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CHAPTER 5

State-Based Armed Conflict

In this chapter, we analyze trends in the number and deadliness of *state-based armed conflicts*—those in which at least one of the warring parties is a government. We show how the geographic locale of the deadliest wars has shifted over time. In the first three decades that followed the end of World War II, most of the world’s battle deaths were in East and Southeast Asia and Oceania. In the 1980s, the Middle East and North Africa was the most violent region; in the 1990s, sub-Saharan Africa. By the middle of the new millennium, Central and South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa had become the world’s deadliest regions. Most recently, the deadliest conflicts in the world are concentrated in these two regions, notably the wars in Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.

Internationalized intrastate conflicts are civil wars in which external military forces fight in support of one warring side.

Finally, we examine the complicated phenomenon of *internationalized intrastate conflicts*—civil wars in which external military forces intervene and fight in support of at least one of the warring sides. These conflicts include many of the wars involving major powers that have dominated the media headlines for decades—the Vietnam War, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the civil war in Iraq following the invasion in 2003, and the current conflict in Afghanistan.¹

We find that these wars are consistently deadlier than civil wars in which there is no external military intervention. Given the large numbers of troops and heavy conventional weapons that major powers can bring to civil-war battlefields, this is perhaps not surprising. What *is*


surprising is that civil wars in which there are military interventions by *minor* powers can be as deadly as those in which major powers are involved.

Global Trends in State-Based Armed Conflict

The last *Human Security Report* noted that the number of state-based armed conflicts rose by 25 percent between 2004 and 2008. While this was a significant increase, and clearly a source of concern, we cautioned against interpreting this five-year increase as a long-term trend towards an increased incidence of warfare around the world.

As Figure 5.1 below demonstrates, the number of conflicts in 2009 was a third lower, at 36, than in the peak year of 1992. The latest data, which we are currently analyzing for the next *Human Security Reports*, show that the number of conflicts appears to be stabilizing roughly at this level—i.e., between 30 and 40 active conflicts per year—despite significant year-to-year fluctuations.

Figure 5.1 Global Trends in State-Based Conflicts, 1946–2009



Data Source: UCDP/PRIO.⁴


The number of conflicts declined steadily after the Cold War, then rose from 2004 to 2008. There was a slight decrease in 2009, however this does not appear to mark the start of a downward trend.

Battle deaths also increased by around a third from 2005 to 2008.² But this increase should be seen in the context of the dramatic, decline in battle deaths over the past 60-plus years, shown in Figure 5.2. The average number of battle deaths per conflict in the post-Cold War period³ is some 76 percent lower than the average during the Cold War period.

A large part of this long-term, but uneven, decline in battle deaths has been a result of the reduction in the number of high-intensity conflicts, counted as wars in years when they cause at least 1,000 battle deaths. As shown in Figure 5.3, in the new millennium the average number of wars being fought each year was just over half that in the 1990s.

Wars also make up a decreasing share of all conflicts.⁵ During the Cold War period—from 1950 to the end of the 1980s—31 percent of conflict years resulted in at least 1,000 battle deaths. That figure dropped to 25 percent in the 1990s, and even further to 19 percent in the new millennium.


Figure 5.2 Global Trends in Battle Deaths from State-Based Conflicts, 1946–2008⁶



Data Source: PRIO.⁷

Battle deaths peaked in 1950 due to the Korean War, in the 1970s due to the Vietnam War, and in the 1980s due to the Iran-Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Despite these deadly wars, battle deaths have declined since 1946.

Figure 5.3 Trends in Wars, 1950–2009



Data Source: UCDP/PRIO.

The average number of high-intensity conflicts per year—defined as conflicts that reach 1,000 or more battle deaths in a calendar year—halved from the 1980s to the new millennium.

The Deadliest Conflicts

In 2009 the three deadliest conflicts in the world were all in Central and South Asia—in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

There were just three high-intensity conflicts outside of Central and South Asia in 2009: in Iraq, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where Rwandan and Congolese forces battled the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR).⁸

Of these six high-intensity conflicts, those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and the DRC are internationalized intrastate conflicts. This type of conflict, as we explain later, tends to be considerably deadlier than civil wars in which there is no military intervention by external powers.

Four of 2009's six most deadly conflicts, those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Somalia, are associated with international and local campaigns against Islamist groups. The security implications of this association were discussed in the last *Human Security Report*.⁹

Regional Trends in State-Based Armed Conflict

Since the end of World War II, the location of the world's deadliest conflicts has shifted repeatedly.

From 1946 to the end of the 1970s, East and Southeast Asia and Oceania was by far the deadliest region in the world, with most of the deaths being caused by the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War and the wars in Indochina. But, as we demonstrated in the last *Human Security Report*, with the effective ending of foreign military intervention (mostly by the US and China), the region's major wars were over by the early 1980s and battle-death tolls declined steeply. Since the end of the Cold War, East and Southeast Asia and Oceania has suffered fewer battle deaths than any other region.


In the early 1980s, the Middle East and North Africa became the deadliest region in the world, with the war between Iran and Iraq alone causing hundreds of thousands of battle deaths. But in the late 1980s, death tolls in the region declined sharply, driving the global death toll down in the process.

Half of the World's Battle Deaths in the Post-Cold War Period Have Occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa

The battle-death toll in sub-Saharan Africa declined in the late 1980s, but in the second half of the 1990s it increased again—this time dramatically. This increase meant that sub-Saharan Africa was by far the deadliest region in the world in the 1990s. And as Figure 5.4 indicates, nearly half of the world's state-based battle deaths between 1989 and 2009 were caused by wars in sub-Saharan Africa, most of them in the 1990s.

But in the new millennium there was another radical change as the number of people being killed in state-based conflicts across the region dropped dramatically. While the number of conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa has remained high, as Figure 5.5 demonstrates, the average number of battle deaths per conflict in the region has declined by 90 percent since 2000.

Figure 5.4 Regional Trends in Battle Deaths from State-Based Conflicts, 1989–2009¹⁰




Data Source: UCDP/HSRP Dataset.¹¹

Nearly half of the world's battle deaths between 1989 and 2009 took place in sub-Saharan Africa, but deaths there have declined since 2000. From the mid-2000s onwards, Central and South Asia has been the deadliest region.

Note: Figure 5.4 is a "stacked graph," meaning that the number of battle deaths in each region is indicated by the depth of the band of colour. The top line shows the global total number of battle deaths in each year.

Figure 5.5 State-Based Conflicts and Battle Deaths in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1989–2009



Data Source: UCDP/HSRP Dataset.

The number of conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa was high throughout the post-Cold War period. However, just five of those conflicts accounted for the majority of battle deaths in the region.

Sub-Saharan Africa has been by far the most conflict-prone region in the post-Cold War years, with nearly a third of the world's total conflicts.

However, over half of the region's battle-death toll has been due to just five conflicts, each of which caused at least 10,000 battle deaths in a calendar year at some stage in the

Sub-Saharan Africa has been by far the most conflict-prone region in the post-Cold War years, with nearly a third of the world's total conflicts.

conflict. Two of these wars were civil conflicts in Ethiopia. There was a single international conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and civil wars in Angola and the Republic of Congo (sometimes referred to as "Congo-Brazzaville") that also exceeded 10,000 reported battle deaths in a year. Since the end of the Cold War, only one conflict outside sub-Saharan Africa has reached this level of intensity in at least one year: the war following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991.

None of these conflicts have been active since 2002, however, and their ending has made a major contribution to the decline in global death tolls in the new millennium.

The list of the deadliest cases of organized violence also includes the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the violence in the DRC (sometimes referred to as "Congo-Kinshasa") during the late 1990s and early 2000s, the latter of which has been described as "the world's deadliest conflict since World War II."¹² In these cases, however, the majority of deaths resulted from one-sided attacks against civilians. Data on one-sided violence are discussed in more detail in Chapter 8 of this *Report*.

Central and South Asia Is Currently the World's Deadliest Region

In the mid-2000s, death tolls due to conflicts in Central and South Asia and in the Middle East and North Africa increased relative to all other regions. As the battle-death toll in Iraq decreased in 2007, however, Central and South Asia has clearly become the world's deadliest region.

Recently, death tolls in Central and South Asia have escalated significantly, more than quintupling between 2005 and 2009, as shown in Figure 5.6.


In 2009 Central and South Asia alone accounted for two-thirds of the world's total battle deaths from state-based armed conflict. The region had four times as many battle deaths as the next deadliest region, sub-Saharan Africa.

The fact that the number of armed conflicts in the region has remained fairly stable while the number of battle deaths has increased dra-

Death tolls in Central and South Asia have escalated, more than quintupling between 2005 and 2009.

matically means that, on average, these conflicts are becoming deadlier. But this higher average is driven by just three conflicts. The wars in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Afghanistan were the three deadliest conflicts in the world both in 2008 and, as noted earlier, in 2009.

Figure 5.6 State-Based Conflicts and Battle Deaths in Central and South Asia, 1989–2009



Data Source: UCDP/HSRP Dataset.

Although conflict numbers in this region have not changed much, death tolls quintupled from 2005 to 2009 due to conflicts in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, the world's deadliest conflicts in 2008 and 2009.

In 2009 the government of Sri Lanka decisively defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and there have been no battle deaths associated with this conflict since mid-2009. However, the other two conflicts, both associated with international and local campaigns against Islamist groups, show no signs of abating.

While these conflicts are currently the world's deadliest, they cost far fewer lives than the deadliest conflicts in previous decades. For example, UCDP researchers estimate that the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea had a battle-death toll of nearly 50,000 in 1999 alone. In Sri Lanka it took some 18 years to reach a comparable cumulative death toll.

The Deadly Impact of Military Interventions

Many of the deadliest conflicts of the past two decades have involved external military forces fighting in civil wars. These internationalized intrastate conflicts are, on average, twice as deadly as intrastate conflicts where there is no military intervention.¹³


Interstate wars tend to have far higher battle-death tolls than civil wars with or without external military support, but as shown in Figure 5.7, conflicts between states have become extraordinarily rare. Since the end of the Cold War there have been three times as many internationalized intrastate conflicts as interstate conflicts.

Internationalized intrastate conflicts are a type of civil conflict in which the military forces of one or more external governments fight in support of one of the warring parties.¹⁴ This includes so-called humanitarian interventions if external military forces officially take sides and support

a party to the conflict with troops. However, the definition does not include most peacekeeping missions, which are usually deployed to support negotiated settlements—and sometimes to help protect the peace against spoilers—but not to further the goals of a combatant.¹⁵

States intervene militarily in civil conflicts in other countries for a variety of reasons. They may send forces to protect political or ideological interests, as was the case in the so called proxy wars of the Cold War era, or in response to humanitarian crises. Intervening states often have a complex combination of motivating factors, many of which may remain unstated. Our data do not provide information on these motivations but rather enable us to focus on the common characteristic of these conflicts: the presence of external military forces supporting at least one of the warring sides.

Figure 5.7 Trends in State-Based Conflicts by Type, 1946–2009



Data Source: UCDP/PRIO.

Extrastate—or anticolonial—conflicts ended by 1975, while interstate conflicts became rare in the 2000s. As a result of this shift, all conflicts in 2009 were intrastate, though nearly a quarter were internationalized.

Note: Figure 5.7 is a “stacked graph,” meaning that the number of conflicts in each category is indicated by the depth of the band of colour. The top line shows the total number of conflicts of all types in each year.

The highest-profile internationalized intrastate conflict currently is in Afghanistan, where the United States and its allies intervened on behalf of the Northern Alliance and now support the current government against the Taliban. The US-led involvement in Iraq started as an interstate war with the foreign forces fighting to end Saddam Hussein’s regime, but in 2004 the conflict shifted to a civil conflict in which the United States and its allies are militarily supporting the current government in its fight against rebel forces. Earlier examples of internationalized intrastate conflicts include the American intervention in South Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s and the Cuban presence in Angola in the 1970s and 1980s. France’s reinstatement of Léon M’ba as president of Gabon in 1964 was a smaller-scale internationalized intrastate conflict.

As the Cuban example shows, intervening countries can be non-major powers. North and South Vietnam (and later the Socialist Republic of Vietnam) played a major role in the Cambodian civil war throughout the 1970s and 1980s, while the armed forces of a major power, the US, were also involved. In the DRC the armies of several neighbouring countries fought in the civil war in the late 1990s and early 2000s without the presence of a major power.

As we will show in the following section, civil wars with foreign military support differ from other intrastate conflicts in a number of ways. Most notably, they are on average twice as deadly as conflicts in which no external powers are involved.

Intervention is Associated with Intensified and Prolonged Conflict

The trend data on internationalized intrastate conflicts show a strong positive correlation between external involvement in a conflict and that conflict's battle-death toll, but this does not necessarily mean that the former caused the latter. The involvement of foreign combat troops and their weaponry in a civil war clearly has the *potential* to increase fatalities, but it may also be the case that foreign military support is more likely in conflicts that are already deadly.

The internationalized intrastate conflict in Iraq from 2004 to 2009 resulted in much higher battle-death tolls than any previous civil conflict in Iraq. In this conflict there is no doubt that the intervention was one of the major drivers of the huge death toll in the country. In other cases the pre-existing level of organized violence prompted the intervention that eventually stopped the fighting. Cases in point are the intervention of the US-led coalition in Kosovo in 1999 and the UK deployment of combat troops in Sierra Leone in 2000.

The limited research findings provide little more than confirmation that external support is usually associated with high battle-death tolls.

Surprisingly little systematic research has been done on the impact of external military support on conflict intensity. The limited findings so far provide little more than confirmation that external support is usually associated with high battle-death tolls, but quantitative analyses tend not to draw strong conclusions about causality.

Bethany Lacina, of the University of Rochester, finds that “[a] strong predictor that a civil war will be severe is the availability of foreign assistance to the combatants”—but her findings do not include an analysis of external military support in civil conflicts since the end of the Cold War.¹⁶ More recently, Kristine Eck, of Uppsala University, has found that the risk of conflict escalation—i.e., of higher death tolls—“increases by 192 percent if an external state intervenes militarily on the side of the rebels,” suggesting that this is because “obtaining troops and military resources from an external state” increases the “strength of the rebel organization.”¹⁷

A number of researchers have examined the impact of external military support on the duration of conflict. Patrick Regan, of Binghamton University, who has done extensive research on different types of intervention, finds for example that “longer running conflicts tend to have

more outside interventions." But again, he notes that the research design of his study "cannot discriminate between the cause and effect."¹⁸

Some researchers argue that a one-sided intervention may increase the probability of victory for the warring party that receives the support and that this will shorten the conflict,¹⁹ but this claim is contested.²⁰ Most agree that intervention leading to a balance of power between the warring parties is likely to prolong conflicts since neither side will have the forces necessary to defeat the other.²¹

David Cunningham, of the University of Maryland, offers a somewhat different perspective, finding that the effect of external military interventions on conflict duration results from cases "in which the intervener has an independent agenda." He argues that if there are separate agendas to be satisfied, the conflict will consequently be more difficult to settle.²²

Cunningham uses the example of South African and Cuban involvement in Angola's civil war to illustrate how the presence of an external party can be an important obstacle to peace: with the winding down of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the political imperatives that had led South Africa²³ to support the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels and the Cuban government to support the left-oriented Angolan government lost their salience. Following an agreement in 1988, Cuban and South African forces withdrew. As Cunningham notes, this "paved the way for an internal peace agreement in Angola in 1991, albeit one that broke down a few years later."²⁴

In December 2011 UCDP released a new dataset that provides more information on the involvement of foreign powers in wars. This includes the provision of both military and economic assistance by external actors. UCDP's Therese Pettersson reviewed the new data, and preliminary findings "suggest that there is a positive relationship between external support and conflict intensity."²⁵


Are Internationalized Intrastate Conflicts a Growing Threat?

Many scholars see military intervention in civil wars as a phenomenon associated primarily with the security politics of the Cold War. Bethany Lacina, for example, examines the impact of military assistance on conflict severity by comparing the death tolls of conflicts that started during the Cold War with those that started subsequently.²⁶ She finds that conflicts that started during the Cold War had 1.8 times as many battle deaths as compared to the post-Cold War era.²⁷ This makes intuitive sense: the high-stakes geopolitics of the Cold War drove many *proxy wars*—conflicts in which the US and the Soviet Union (or their allies) supported warring parties in the developing world. Support related to the ideology of the Cold War, which was often associated with extremely high death tolls, ended with the Cold War.

But while this might suggest that internationalized intrastate conflict numbers should have declined in the aftermath of the Cold War, the reverse has been true. The number of foreign military interventions in civil wars over the past two decades has actually increased, while the number of intrastate conflicts with no such intervention has decreased substantially. In the new millennium the number of conflicts in which external forces have intervened militarily

is 70 percent higher than in the 1980s, the last decade of the Cold War.²⁸ Therese Pettersson, using UCDP's new data on external support, finds that the proportion of "active conflicts with external troop involvement" has gone from an average of 12 percent during the Cold War, to 7 percent in the 1990s, and up to 16 percent in the new millennium. If sustained, the rise in both the number and percentage of conflicts with external military intervention in recent years is a cause for concern.²⁹

As the number of internationalized intrastate conflicts increased over the past two decades, their average deadliness showed no discernible upward or downward trend. As Figure 5.8 demonstrates, internationalized intrastate conflicts have remained, on average, deadlier than other intrastate conflicts throughout most of the post-Cold War period. The difference peaks in 1997, a year in which external military support was recorded in only two intrastate conflicts.³⁰ The civil wars in the DRC ("Congo-Kinshasa") and in the neighbouring Republic of Congo ("Congo-Brazzaville") each resulted in several thousands of battle deaths that year.



Data Source: UCDP/HSRP Dataset.

Intrastate conflicts with external military support on one side have been deadlier, on average, than those without. The dramatic spike in 1997 was due to deadly conflicts in the DRC and in the Republic of Congo.

While there are civil conflicts with no foreign military support that are quite deadly, this analysis shows that, on average, conflicts that do involve external armed forces tend to be deadlier. The number of these conflicts, and the proportion of all armed conflicts that involve foreign military support, appears to be increasing. Even though the limited evidence available does not prove that military intervention causes deadlier conflicts—foreign militaries may be more likely to intervene in already deadly wars—it does suggest that a significant risk of escalation may be associated with intervention on behalf of a party to a conflict.

The Surprising Deadliness of Minor Power Intervention

Since the end of World War II, France, the UK, the US, and Russia (USSR) have each shown the ability to independently project power over significant distances.³¹ These four countries, which here we consider the major powers, have repeatedly dispatched military forces overseas to assist governments or rebels in fighting civil wars around the world.³² Some of these interventions—such as those by the US in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan—have been associated with hundreds of thousands of battle deaths.

It is not surprising that major power interventions, which add highly trained troops and sophisticated weapons systems into ongoing civil wars, are sometimes associated with high battle-death tolls. What *is* surprising is that military interventions by *minor* powers are, in many cases, associated with battle-death tolls that are just as high.³³

For example, the internationalized intrastate conflict in Angola involved the armed forces of Cuba, South Africa, and the DRC—none of which are here considered major powers. The conflict caused over 1,000 battle deaths every year from 1975 to 1989. This minor power intervention is far more deadly than some examples of major power intervention. The Russian intervention in Georgia’s South Ossetia region in 2008 was associated with hundreds, not thousands, of battle deaths, while even fewer fatalities were recorded in the context of the UK’s intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000.

Major power interventions, which add troops and weapons to civil wars, are often associated with high death tolls.

High-profile major power interventions that cause extremely high death tolls—from Vietnam to Afghanistan—capture most of the media’s attention. But, in fact, minor power interventions in civil wars are more often associated with high death tolls than major power interventions.

Some 61 percent of minor power interventions—by which we mean external military support that does not involve any of the major powers—in civil wars since 1946 were associated with battle-death tolls that crossed the high-intensity, thousand-battle-death threshold for a year or more. Over the same period, just half of the intrastate conflicts in which major powers intervened crossed this threshold.

Conclusion

Some scholars have suggested that international military interventions are an effective means of ending civil wars. Ann Hironaka, for example, argues that “decisive external intervention” represents a “promising possibility” to end civil wars, citing the NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo as examples.³⁴ The doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which was endorsed in principle by the UN General Assembly in 2005, also envisages the possibility of Security Council-mandated military interventions by the international community to protect civilians from war crimes, genocides, or other gross violations of human rights, which tend to occur during civil wars.

However, we have shown in this chapter that the support of foreign military forces for a warring party in a civil conflict is very generally associated with higher death tolls than is the case where there is no intervention. While in some cases military intervention can save lives, the reality is that we know very little about the necessary conditions for successful military interventions.

By contrast, there is much evidence to suggest that international efforts to resolve conflicts through diplomacy, negotiations, and peace operations have overall been successful in reducing the number of wars worldwide—as we have discussed in detail in the last *Human Security Report*.³⁵ The following chapter analyzes trends in the duration and termination of civil wars and argues, among other things, that the large increase in the number of peacemaking and peace-building efforts since the end of the Cold War has helped make recent conflicts less persistent.

PART II

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER 5

- 1 For the purpose of this chapter, the US, the UK, France, and Russia (USSR) are considered major powers. In some conflicts, such as in Iraq and in Afghanistan, the government may receive support from both major powers and other countries—the latter rarely involved in more than a minor combat role. Where this is the case the conflict is still treated as a civil war with military involvement by a major power.
- 2 This *Report*, like previous *Reports*, uses battle-death data from two datasets. For the long-term trend from 1946 to 2008, we rely on the dataset compiled by the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO). Data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) are now available from 1989 and are updated annually. The overall trends for the period where the two datasets overlap—the post-Cold War period—are very similar. There are, however, differences in absolute death tolls between the two datasets that reflect the different approaches to estimating battle deaths. UCDP's methodology, which requires much more detail in order to code battle deaths, tends to report lower battle-death tolls. The number of battle deaths reported by either UCDP or PRIO for any individual conflict should therefore be treated with caution, but the trend is reliable (see Appendix for more details).
- 3 We consider the post-Cold War period to start in 1989.
- 4 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2010, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/ (accessed 14 March 2012).
- 5 Each *conflict* year represents a calendar year in which a conflict was ongoing. Most calendar years involve more than one conflict year because more than one conflict was being fought during that year.
- 6 The long-term trend remains the same steep decline shown in Figure 10.4 of the last *Human Security Report*, however the numbers are different. The last *Human Security Report* used PRIO data for 1946 to 2001 and UCDP data for 2002 to 2008. Figure 5.2 in this *Report* only uses PRIO data and ends in 2008, the last year of the dataset. UCDP data, which cover the period from 1989 to 2009, are graphed separately.
The Human Security Report Project (HSRP) has also changed how it calculates best estimates for the PRIO dataset in cases where PRIO has not provided a best estimate. In the past, HSRP calculated the straight average. HSRP now uses the geometric mean to calculate best estimates. This reduces the upward bias when there is a substantial difference between the high and low battle-death estimates.
- 7 Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute Oslo, (PRIO), Battle Deaths Dataset 3.0, <http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths/The-Battle-Deaths-Dataset-version-30/> (accessed 14 March 2012), updated from Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths," *European Journal of Population* 21, no. 2–3 (2005): doi: 10.1007/s10680-005-6851-6.

- 8 This latter conflict was also associated with significant levels of *one-sided violence*—deaths due to targeted attacks on civilians by government forces or by formally organized non-state armed groups. See Chapter 8 of this *Report* for more analysis of this type of organized violence.
- 9 HSRP, *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 160.
- 10 The battle-death data graphed here are similar to, but not exactly the same as, those shown in Figure 10.4 of the last *Human Security Report*. The last *Human Security Report* used PRIO data for 1946 to 2001, and UCDP data for 2002 to 2008. Figure 5.4 only uses UCDP data, which are now available for the period 1989–2009. PRIO data are graphed separately.
- 11 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/ Human Security Report Project, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada.
- 12 While no one doubts that the war-related death toll in the DRC was very high, the last *Human Security Report* demonstrated that the much-cited estimated 5.4 million death toll is a substantial overestimate. Nor is the claim that the war in the DRC is the world’s deadliest conflict since the end of World War II correct. Deaths from organized violence—both in total numbers and per population—were many times higher during the Korean War, for example. See HSRP, *Human Security Report 2009/2010*, 121.
- 13 Some intrastate conflicts are internationalized in only some of the years of the conflict. Following the coding of the UCDP dataset, the term *internationalized intrastate conflict* in this chapter only refers to conflict years (see endnote 5) with external military intervention. When comparing internationalized intrastate conflicts with other types of conflicts, we check the robustness of our findings by comparing all civil conflicts that have ever had foreign military involvement with those that have never had such an involvement.

With both definitions, UCDP data for 1989–2009 show internationalized intrastate conflicts as just over twice as deadly as other intrastate conflicts. PRIO data from 1946 to 2008 confirm this with the latter definition. When considering conflict years, PRIO data show internationalized intrastate conflicts as nearly four times as deadly on average as other intrastate conflicts.

- 14 The definition of internationalized intrastate conflict excludes solely indirect military assistance, such as the provision of arms. Internationalized intrastate conflicts, however, include some cases in which fighting occurs outside the territory of the disputed government. The rebel group may be fighting the forces of more than one government but has only stated its intention to target one, so all related deaths are considered part of that conflict, and the forces of the other governments are considered to be fighting on behalf of the targeted government. These cases include the fighting in Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the DRC involving the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which is in conflict with Uganda; the fighting in the DRC involving the FDLR, which is in conflict with Rwanda; plus, the fighting in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Yemen involving al-Qaida, which UCDP codes as conflict with the US.
- 15 Most peacekeeping missions start when a peace process is already significantly advanced. Peace agreements tend to be in place before the UN deploys a peacekeeping mission, which is then mandated to support that peace. This role is quite different from military operations intended to secure victory for one side of the conflict.
- 16 Bethany Lacina, "Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 2 (2006): 285–287, doi: 10.1177/0022002705284828 (accessed 13 August 2012).
- 17 Kristine Eck, "From Armed Conflict to War: Ethnic Mobilization and Conflict Intensification," *International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 2 (2009): 380, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00538.x (accessed 13 August 2012).
- 18 Patrick M. Regan, "Third-party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 1 (2002): 57, doi: 10.1177/0022002702046001004 (accessed 13 August 2012).
- 19 See, for example, Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom, "On the Duration of Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 253–273. doi:10.1177/0022343304043769.
- 20 See Regan, "Third-party Interventions," 55–73.
- 21 See, for example, Dylan Balch-Lindsey and Andrew J. Enterline, "Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820–1992," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 4 (2000): 615–642. Ibrahim A. Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, "External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars" (unpublished manuscript, World Bank, March 2000), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2000/09/30/000094946_00091405494827/additional/122522322_20041117154546.pdf; Regan, "Third-party Interventions," 55–73.
- 22 David E. Cunningham, "Blocking resolution: How external states can prolong civil wars," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 2 (2010): 124–125, doi: 10.1177/0022343309353488 (accessed 13 August 2012).
- 23 The US also supported UNITA but not with armed forces on the ground.
- 24 Cunningham, "Blocking resolution," 116–117.

- 25 Therese Pettersson, "Pillars of Strength: External Support to Warring Parties," in *States in Armed Conflict 2010*, edited by Therese Pettersson and Lotta Themner (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2011), 51.
- 26 Bethany Lacina, "Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars," 285.
- 27 *Ibid.*, 286.
- 28 Andrea Kathryn Talentino, whose definition is broader than the one we use here for internationalized intrastate conflict, also finds an increase in intervention following the end of the Cold War: "[o]f all post-Cold War [conflicts], 71 percent saw some form of intervention, compared to 59 percent during the Cold War." Andrea Kathryn Talentino, *Military intervention after the Cold War: The evolution of theory and practice* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005), 26.
- 29 These data include interstate conflicts. However, because interstate conflicts have been very rare in the new millennium, the recent surge in conflicts with external troop support is almost entirely in internationalized intrastate conflicts. See Pettersson, "Pillars of Strength," 49, 57.
- 30 The number of internationalized intrastate conflicts is significantly lower than the number of intrastate conflicts in every year. This in large part explains why the trend in Figure 5.2 is more uneven than that of the intrastate conflicts.
- 31 Although China may also come to mind as a major power, we do not include China in this list, as China has not been involved in any internationalized intrastate conflicts since 1989.
- 32 As we showed in our last *Report*, France, the UK, the US, and Russia (USSR) have each been involved in more international conflicts—which include interstate as well as internationalized intrastate—since the end of World War II than any other state. HSRP, *Human Security Report 2009/2010*, 165.
- 33 In some cases, the conflict may involve both major and other powers, such as in the Kosovo conflict in 1999, fought between the Serbian military and US-supported Kosovo rebel force, with additional military forces from other NATO countries. For the purpose of this discussion, we consider these conflicts to be civil wars with external military support by a major power.
- 34 Ann Hironaka, *Neverending Wars: The international community, weak states, and the perpetuation of civil war* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 155.
- 35 HSRP, *Human Security Report 2009/2010*.

CHAPTER 6

- 36 An extended version of the arguments made in this chapter has appeared in Sebastian Merz, "Less Conflict, More Peace? Understanding Trends in Conflict Persistence," in *Conflict, Security & Development* 12, no. 3 (2012): 201–226. doi:10.1080/14678802.2012.703532.
- 37 Fen Osler Hampson, Chester A. Crocker, and Pamela Aall, "If the World's Getting More Peaceful, Why Are We Still in Danger?" *Globe and Mail*, 20 October 2005, A25.
- 38 James D. Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 275–301, 275. doi: 10.1177/0022343304043770 (accessed 13 August 2012).
- 39 Paul Collier, *Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy*, ed. World Bank, A World Bank policy research report (Washington, DC: World Bank; Oxford University Press, 2003), 99–100; Ann Hironaka, *Neverending wars: The international community, weak states, and the perpetuation of civil war* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 4.
- 40 The World Bank, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development* (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2011), 57.
- 41 Unlike in other chapters of this *Report*, the term *conflict* will in this chapter only refer to intrastate conflicts. This includes *internationalized intrastate* conflicts where foreign troops are involved on at least one side. The category of intrastate conflict also includes a number of bloody coups d'état. Note that because coups are very short and occurred most frequently during the Cold War years, the inclusion of some of these coups makes conflicts that occurred prior to 1989 appear shorter than if all coups were excluded. Even so, the data show that Cold War-era conflicts have tended to last longer than more recent conflicts.
- 42 Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom, "On the Duration of Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 253–273, 257. doi: 10.1177/0022343304043769; Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?" 278–279.
- 43 At the core of UCDF/PRIO's definition of *conflict* is the "contested incompatibility" between the warring parties, which could be over the control of government power or over control of a specific territory. According to this definition, there can be only one conflict over government in a country, which means that in a few cases, episodes of fighting involving unrelated rebel groups are coded as part of the same conflict, even if those episodes occurred many years apart. Such cases are relatively rare, but we have checked our findings that refer to the duration of entire conflicts by using alternate definitions of conflicts. For this, we coded as a new conflict over government any cases where the conflict had been inactive for 10 or more years and the rebel side had changed completely. The result was not appreciably different.

- 44 As a consequence of this coding rule, the coding of terminations lags one year behind all other conflict data; in other words, the data presented in this *Report* include conflict outbreaks through 2009 and conflict terminations through 2008.
- 45 The start date of a conflict episode is the first day when a conflict (for the first time, or for the first time after at least a year of nonactivity) reaches the threshold of 25 battle deaths in a year; the end date is the last day of fighting before a full calendar year of inactivity. See Joakim Kreutz, *UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset Codebook*, Version 2010-1, http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/55/55056_UCDP_Conflict_Termination_Dataset_v_2010-1.pdf (accessed 27 May 2011).
- 46 We simplify the termination types from the UCDP dataset, using just four categories: peace agreements, ceasefires (which we sometimes discuss together as *negotiated settlements*), victories, and “other.” UCDP differentiates between two types of ceasefires, which we count in a single category here, and also has two categories without specific outcome events that we combine in the category “other terminations” here. See Kreutz, *UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset Codebook*.
- 47 Crocker et al. use the term “intractable” specifically for conflicts that resist resolution. See Chester A. Crocker, Fen O. Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall, eds., *Grasping the nettle: Analyzing cases of intractable conflict* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 5.
- 48 Collier, *Breaking the conflict trap*, 4, see also 82–83.
- 49 Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?” 276 (Figure 1).
- 50 Fearon does not distinguish between conflicts and conflict episodes. He considers a war terminated if there is “either a military victory, wholesale demobilization, or truce or peace agreement followed by at least two years of peace.” See *ibid.*, 279.
- 51 Roy Licklider, “Comparative Studies of Long Wars,” in *Grasping the nettle: Analyzing cases of intractable conflict*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen O. Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 42.
- 52 When using the median value, which is less vulnerable to distortion by outliers, the rate of decline is almost two-thirds, from 3.5 years in the 1970s to just over one year during the 1980s, and has remained at that level.
- 53 Using the duration of entire conflicts rather than conflict episodes shows the average duration halved between the 1970s and the 1980s. Because conflicts may restart any time in the future, however, choosing total conflict duration aggravates the problem of truncated data.
- 54 The percentage of onsets of civil wars and international conflicts followed by 10 years of fighting—that is, the most persistent conflicts—dropped significantly after the 1970s, as we reported in the *Human Security Report 2009/2010*.
- 55 The graph ends in 2004 to make sure that all conflict episodes in the sample had an equal chance of reaching the five-year threshold.

- 56 The total number of civil war episodes of five years or more dropped during the 1980s, spiked in the 1990s, and declined again in the early 2000s. In other words, there is no consistent decline in the absolute number of longer-than-average conflict episodes when the length threshold is five years. This, however, must be seen in the context of an extraordinary increase in the total number of conflict onsets during the 1990s: twice as many civil wars broke out during the 1990s as in any other post–World War II decade. The trend displayed in Figure 6.1 shows that longer episodes increased to a much lesser extent, which means that long conflict episodes as a percentage of all conflict episodes shrank.
- 57 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/ Human Security Report Project, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada.
- 58 The overall trend is the same if we apply a 10-year threshold to the conflict-episode duration data. Almost one in three episodes starting in the 1970s lasted for 10 years or more. In the 1990s it was only roughly one in 11. If we do an analysis similar to Figure 6.1, but using conflict rather than episode duration, the trend is confirmed both with a five-year and a 10-year threshold (using conflict duration, however, again confronts the truncated-data problem described above).
- 59 Joakim Kreutz, “How and when armed conflicts end: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset,” *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 2 (2010): 244, doi: 10.1177/0022343309353108 (accessed 13 August 2012).
- 60 World Bank, *World Development Report 2011*, 58. The WDR cites UCDP/PRIO data and thus its results are comparable with the data presented here.
- 61 In our figures, we only include conflict terminations through 2004 and consider them recurred when renewed violence is recorded within less than five years. This is to ensure that all terminations have the same amount of time to recur, making sure that figures are comparable across time.
- 62 We simplify the termination types from the UCDP dataset (see endnote 46). The difference between ceasefires and peace agreements is explained in more detail in the box on page 178-9.
- 63 Roy Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993,” *The American Political Science Review* 89, no. 3 (1995): 681–690. The well-established finding that victories tend to be stable outcomes (not followed by another episode of violence) is not undermined by the fact that between 2000 and 2004, as shown in Table 6.1, victories have shown an exceptionally high recurrence rate of 50 percent, because the 50 percent figure is based on only four cases.
- 64 Page Fortna, “Where Have All the Victories Gone? Peacekeeping and War Outcomes” (prepared for presentation at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, ON, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450558 (accessed 5 December 2011).

- 65 The high failure rate of victories in the 2000s is based on a very small number of cases: two of the four victories counted between 2000 and 2004 broke down. Similarly, only very few ceasefires were recorded in civil conflicts before 1990, which may have been due in part to under-reporting. The small number of cases makes it difficult to discern reliable trends, because the results are influenced heavily by only a handful of observations.
- 66 Raleigh et al. analyze a sample of new geo-referenced data on conflicts between 1997 and 2010, and find that, on average, repeated fighting takes place in only 15 percent of the territory. See Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, "Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset: Special Data Feature," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 5 (2010): 651–660.
- 67 Several scholars have questioned the effectiveness of peace agreements and other settlements. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," 36–44; Robert Wagner, "The Causes of Peace," in *Stopping the Killing: How Wars End*, ed. Roy Licklider (New York, New York University Press, 1995), 235–268; Monica D. Toft, "Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?" *International Security* 34, no. 4 (2010), 20, doi: 10.1162/isec.2010.34.4.7 (accessed 4 April 2012).
- 68 As pointed out above, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) differentiates between two types of ceasefires, which we count in a single category here.
- 69 Kreutz, *UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset Codebook*, 2–3, http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/55/55056_UCDP_Conflict_Termination_Dataset_v_2010-1.pdf (accessed 27 May 2011).
- 70 Note that the dataset only records terminations followed by at least one calendar year in which the conflict does not reach the threshold of 25 battle deaths.
- 71 As Table 6.1 in this report shows, the most recent recurrence rate for the years 2000–2004 is significantly lower than the 40-percent figure of the turbulent 1990s. Because two peace agreements signed since 2004 (not included in Table 6.1) have already failed, the preliminary recurrence rate for the new millennium currently stands at some 20 percent, but this figure will be subject to change as new data becomes available.
- 72 D. Nilsson, "Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil War Settlements," *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 4 (2008): 479–495, doi: 10.1177/0022343308091357 (accessed 4 April 2012). At this (dyadic) level of analysis, the failure rate of peace agreements in intrastate conflicts between 1950 and 2004 is a mere 10 percent.
- 73 Toft, "Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?" 20.
- 74 Ibid., 20. See also the discussion of these findings in Toft, *Securing the peace*, 61–62. Note that Toft's findings are based on a total of five failed peace agreements. In two out of these cases more than 10 years lie between termination and recurrence.
- 75 Toft, *Securing the peace*, 62.

- 76 In fact, the reverse is very likely the case. Toft's finding appears to be driven by death tolls *before* a settlement. It is much more plausible that the willingness of the conflict parties to settle their dispute through negotiations was influenced by the high intensity of protracted fighting—a so-called hurting stalemate—rather than the other way around.
- 77 In Figure 6.5 we focus on the period 1989–2009 for which we have updated battle-death data and a larger number of observations than Toft's sample that covers the years 1940–2003. Terminations are included through 2004 to make sure that all terminations had an equal chance of reaching the five-year recurrence threshold; battle deaths are included through 2009. The patterns remain the same if the analysis is extended to the entire post-World War II period.
- 78 Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?" 283; Karl R. de Rouen and David Sobek, "The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 303–320, 307, doi: 10.1177/0022343304043771 (accessed 13 August 2012).
- 79 Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, and Päivi Lujala, "Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 4 (2009): 544–569. doi: 10.1177/0022002709336457; Daron Acemoglu, Andrea Vindigni, and Davide Ticchi, "Persistence of Civil Wars," *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8, nos. 2–3 (2010): 664–676, doi: 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00536.x (accessed 13 August 2012).
- 80 Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?" 289.
- 81 Chester A. Crocker, Fen O. Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall, "Introduction: Mapping the Nettlefield," in *Grasping the nettle: Analyzing cases of intractable conflict*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen O. Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 6–7.
- 82 Bethany Lacina and Nils P. Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths," *European Journal of Population* 21, no. 2–3 (2005): 145–166, doi: 10.1007/s10680-005-6851-6 (accessed 13 August 2012); Hironaka, *Neverending wars*, 124–125.
- 83 Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, "International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 3 (2010): 415–429, http://stathis.research.yale.edu/documents/Kalyvas_Balcells_APSR.pdf (accessed 21 September 2011).
- 84 Hironaka, *Neverending wars*, 151; Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, *The political economy of armed conflict: Beyond greed and grievance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 9.
- 85 Rouen and Sobek, "The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome."
- 86 HSRP, *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

- 87 Patrick M. Regan and Aysegul Aydin, "Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 5 (2006): 748–749, doi: 10.1177/0022002706291579 (accessed 13 August 2012).
- 88 A. Escribà-Folch, "Economic sanctions and the duration of civil conflicts," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 2 (2010), 129–141, doi: 10.1177/0022343309356489 (accessed 13 August 2012); HSRP, *Human Security Report 2009/2010*, 74.
- 89 Edward N. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 4 (1999): 36–44, <http://digilib.bc.edu/reserves/sc094/finn/sc09436.pdf> (accessed 18 November 2011).
- 90 Ibid.
- 91 Kreutz, "How and when armed conflicts end," 246.
- 92 Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," 36. In the *Human Security Brief 2006*, we provided a more detailed critique of this argument. See Human Security Centre, *Human Security Brief 2006* (Vancouver, BC: Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, 2006), 22, <http://hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/2006/text.aspx>.
- 93 Barbara F. Walter, *Committing to peace: The successful settlement of civil wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 161.
- 94 Ibid., 90. For a different view on security guarantees, see Monica Duffy Toft, *Securing the peace: The durable settlement of civil wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 30–32.
- 95 Virginia P. Fortna, *Does peacekeeping work? Shaping belligerents' choices after civil war* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). For a more in-depth discussion of the effect of peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions on the risk of recurring violence, see HSRP, *Human Security Report 2009/2010*, Chapter 4.
- 96 Michael Gilligan and Stephen Stedman, "Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?" *International Studies Review* 5, no. 4 (2003): 37–54.
- 97 James D. Fearon, "Governance and Civil War Onset: World Development Report 2011 Background Paper," http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/WDR%20Background%20Paper_Fearon_0.pdf (accessed 9 August 2012).
- 98 Indeed, this is one of the objectives of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States agreement—an initiative of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding—that was concluded at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness at Busan, South Korea, on 1 December 2011.

CHAPTER 7

- 99 For more discussion about the shift in armed conflict, see Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars*, 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Principles, Methods, and Approaches* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2009); Martin van Creveld, "The Transformation of War Revisited," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 13, no. 2 (2002): 3–15. doi: 10.1080/09592310208559177 (accessed 13 August 2012); World Bank, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development* (Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2011), 53, <http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/fulltext> (accessed 13 December 2011).
- 100 Kristine Eck, Joakim Kreutz, and Ralph Sundberg, "Introducing the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset," Uppsala University, 2010, unpublished manuscript.
- 101 UCDP codes broad categories of identification, such as Christian and Muslim, by country; an example would be Christians versus Muslims in Nigeria. A global conflict between Christians and Muslims, by contrast, would not be coded in this dataset. See Ralph Sundberg, *Non-state Conflict Dataset Codebook v 2.3-2010* (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2009), 3.
- 102 State-based conflicts, on the other hand, were recorded as active for 6.4 years on average. Note these figures are not directly comparable to figures provided in Chapter 6. Here we consider the cumulative number of calendar years a conflict was active, whereas in Chapter 6 we consider the number of consecutive years in a conflict episode, using more precise coding for start and end dates.
- 103 Therése Pettersson, "Non-state conflicts 1989–2008—Global and Regional Patterns," in *States in Armed Conflict 2009*, Research Report 92, ed. Therése Pettersson and Lotta Themnér (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2010), 187. One reason that non-state conflicts have generally been short is that the majority of them are fought between groups that are less organized for combat than state actors. Few such groups have the resources to sustain long periods of fighting.
- 104 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/Human Security Report Project, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada.
- 105 In the measure of duration used here we count the number of years in which a non-state conflict was active. The conflict does not need to be active for the entire 365 days of a given year to be considered "active" in that year.
- 106 In the relatively rare case of a failed state with no effective government (the situation in Somalia is a case in point), UCDP codes fighting between rebel groups and militias over government power as non-state conflicts. This will result in a higher number of non-state conflicts being coded than if one of the warring parties was holding government power.
- 107 World Bank, "World Development Indicators 2010," (Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2010), <http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/wdi-final.pdf> (accessed 5 April 2012).
- 108 Pettersson, "Non-state conflicts 1989–2008," 195.

- 109 Recent research identifying such factors can be found in papers such as Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 3 (August 2006): 508–535. doi: 10.1177/0022002706289303; and Jeffrey Dixon, "What Causes Civil Wars? Integrating Quantitative Research Findings," *International Studies Review* 11, no.4 (December 2009):707–735. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2486.2009.00892.x.
- 110 Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy: How scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet," *The Atlantic*, February 1994, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/4670/?single_page=true (accessed 9 November 2011).
- 111 See N. P. Gleditsch, "Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature," *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no. 3 (1998): 381–400, doi: 10.1177/0022343398035003007 (accessed 8 November 2011).
- 112 Halvard Buhaug, Nils P. Gleditsch, and Ole M. Theisen, "Implications of Climate Change for Armed Conflict," in *Social dimensions of climate change: Equity and vulnerability in a warming world*, ed. Robin Mearns and Andrew Norton (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010), 89–93.
- 113 Eric Melander and Ralph Sundberg, for example, describe non-state conflict as a "form of violence that carries a much lower cost of initiation than interstate and intrastate wars, and that is known to be much more localized in its geographic scope, and thus can be expected to be more sensitive to local conditions"; Melander and Sundberg, "Climate Change, Environmental Stress, and Violent Conflict," 8 November 2011, unpublished manuscript, 4.
- 114 Ibid.
- 115 Ole M. Theisen and Kristian B. Brandsegg, "The Environment and Non-State Conflicts," (paper presented at the 48th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, 2007), <http://www.svt.ntnu.no/iss/fagkonferanse2007/intern/papers/Ole.Magnus.Theisen@svt.ntnu.noThe%20Environment%20and%20Non-State%20Conflicts.doc> (accessed 9 November 2011).
- 116 For more on the debate, see HSRP, *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 68.
- 117 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (2004): 563–595, doi: 10.1093/oep/gpf064, (accessed 8 November 2011).
- 118 Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War"; James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90, doi: 10.1017/S0003055403000534 (accessed 8 November 2011).
- 119 Hanne Fjelde and Gudrun Østby, "Economic Inequality and Inter-group Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2008," last modified 10 November 2011, unpublished manuscript.
- 120 Joakim Kreutz and Kristine Eck, "Regime Transition and Communal Violence," 8 November 2011, unpublished manuscript.

CHAPTER 8

- 121 Joakim Kreutz, *One-Sided Violence Codebook v 1.3* (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2008), 2, http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/55/55080_UCDP_One-sided_violence_Dataset_Codebook_v1.3.pdf (accessed 18 January 2012).
- 122 United Nations General Assembly, "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide," <http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html> (accessed 28 November 2011).
- 123 Madelyn H.-R. Hicks et al., "Global Comparison of Warring Groups in 2002–2007: Fatalities from Targeting Civilians vs. Fighting Battles," *PLoS ONE* 6, no. 9 (2011): 1–14, 2, doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0023976 (accessed 13 April 2012).
- 124 Ibid.
- 125 Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars*, 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007). See also our discussion of these claims in Chapter 3 of this Report.
- 126 Chyanda M. Querido, "State-Sponsored Mass Killing in African Wars—Greed or Grievance?" *International Advances in Economic Research* 15, no. 3 (2009): 351–361, doi: 10.1007/s11294-009-9207-x (accessed 13 April 2012).
- 127 Kristine Eck and Lisa Hultman, "One-Sided Violence against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 2 (2007): 233–246, doi: 10.1177/0022343307075124 (accessed 13 April 2012).
- 128 Reed M. Wood, "Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 5 (2010): 601–614, doi: 10.1177/0022343310376473.
- 129 Lisa Hultman, "Keeping Peace or Spurring Violence? Unintended Effects of Peace Operations on Violence against Civilians," *Civil Wars* 12, nos. 1–2 (2010): 29–46, doi: 10.1080/13698249.2010.484897 (accessed 13 April 2012).
- 130 Ibid., 30.
- 131 Margit Bussmann and Gerald Schneider, "A Porous Humanitarian Shield: The Laws of War, the Red Cross, and the Killing of Civilians," September 2010, unpublished manuscript, <http://147.142.190.246/joomla/peio/files2011/papers/Bussmann,%20Schneider%2027.09.2010.pdf> (accessed 8 September 2011).
- 132 Lara J. Nettelfield, "Research and Repercussions of Death Tolls," in *Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict*, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill (New York: Cornell University Press, 2010), 159–188.
- 133 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/ Human Security Report Project, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada.
- 134 The adjustments to the death toll were made based on new evidence from the UN *Mapping Report*, which was published in 2010. See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "DRC: Mapping Human Rights Violations 1993–2003," August 2010, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ZR/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_EN.pdf (accessed 21 November 2011).

- 135 UCDP's high estimate for the Rwandan genocide in 1994 is around 800,000, while the low estimate is approximately 150,000.
- 136 HSRP, *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 182.
- 137 The percentage of deaths that occurred in sub-Saharan Africa includes the Rwandan genocide. However, excluding deaths in Rwanda, the region still accounts for 61 percent of global deaths from one-sided violence.

APPENDIX

- 138 The discussion about the differences between the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and Uppsala University's Conflict Data Program (UCDP) datasets on battle deaths from state-based armed conflict was initiated by Gerdis Wischnath and Nils Petter Gleditsch, with subsequent input from UCDP and the Human Security Report Project (HSRP). This overview, prepared by HSRP, reflects the views of all three institutions.
- 139 State-based conflicts from 1946 to 2010 are recorded in the now widely used UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.
- 140 Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute Oslo, (PRIO), Battle Deaths Dataset 3.0, <http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths/The-Battle-Deaths-Dataset-version-30/> (accessed 14 March 2012), updated from Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths," *European Journal of Population* 21, no. 2–3 (2005): doi: 10.1007/s10680-005-6851-6; Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/ Human Security Report Project, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada.
- 141 See Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand, "Armed conflict 1946–2001: A new dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 5 (2002): 615–637. doi: 10.1177/0022343302039005007, and the two websites, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/ and <http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/> (accessed 27 April 2012).
- 142 Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths," *European Journal of Population* 21, no. 2–3 (2005): 145–166. doi: 10.1007/s10680-005-6851-6. One version of the PRIO dataset has data going as far back as 1900. See Bethany Lacina, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Bruce Russett, "The Declining Risk of Death in Battle," *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 3 (2006): 673–680. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00419.x. The replication data are found at <http://www.prio.no/csw/datasets> (accessed 27 April 2012).
- 143 More information on the coding of the low, high, and best estimates for each dataset can be found by consulting the respective PRIO and UCDP codebooks, available on the websites cited above.

- 144 For a description of UCDP's data collection methodology, see UCDP "How are UCDP data collected?" http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/faq/#How_are_UCDP_data_collected_ (accessed 27 April 2012).
- 145 Summary estimations of battle deaths may be based in part on body-count data from the warring parties. Typically, both sides will tend to minimize their own casualties and maximize those of their enemies. Reliance on such data is not likely to lead to any systematic upward or downward bias, however.
- 146 To produce annual battle-death estimates in these cases, PRIO had little choice but to divide estimates for the entire period of the war by the number of years it had lasted. The researchers recognized, of course, that in reality, the probability that each year of conflict would have the same number of battle deaths was low. This is another cause of the difference between PRIO's annual estimates and UCDP's—the latter are always based on incident data of reported battle deaths.
- 147 They may also include some *non-state* conflict deaths—fighting between rival militias, for example, which would be counted separately by Uppsala.
- 148 Conflicts that are likely to include a high level of one-sided violence are noted in the documentation for the PRIO dataset.
- 149 This is an even greater problem with estimating deaths from one-sided violence, since few armed groups are likely to boast about killing civilians.
- 150 There are additional technical issues that we do not elaborate on here. Most notably, PRIO researchers do not publish best estimates for conflict years where they lack reliable information based on their set of sources. Using an average of high and low estimates to replace the missing best estimates as we do in Figure A.2 exaggerates the differences between PRIO and UCDP. Note also that the PRIO and UCDP battle-death data currently available are based on different versions of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, which means that some conflict years are coded in one, but not the other, battle-death dataset.
- 151 See Ziad Obermeyer, Christopher J. L. Murray, and Emmanuela Gakidou, "Fifty years of violent war deaths from Vietnam to Bosnia: analysis of data from the world health survey programme," *British Medical Journal* 336, no. 7659 (2008): 1482. doi: 10.1136/bmj.a137. See rebuttal by Michael Spagat, Andrew Mack, Tara Cooper, and Joakim Kreutz, "Estimating War Deaths: An Arena of Contestation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 6 (2009): 934–950. doi: 10.1177/0022002709346253. See also Meredith R. Sarkees, Frank W. Wayman, and J. David Singer, "Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution over Time, 1816-1997," *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 1 (2003): 49–70. See rebuttal by Bethany Lacina, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Bruce Russett, "The Declining Risk of Death in Battle," *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 3 (2006): 673–680. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00419.x. See also Anita Gohdes and Megan Price, "First things first: Assessing data quality before model quality," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, forthcoming (a response by Bethany Lacina, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Bruce Russett will be published in the same issue).

- 152 See Steven Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature* (New York: Viking, 2011); Joshua Goldstein, *Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide* (New York: Dutton, 2011); and HSRP, *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
- 153 See HRDAG, "Projects," <http://www.hrdag.org/about/projects.shtml> (accessed 30 April 2012).