexual violence have increased; our concern, however, is with overall trends.
- 217 UN Security Council, "Security Council Establishes Monitoring, Reporting Mechanism on Use of Child Soldiers, Unanimously Adopting Security Council Resolution 1612 (2005)," news release, 26 July 2005, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8458.doc.htm> (accessed 31 July 2012).
- 218 Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, *Getting It Done and Doing It Right: A Global Study on the United Nations-led Monitoring & Reporting Mechanism on Children and Armed Conflict* (New York: Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, 2008), 18, <http://www.watchlist.org/reports/pdf/global-v8-web.pdf> (accessed 31 July 2012).
- 219 Even well-run surveys will underestimate the extent of sexual violence, especially if respondents are not given the opportunity of answering questions anonymously. But the degree of underestimation is still far less than with the type of reporting undertaken by the MRM task forces.
- 220 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, UNICEF, and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), *Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on Grave Violations against Children in Situations of Armed Conflict: MRM Field Manual*, http://s3.amazonaws.com/tdh_e-platform/assets/147/original/MRM_Field_Manual_16-04-10.pdf?1309159505 (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 221 Because these studies have recall periods of 10 years or more, some of the adult respondents may have been children when they were violated, but the data are not disaggregated to reveal the prevalence of sexual violence against children.

- 222 Two questions in the module are critical here for information on sexual violence against children in wartime. First, women respondents are asked, “How old were you the first time you were forced to have sexual intercourse or perform any other sexual acts?” Answers to this question will determine what percentage of females experienced sexual violence while still children—and at what age. A follow-up question asks about the identity of the perpetrator. These data could be used to derive a conservative estimate of the percentage of the under-age population that had experienced sexual violence, and who the perpetrators were—family members or acquaintances (most likely), or soldiers and other members of the security forces. This would, however, still underestimate the extent of sexual violence, especially if respondents were not given the opportunity to answer questions anonymously. See DHS, “Domestic Violence Module: Questionnaire and Interviewer’s Manual,” 3 January 2011, 5, http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/DHSQM/DHS6_Module_Domestic_Violence_3Jan2011.pdf (accessed 23 August 2012).
- 223 The UNICEF surveys can include optional modules that collect data on *child discipline*—i.e., physical violence against young children—and on adult *attitudes* towards the use of disciplinary force against children, but nothing on sexual violence. See UNICEF, “Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys: Questionnaires and Indicator List,” April 2012, http://www.childinfo.org/mics4_questionnaire.html (accessed 23 August 12).
- 224 See Marije Stoltenborgh et al., “A Global Perspective on Child Sexual Abuse: Meta-Analysis of Prevalence Around the World,” *Child Maltreatment* 16, no. 2 (2011): 79–101, doi: 10.1177/1077559511403920 (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 225 See *ibid.*, 84.
- 226 *Ibid.*, 83, 88.
- 227 See Stoltenborgh et al., “A Global Perspective on Child Sexual Abuse,” 87, 89.
- 228 Claudia García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-Country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence against Women: Initial Results on Prevalence, Health Outcomes and Women’s Responses* (Geneva: WHO, 2005), 3, xiv, http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_study/en/ (accessed 18 July 2012)
- 229 *Ibid.*, 50.
- 230 In addition to being asked directly if they had experienced sexual violence before they were 15, the women could respond anonymously by placing the answer in a sealed envelope.
- 231 WHO (World Health Organization), Claudia García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence against Women*, (Geneva: WHO, 2005), 50, http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_study/en/ (accessed 23 August 2012).
- 232 UNICEF, *Machel Study 10-Year Strategic Review*, 161.
- 233 Unpublished data provided by the WHO based on García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-Country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence against Women*.

- 234 There are only two sites where the rate of sexual violence against children was shown to be higher than that against adults.
- 235 Ibid., 50. The 33-percent figure for adults is high. We should, however, expect that the data broadly reflect the difference in prevalence rates between adults and children.
- 236 Unpublished data provided by the WHO (World Health Organization) based on García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-Country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence against Women*.
- 237 *Neighbourhood surveys* are so called because interviewers solicit information from female heads of households, not only about their own experience of sexual violence and that of other females in the household but also of the experience of women in three neighbouring households. This has the effect of increasing the sample size of the population being surveyed, but there is no guarantee that the single respondent's estimate of sexual violence in other households will be correct. For more information on neighbourhood surveys, see Child Protection in Crisis Network for Research, Learning and Action, "Neighbourhood Method," <http://www.cpcnetwork.org/neighborhood-method.php> (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 238 Birthe Steiner et al., "Sexual Violence in the Protracted Conflict of DRC Programming for Rape Survivors in South Kivu," *Conflict and Health* 3, no. 1 (2009) doi: 10.1186/1752-1505-3-3 (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 239 UN Population Division, *World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, Population Database*, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm (accessed 18 July 2012) and <http://esa.un.org/wpp/Excel-Data/population.htm> (accessed 11 June 2012).
- 240 This was done only for a short period from October to December 2005.
- 241 Luc Malemo Kalisya et al., "Sexual Violence toward Children and Youth in War-Torn Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo," *PLoS ONE* 6, no. 1 (2011), Table 1, doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0015911 (accessed 19 July 2012).
- 242 For the very small number of adult victims included in the Kalisya et al. study, the data show a high share of rape by strangers and perpetrators in military uniform (70 percent and 48 percent, respectively). Note that these figures are based on a total of only 54 adult cases, as opposed to the 440 "pediatric victims." See *ibid.*, 3.
- 243 Child Protection in Crisis Network, "Neighbourhood Method."
- 244 Birthe Steiner et al., "Sexual Violence in the Protracted Conflict of DRC Programming for Rape Survivors in South Kivu," *Conflict and Health* 3, no. 3 (2009): 7, doi: 10.1186/1752-1505-3-3 (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 245 Braeden Rogers et al., "Estimating the Incidence of Physical and Sexual Violence against Children and Women in Trincomalee District, Sri Lanka: The Neighbourhood Method," 14 January 2009, Heilbrunn Department of Population and Family Health, Program on Forced Migration and Health, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University/Save The Children, 18, <http://www.cpcnetwork.org/learning-details.php?ID=1> (accessed 21 June 2012).

- 246 Ibid., 27. The two cases of rape of girls recorded in the survey were both perpetrated by family members, but the total number is too low to be meaningful. See *ibid.*, 23.
- 247 Angela Parcesepe, Lindsay Stark, and Les Roberts, "Using the Neighbourhood Method to Measure Violence and Rape in Ethiopia," Heilbrunn Department of Population and Family Health, Program on Forced Migration and Health, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, 11, <http://www.cpcnetwork.org/neighborhood-method.php> (accessed 18 July 2012).
- 248 Ibid., 17.
- 249 Ann Warner, "Incidence of Violence against Women and Girls in Liberia: A Quantitative Study Using the 'Neighborhood Method,'" International Rescue Committee; Program on Forced Migration and Health, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, 7, http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/IRCReportonNeighborhoodStudy_10-1-07.pdf (accessed 18 June 2012).
- 250 Ibid., 11–12.
- 251 Kathleen Myer, Alina Potts, and Les Roberts, "Grave Violations of Children's Rights and Mortality in the Central African Republic: Results of a Nationwide Survey," Heilbrunn Department of Population and Family Health, Program on Forced Migration and Health, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, 13, http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/CAR_1612_Survey_Report_17Sep09_FOR_DISTRIBUTION.pdf (accessed 18 June 2012).
- 252 Ibid.
- 253 See Lindsay Stark et al., "Measuring Violence against Women amidst War and Displacement in Northern Uganda Using the 'Neighborhood Method,'" *Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health* 64 (2010): 1056–1061, doi: 10.1136/jech.2009.093799 (accessed 20 July 2012).
- 254 As Elisabeth Wood has argued, differences in the rate of rape committed by armed groups may also be determined by antisexual violence policies pursued by military authorities. However, there is insufficient cross-national data to determine the extent to which such policies have been implemented outside the relatively small number of case studies that have been carried out thus far. See Elisabeth J. Wood, "Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare?" *Politics & Society* 37, no. 1 (2009): 131–161, doi: 10.1177/0032329208329755 (accessed 22 August 2012).
- 255 See Stoltenborgh et al., "A Global Perspective on Child Sexual Abuse," 89.
- 256 This is not to say that the MRM has no utility—simply that it is not useful for measuring trends in conflict-related sexual violence against children. For a description of the MRM and some of its roles, see Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, *Getting It Done and Doing It Right* (accessed 18 June 2012).
- 257 UN Statistical Commission, "Proposed Draft Outline for the Guidelines for Producing Statistics on Violence against Women, Part I: Statistical Survey," 3, <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/meetings/vaw/docs/Item13.pdf> (accessed 18 June 2012).

CHAPTER 4

- 258 Brian Lai and Clayton Thyne, "The Effect of Civil War on Education, 1980–97," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 3 (2007): 289, doi: 10.1177/0022343307076631 (accessed 18 July 2012).
- 259 Marc Sommers, *Children, Education, and War: Reaching Education for All (EFA) Objectives in Countries Affected by Conflict*, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (CPR) Working Papers 1 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002), Introduction, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/278200-1099079877269/547664-1099079993288/children_educ_war_efa02.pdf (accessed 18 July 2012).
- 260 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Education for All (EFA) Global Monitoring Report Team, *The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education* (Paris: UNESCO, 2011), 13, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001907/190743e.pdf> (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 261 See Paul Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington, DC; New York: World Bank; Oxford University Press, 2003).
- 262 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," UIS technical paper no. 7 (Montreal: UIS, 2011), <http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/tp7-quantitative-armed-conflict-impact-education-2011-en.pdf> (accessed 18 July 2012).
- 263 EPDC, "How Do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment? Analysis of Sub-National Evidence from 19 Countries" (Geneva: UNESCO, 2010), background paper prepared for the *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011—The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001912/191248e.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 264 See Chapter 6 of Human Security Report Project (HSRP), *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War* (New York: Oxford University, 2011), <http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/overview.aspx> (accessed 13 September 2012). Note that the period studied was 1970 to 2008.
- 265 Scott Gates et al., "Consequences of Civil Conflict," *World Development Report 2011* Input Paper, World Bank, <http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/PRI0> (accessed 19 July 2012). A shortened and revised version of this study was published in September 2012. See Scott Gates et al., "Development Consequences of Armed Conflict," *World Development* 40, no. 9: 1713–1722, doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.04.031 (accessed 14 September 2012).
- 266 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education; EPDC, How Do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment?"
- 267 Gates et al., "Consequences of Civil Conflict."
- 268 "Descriptive statistics" include the tables, charts and graphics used to describe, summarize and graphically present raw statistical data. They help summarize and support factual claims and are much easier to understand than the raw data.

- 269 Econometric studies may choose to exclude select countries where including them in the analysis would distort the results. The PRIO study, for example, excluded a number of developed countries, such as the UK, which experienced a small conflict in Northern Ireland. Development indicators in such highly industrialized countries are unlikely to improve significantly. See Scott Gates et al., “Consequences of Civil Conflict,” 5.
- 270 *Regression analysis* seeks to determine associations between different phenomena, with the assumption usually being that the association indicates an “average” causal effect.
- 271 Gates et al., “Consequences of Civil Conflict,” 13.
- 272 Most of these statistics are from the Households in Conflict Network (HiCN), which has published studies on education and conflict in Burundi, Tajikistan, Nepal, Timor Leste, and Bosnia. See HiCN, “About,” <http://www.hicn.org/papers.html/> (accessed 21 July 2012). See also Francis Akena Adyanga, *The Catastrophe of Education in Civil War Areas, Uganda: The Impact of Civil War on Education: A Case Study of Acholiland, Northern Uganda* (Saarbrücken, Germany: Lambert Academic Pub., 2010); Avis Sri-Jayantha, “Impact of War on Children in Sri Lanka,” Association of Tamils of Sri Lanka in the USA, http://www.sangam.org/ANALYSIS/Children_1_28_03.htm (accessed 21 July 2012); and Kate Wharton and Ruth U. Oyelere, “Conflict and Its Impact on Educational Accumulation and Enrollment in Colombia: What We Can Learn from Recent IDPs,” Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/papers/viewAbstract?dp_id=5939 (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 273 World Bank, *Reshaping the Future: Education and Postconflict Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), xi, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/Resources/Reshaping_the_Future.pdf (accessed 21 July 2012). Note that no sources were provided for these claims.
- 274 World Bank, *Reshaping the Future*, 13.
- 275 *Ibid.*, 13, 22.
- 276 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), “Internally Displaced Children,” [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004D404D/\(httpPages\)/6E780F0E0FE6BA1AC1257214003D980E?OpenDocument](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004D404D/(httpPages)/6E780F0E0FE6BA1AC1257214003D980E?OpenDocument) (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 277 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Global Trends 2010: 60 Years and Still Counting* (Geneva: United Nations, 2011), <http://www.unhcr.org/4dfa11499.html> (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 278 UNESCO, “Conflict Is Robbing 28 Million Children of a Future, UNESCO Report Warns,” News Release, 1 March 2011, <http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/ED/pdf/gmr2011-press-release-main.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 279 UNESCO, “Education Under Attack 2010—Iraq,” <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b7aa9df5.html> (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 280 Brendan O’Malley, *Education Under Attack 2010* (Paris: UNESCO, 2010), 43, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001868/186809e.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012).

- 281 Ibid.
- 282 World Bank, *Reshaping the Future*, 17.
- 283 Bede Sheppard and Kyle Knight, "Disarming Schools: Strategies for Ending the Military Use of Schools during Armed Conflict," *Disarmament Forum* 2011, no. 3 (2011): 23, http://unidir.org/bdd/fiche-periodique.php?ref_periodique=1020-7287-2011-3-en#biblio (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 284 Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan, "The Consequences of Child Soldiering," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 92, no. 4 (2010): 882–898, doi: 10.1162/REST_a_00036 (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 285 World Bank, *Reshaping the Future*, 18–19.
- 286 UN, "Millennium Development Goals: Goal 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education—Fact Sheet," http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG_FS_2_EN.pdf (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 287 Julia Paulson and Jeremy Rappleye, "Education and Conflict: Essay Review," *International Journal of Educational Development* 27, no. 3 (2007): 341, doi: 10.1016/j.ijedudev.2006.10.010 (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 288 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education."
- 289 Note that the study does not measure directly a country's overall national attainment rate but rather the educational attainments of cohorts of 15-year-olds at given points in time. We describe this indicator more fully below.
- 290 See UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," 13, for a detailed description of the methodology used by the UIS researchers—and some cautions about the conclusions that can be drawn from the data analysis. The conflict data come from PRIO and the Uppsala University Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The graphics in the study show periods of both minor conflict (in yellow) and major conflict (referred to as "war" here). *Major conflicts* or *wars* are those that incur 1,000 or more battle deaths in a calendar year.
- 291 In addition, the researchers also grouped the respondents in cohorts of 13- to 17-year-olds to smooth year-to-year fluctuations.
- 292 The data used in the UIS report can serve as an indicator of the effect of conflict on education, but as the authors note, they do not directly "reveal the educational attainment of 15 year-olds... at any time in the past." See UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," 13 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 293 Ibid., 7.
- 294 Ibid.

- 295 The figures derived from the UIS study that are presented here do not extend as far in time as the UIS graphics. This is because, as the UIS report's authors explain, data immediately prior to the time of the survey are distorted. This is very evident in the UIS graphics, which all reveal a sharp decline in educational outcomes prior to, and following, the survey date. To avoid misinterpretation, the graphics used here only extend the year that is nine years *prior* to the year in which the survey was undertaken. This is the maximum period over which the UIS researchers believe the distortion will be evident.
- 296 To be more precise, the Kurdish areas had a greater percentage of individuals with no formal education than the rest of Turkey.
- 297 By the time the conflict started, only a very small percentage of those living in the areas of Turkey not directly affected by war had received no education at all, which means that there was little room for improvement on this measure. But the counterintuitive process of educational attainments improving more rapidly in war-affected areas than in those that are not directly affected is evident in other graphs in the UIS study.
- 298 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," 27 (Figure 4.6) (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 299 The UIS study did not examine the differences between war-affected and non-war-affected areas in all the countries it reviewed.
- 300 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," UIS technical paper no. 7 (Montreal: UIS, 2011), <http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/tp7-quantitative-armed-conflict-impact-education-2011-en.pdf> (accessed 18 July 2012).
- 301 Attainment rates for women were broadly similar but from a lower base than males, and the attainment rate for women in the conflict zones, unlike for males, lagged somewhat behind the attainment rate for women in the non-conflict zones. UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," 38–40 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 302 Exceptions were periods of violence in the 1960s and 1980s, during which the average years of education followed an unsteady, but largely stagnant, pre-war trend.
- 303 See UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," 45 (Figure 8.5) (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 304 The data for the male population without formal education represented an exception here, as it deteriorated during the 1970s but then caught up again with the trend in the rest of the country.
- 305 It could also mean that the negative impact of conflict on the rate of educational attainment is being offset by the positive impact of some other factor—e.g., rising incomes or improved educational attainment among girls.

- 306 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), “The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education,” UIS technical paper no. 7 (Montreal: UIS, 2011), <http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/tp7-quantitative-armed-conflict-impact-education-2011-en.pdf> (accessed 18 July 2012).
- 307 Andrew Mack, “Armed Conflicts,” Perspective Paper, Copenhagen Consensus 2012, http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/Files/Filer/CC12%20perspective%20papers/Armed%20Conflicts__Mack.pdf (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 308 See UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education,” 66 (Figure 9.20) (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 309 EPDC, “How Do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment?”
- 310 This refers to 10 countries that experienced conflict in 2010 and for which conflict-affected as well as peaceful regions could be identified. See *ibid.*, 2 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 311 *Ibid.*, 1 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 312 *Ibid.* (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 313 *Ibid.*, 2 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 314 See the methodology section of *ibid.*, 6–8 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 315 The countries in question are Burma, Burundi, Chad, Indonesia, Liberia, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. In the case of Sierra Leone, there was trend data but no period of conflict; in the case of Chad, trend data existed only for the nonconflict region.
- 316 Note that for most of these countries, only two data points are available, or there are only data for the conflict period, which means that we cannot compare values for all periods, i.e., before, after, and during the conflict.
- 317 EPDC, “How Do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment?” 27 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 318 In addition, Ethiopia also shows increases in attendance rates. The EPDC does not show conflict periods in its Ethiopia graph covering the years 2000–2009. According to UCDP/PRIODATA, however, the country continuously experienced conflict during that time period.
- 319 The countries in question are Burma, Burundi, Chad, Indonesia, Liberia, the Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Uganda.
- 320 Gross attendance rates can be more than 100 percent, because in addition to the regular cohort of children, they include children older than the cohort who previously missed a year or more of education.
- 321 Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC), *How do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment? Analysis of Sub-National Evidence from 19 Countries* (Geneva: UNESCO, 2010), Background paper prepared for the *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011—The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 12, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001912/191248e.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012); Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/Center for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute Oslo, (PRIO).

- 322 See Ray Rivera and Taimoor Shah, "Taliban Attacks on Afghan Schools Lessen," *SFGate*, 9 June 2011, <http://www.sfgate.com/world/article/Taliban-attacks-on-Afghan-schools-lesser-2368869.php> (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 323 Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC), *How do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment? Analysis of Sub-National Evidence from 19 Countries* (Geneva: UNESCO, 2010), Background paper prepared for the *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011 - The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 21, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001912/191248e.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012); Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/Center for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute Oslo, (PRIO).
- 324 World Bank, "In Afghanistan, Out of Conflict and Into School," <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTEDUCATION/0,,contentMDK:20279607~menuPK:617572~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:282386,00.html> (accessed 30 August 2012).
- 325 However, as we pointed out previously, the limited evidence we have suggests that these outcomes usually precede the conflict.
- 326 Adding deaths caused by the intentional killing of civilians for the period covered by the survey does not significantly alter the average. If death tolls in minor conflicts are so low that the impact that they make on educational outcomes is not discernible, it might be useful to focus on high-intensity conflicts only. This is what we did in our analysis of under-five mortality in the last *Human Security Report*, where only *wars*—conflicts in which there were a reported 1,000 or more battle deaths in a calendar year—were included. The findings were very similar for both intensity levels. This time we include minor conflicts, primarily because the UIS and EPDC studies that we review include minor conflicts as well as wars in their analyses.
- 327 Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC), *How do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment? Analysis of Sub-National Evidence from 19 Countries* (Geneva: UNESCO, 2010), Background paper prepared for the *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011—The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 15, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001912/191248e.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012); Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/Center for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute Oslo, (PRIO).
- 328 Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC), *How do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment? Analysis of Sub-national Evidence from 19 Countries*, (Geneva: UNESCO, 2010), Background paper prepared for the *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011—The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 15, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001912/191248e.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012); Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/ Human Security Report Project, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada.

- 329 Gratien Mokonzi Bambanota and Mwindi Kadongo, *Democratic Republic of Congo: Effective Delivery of Public Services in the Education Sector: A Study* (Johannesburg, South Africa: Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 2010), 4, doi: 10.1177/00223433030405006 (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 330 Bambanota and Kadongo, *Democratic Republic of Congo: Effective Delivery of Public Services in the Education Sector*, 19 (accessed 30 August 2012).
- 331 Ibid. (accessed 30 August 2012).
- 332 The light blue South Kivu trend line is that which has the highest attendance rate in 2007 of the three secondary conflict region trend lines.
- 333 Lisa Bender, *Innovations in Emergency Education: The IRC in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Geneva: UNESCO, 2009), commissioned background report prepared for the *Global Monitoring Report*, 3, <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/EdStats/ZARgmrap10.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 334 IDMC, "Democratic Republic of Congo: IDPs Need Further Assistance in Context of Continued Attacks and Insecurity," <http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/drcongo> (accessed 22 July 2012).
- 335 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," 7 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 336 EPDC, "How Do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment?" 31 (accessed 4 September 2012). Emphasis added.
- 337 See *ibid.*, 6–8 (accessed 4 September 2012) for a discussion of all EPDC's methodological concerns.
- 338 *Ibid.*, 7 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 339 In the Central African Republic there are only data for the two secondary conflict regions. In 2006 the primary conflict region was not surveyed. It is possible that the primary conflict region saw a decline, but both of the secondary conflict areas witnessed an appreciable *improvement* in educational outcomes in this period, as seems to be the case for all the other regions. In Uganda parts of the Northern and Western regions were omitted from the survey in 2001. However, this is unlikely to change the main finding much, since the data already show a decline in educational attainments for most of the period. Several areas of Indonesia were missed from the survey, but there were only data for one year on Indonesia so they are not discussed here. The same is the case with Sudan. In the cases of Pakistan and Colombia, there were missing data, but the EPDC states that the omission is unlikely to have affected the overall results in either case.
- 340 EPDC, "How Do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment?" 6 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 341 The terms *effect* and *impact*—which imply causality—are used both in this *Report* and in most other studies. Strictly speaking, we should be referring to an *association* between conflict and educational outcomes.

- 342 The PRIO study uses both cross-section and fixed-effects models, but the authors believe the latter are more appropriate (HSRP correspondence with Håvard Mogleiv Nygård, 29 May 2012). See Gates et al., “Consequences of Civil Conflict,” 1. Cited earlier in the chapter, the updated Gates et al., “Development Consequences of Armed Conflict” corrects a minor error in the version that is cited here.
- 343 Gates et al., “Consequences of Civil Conflict,” 40.
- 344 Ibid., 43.
- 345 Scott Gates et al., “Consequences of Civil Conflict,” *World Development Report 2011* Input Paper (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2010): 41, <http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/PRIO> (accessed 19 July 2012).
- 346 Siyan Chen, Norman V. Loayza, and Marta Reynal-Querol, “The Aftermath of Civil War,” *The World Bank Economic Review* 22, no. 1 (2008): 63–85, doi: 10.1093/wber/lhn001 (accessed 14 September 2012). In this study, conflict periods sometimes included shorter interwar peace periods (fewer than 10 years).
- 347 Lai and Thyne, “The Effect of Civil War on Education,” 277 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 348 Ibid., 284 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 349 EPDC, “How Do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment?” 6 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 350 The *World Bank Economic Review* study has a considerable smaller number of countries than the PRIO and Lai and Thyne studies, meaning that its findings are likely a less reliable guide of the overall effect of war on education.
- 351 There is also the possibility, canvassed by Lai and Thyne themselves, that the positive relationship that they find between conflict and low educational outcomes is affected by the omitted variable bias discussed above—i.e., that the association between war and educational outcomes that they report could be caused by factors that were not included in their statistical models. See Lai and Thyne, “The Effect of Civil War on Education,” 277 (accessed 4 September 2012) 289.
- 352 For a discussion of the differences in results in the literature on civil war onset, see Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 4 (2006): 508–535, doi: 10.1177/0022002706289303 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 353 We reiterate a cautionary note here. The trends that we have been describing are averages—what is *generally* the case and certainly not what is *always* the case. The averages will, of course, include many cases where war does indeed have disastrous impacts on educational outcomes. These cases are the ones that receive the most attention from policy-makers, that generate the headlines, and that inform the mainstream narrative. Those cases where educational outcomes improve in conflicts at a more rapid rate than the average get no attention.
- 354 UNESCO EFA Global Monitoring Report Team, *The Hidden Crisis*, 126.

- 355 Ibid., 159.
- 356 Ibid.
- 357 However, even if conflict is *not* the primary cause of low educational outcomes in war-affected countries, it may well exacerbate them.
- 358 The nonconflict fragile states in the PRIO study have consistently lower educational attainments than those in conflict. See Gates et al., “Consequences of Civil Conflict,” 41.
- 359 See INEE, <http://www.ineesite.org/> (accessed 4 September 2012) and INCAF, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflictandfragility/44282247.pdf> (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 360 Some of the research of the INEE focuses on fragility in explaining educational and other development outcomes. See INEE, <http://www.ineesite.org/> (accessed 4 September 2012). For an overview of the concept of state fragility as it applies to education, see Jacqueline Mosselson, Wendy Wheaton, and Paul St. John Frisoli, “Education and Fragility: A Synthesis of the Literature,” *Journal of Education for International Development* 4, no. 1 (2009).
- 361 Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, *Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility* (Vienna, VA: CSP, 2011), 21, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/GlobalReport2011.pdf> (accessed 4 September 2012). The total global fragility score hides considerable variation between individual countries, of course. The CSP’s 2011 *Global Report* points out that from 1995 to 2010, state fragility ratings improved for 115—or 72 percent—of the 161 countries on its list. For 27 countries (17 percent), the ratings stayed the same, while 19 (12 percent) showed a deterioration (23). Different fragility measures provide somewhat different results. The CSP index includes OECD countries, as well as developing states. On the other hand, Carleton University’s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) shows data for developing countries only and finds that fragility increased from 1980 to 1997 and then stopped rising and stayed at about the same level until 2006. See David Carment and Yiagadeesen (Teddy) Samy, “Extent and Sources of State Fragility and Failure: Core Factors in Fragility and Failure,” PowerPoint presentation, <http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1243.pdf> (accessed 4 September 2012). Over an overlapping period (1995 to 2010), the CSP dataset shows a global decline in fragility of some 20 percent.
- 362 Note that the implications of the descriptive statistics in the PRIO study are not exactly the same as the findings of the econometric analysis. In the former case, the PRIO graphics simply show the net trend for a range of development indicators. These graphs—like Figure 4.7 above, for example—show how development outcomes differ between countries affected by conflict and nonconflict countries. But they do *not* tell us whether conflict has an impact on these development indicators that may be overridden by other factors.