



Marie Frechon / UN Photo. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

## CHAPTER 1

### Sexual Violence in War-Affected Countries

In 2002 Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, now president of Liberia, delivered a major report to the UN (United Nations) that examined the impact of sexual violence against women and girls in war-affected countries.

Although well aware of the available literature on this issue, Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf reported that they had been quite unprepared for what they learned from their on-the-ground investigations of sexual violence in the world's war zones.

The stories were horrific:

Wombs punctured with guns. Women raped and tortured in front of their husbands and children. Rifles forced into vaginas. Pregnant women beaten to induce miscarriages. Foetuses ripped from wombs. Women kidnapped, blindfolded and beaten on their way to work or school. We saw the scars, the pain and the humiliation. We heard accounts of gang rapes, rape camps and mutilation. Of murder and sexual slavery. We saw the scars of brutality so extreme that survival seemed for some a worse fate than death.<sup>7</sup>

This and other official reports, plus the tireless investigations of human rights and humanitarian advocacy groups, have drawn international attention to the long-neglected issues of wartime sexual violence against women, helped galvanize action against the perpetrators, and increased assistance to its survivors.

But these same reports are problematic—not because shocking violations like those described by Rehn, Johnson Sirleaf, and many others are untrue—but because the accounts in which they are embedded are misleading.

The mainstream narrative informed by reports from the UN human rights organizations, and media-propagated “urban myths,” presents a picture of wartime sexual violence that is, with some exceptions, both partial and often deeply misrepresentative.

In particular:

- It focuses disproportionate attention on the relatively small number of countries that are deeply affected by conflict-related sexual violence—by which we mean sexual violence perpetrated by combatants. This has created the impression that the extraordinarily high levels of rape reported in war-affected Bosnia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan are characteristic of all war-affected countries. They are not.
- It depicts wartime sexual violence as increasing, but provides little evidence to support such a claim. All we can say with certainty is that reporting of sexual violence has increased significantly. Indirect evidence suggests that the overall level of wartime sexual violence may have *decreased* worldwide.
- It argues that *strategic rape*—the use of rape as a weapon of war—is a pervasive and growing threat but presents no evidence to support this claim. Some evidence suggests that its incidence is less prevalent than claimed, and that it may have declined in recent years.
- It presents men—invariably combatants—as the perpetrators of sexual violence; women and girls as the victims. Little is said about sexual violence against males, while female perpetration is ignored almost completely despite recent evidence indicating that it may be far more prevalent in wartime than is generally understood.
- It concentrates on sexual violence perpetrated by combatants—i.e., rebels, militias, and government forces—while ignoring almost completely noncombatant sexual violence. Yet, the evidence indicates that the latter—most of it perpetrated within the household or extended family—is much more pervasive than the former.

Lacking useful data on sexual violence, official and NGO (nongovernmental organization) accounts of wartime rape and other forms of sexual violence tend to rely on statistics that are often of questionable reliability and on survivor accounts of individual atrocities, which—while true and deeply shocking—are not representative.

## Focus and Scope

This chapter argues that the mainstream narrative on sexual violence in war-affected countries is biased in two important ways. We use the term *mainstream narrative* here to mean the manner in which people frame, perceive, and explain the social world.<sup>8</sup>

First, it exaggerates the worldwide prevalence and intensity of wartime sexual violence by inappropriately generalizing from shocking victim accounts and statistics drawn from a relatively small number of the worst-affected countries.

Second, it systematically neglects domestic sexual violence in war-affected countries, despite the fact that its impact is far more pervasive than that of conflict-related sexual violence. It also largely ignores sexual violence against males in wartime.

In other words, wartime sexual violence is both overstated and understated. In Chapter 2 we argue that both forms of bias have unfortunate implications for policy.

This chapter relies heavily on a small number of population surveys—all undertaken over the past 10 years—that have examined the incidence and drivers of sexual violence in conflict-affected countries. Notwithstanding the various ethical and methodological challenges confronted while conducting surveys in war-affected countries, these constitute the most reliable sources of data that currently exist on the prevalence, scope, and intensity of sexual violence in conflict-affected societies.

### *What Do We Mean by Sexual Violence?*

The term sexual violence includes, but is not limited to, rape. As Anne Marie Goetz, Chief Advisor for Governance, Peace and Security for the UN's Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), points out, international law further includes in its definition of sexual violence:

forced prostitution; sexual slavery; forced impregnation; forced maternity; forced termination of pregnancy; enforced sterilization; indecent assault; trafficking; inappropriate medical examinations and strip searches.<sup>9</sup>

We do not seek to examine these types of sexual violence in this report, not because they are unimportant, but because no reliable data are available in most war-affected countries to estimate their scope or intensity. Nor, for essentially the same reason, do we include lesser forms of sexual abuse—such as unwanted sexual comments and unwanted sexual touching.

The most commonly studied form of sexual violence is rape. Yale scholar Elisabeth Wood's definition is a useful guide:

By *rape*, I mean the penetration of the anus or vagina with any object or body part or of any body part of the victim or perpetrator's body with a sexual organ, by force or by threat of force or coercion, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.<sup>10</sup>

Rape thus defined is the central focus of Part I of this report, but we also include some forms of sexual violence that do not fall within rubric of rape as defined here, notably the use of *sexual torture*—castration or other intentional violence against male genitalia; or the mutilation of women's genitals<sup>11</sup> and breasts, both of which occur in some conflict situations.<sup>12</sup>

We make a distinction between the two major types of sexual violence that occur during wartime. First, there is *conflict-related sexual violence*, by which we mean that perpetrated by combatants—rebels, militia fighters, and government forces.<sup>13</sup> Second, there is *domestic sexual violence*, which includes not only that perpetrated by intimate partners but also by other household or family members. The evidence we have indicates that the large majority of noncombatant sexual violence in wartime is made up of domestic sexual violence. We discuss the different categories of sexual violence in war-affected countries in more detail in the box on page 23.

Finally, we note that throughout this chapter, where we discuss survey data on sexual violence, we are only using the *best estimate*—i.e., that which indicates the most probable rate of sexual violence. In reality, all survey-based estimates are subject to considerable uncertainty, usually expressed as *confidence intervals*.<sup>14</sup>

## The Sources of Evidence

Developing evidence-based policies to combat wartime sexual violence requires reliable quantitative data on the rate and severity of sexual violence in addition to qualitative data. Robust quantitative data are, however, rarely available in conflict and post-conflict environments.

The most influential reporting comes from the investigations of international human rights organizations like Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International. These and other human rights organizations provide timely information on violations of all forms of human rights—including wartime rape and other forms of sexual violence.

HRW, Amnesty, and other human rights organizations bear witness to rights violations and advocate for justice on behalf of victims. However, the detailed information they collect on particular incidents of sexual violence and survivor narratives is rarely suitable for making quantitative assessments of the *overall* prevalence and incidence of human rights violations in a country. For that purpose, population surveys are the most appropriate.

The most comprehensive cross-national data on the extent of conflict-related sexual violence in war-affected countries come from a new dataset compiled by Dara Cohen of the University of Minnesota. Using data from the US State Department’s annual reports on human rights abuses, Cohen categorizes the severity of reported sexual violence in conflict-affected

---

Evidence-based policies against wartime sexual violence require qualitative data as well as reliable quantitative data, which are rarely available.

---

countries on a four-point scale, from “systematic” or “massive” to zero.<sup>15</sup> This is the only cross-national quantitative study that provides data on reported levels of conflict-related sexual violence. But determining whether what is being recorded by the State Department is actual changes in the level of sexual violence, or simply changes in the *reporting* of this sexual violence can be very difficult.<sup>16</sup>

A critically important source of cross-national data on the prevalence of sexual violence in individual war-affected countries is provided by nationwide population surveys. These surveys provide estimates of domestic, as well as conflict-related, sexual violence and are a reflection of the more general international concern to map the worldwide incidence of sexual violence against women that has grown since the UN’s landmark World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995.<sup>17</sup> Most have been undertaken since the beginning of the new millennium.

Providing that the survey samples are selected to ensure that they are representative of the national population, the national rate of victimization will, in principle, be approximately the

## SEXUAL VIOLENCE TERMINOLOGY

In the literature on sexual violence in war-affected countries two broad categories of sexual violence can be distinguished:

- *Conflict-related sexual violence* is that perpetrated by combatants—rebels, militias, and government forces. This is the sexual violence that most studies and reports focus on.
- *Domestic sexual violence* is that perpetrated by intimate partners<sup>18</sup> and by other family/household members. It also includes sexual assaults by noncombatant acquaintances, although these usually only constitute a very small minority of assaults.<sup>19</sup>

In practice, estimates of conflict-related sexual violence can include not only violence perpetrated by combatants but also cases of *stranger rape* perpetrated by civilians unknown to the victim. Many studies of sexual violence in war-affected countries do not specify whether perpetrators identified as “strangers” or “outside of the household” were combatants or noncombatants. But where they do, the data suggest that the overwhelming majority of sexual violence perpetrated *by strangers* during wartime is, in fact, attributable to combatants.

*War-affected countries*: we use the term “war-affected” to describe both countries in conflict and during the immediate post-conflict years.<sup>20</sup> When wars end, the incidence of sexual violence perpetrated by combatants is usually sharply reduced, but it does not end.<sup>21</sup>

*Lifetime prevalence of sexual violence*: this is by far the most commonly used measure of sexual violence in the literature. It refers to the percentage of the population that has ever been victimized by sexual violence during their lifetime.<sup>22</sup> This measure has the virtue of simplicity—almost everyone who has been victimized by sexual violence remembers that this is the case.<sup>23</sup>

In the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) multi-country surveys on sexual violence that we discuss in Chapters 2 and 3, respondents were asked if they had been assaulted as a child.<sup>24</sup> The resulting data provided a rare insight into the prevalence of sexual violence against children, though not all of the 10 countries were war-affected.

*Incidence of sexual violence*: this, as the term suggests, is a measure of the number of incidents of sexual violence in a given population unit (e.g., incidents per 100 or 1,000 people) within a given time period. So, while *prevalence* data tell us what percentage of a population had experienced sexual violence at least once during a particular period, *incidence* data tell us the total number of incidents—some individuals are likely to be victimized more than once.<sup>25</sup>

Incidence data is very rarely collected in population surveys. If they were, it would likely reveal that the incidence, as well as the prevalence, of domestic sexual violence is much higher than conflict-related sexual violence. This is because individuals subjected to conflict-related sexual violence are rarely assaulted on an ongoing basis for months or years on end, as is often the case with respect to domestic sexual violence.<sup>26</sup>

same as that of the sample population. Where such surveys are professionally and sensitively administered, they can provide robust estimates of the national rates of both domestic and conflict-related sexual violence.

However, relatively few population surveys in this area are national in scope; most have been subregional, or have been undertaken solely in refugee or internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. As such, they cannot be assumed to be a reliable guide to national rates of sexual violence in war-affected countries.

Moreover, the extraordinarily sensitive nature of the questions that are asked in surveys on sexual violence confronts a range of challenging ethical issues<sup>27</sup> and a much higher probability of under-reporting than is likely with, for example, questions about maternal health or child mortality.<sup>28</sup>

A further challenge arises because surveys often rely on different definitions of sexual violence and different survey methodologies. This, plus the paucity of nationwide surveys, makes cross-national comparisons of survey findings on wartime sexual violence often difficult, and sometimes impossible.

The minimal amount of data collected on wartime sexual violence stands in sharp contrast with the huge data-collection efforts undertaken for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In the latter case, large-scale population surveys, using common definitions and methodologies, have been undertaken at regular intervals across large numbers of developing countries. The data from the surveys undertaken for the MDGs enable policy-makers to track trends in poverty, health, education, gender equality, and other development issues and help determine the impact of their policies.

Yet, despite the huge increase in international attention being paid to wartime sexual violence, no remotely comparable data-collection effort has been devoted to gathering information on its prevalence and severity. We demonstrate in this chapter that as a consequence, highly misleading assumptions about the scope and intensity of sexual violence in war-affected countries have become widely accepted in the media, in the UN and other international agencies, and in the advocacy community.

### **Five Challenges to the Mainstream Narrative**

It is in large part because there are so few reliable statistics on wartime sexual violence that myths about its incidence have flourished virtually unchallenged. In this section we examine in detail the five misleading characterizations of wartime sexual violence noted in the introduction to this chapter.

#### *Reporting of Wartime Sexual Violence Is Biased towards the Extreme Cases*

Most discussion on wartime sexual violence focuses on the worst-affected countries. Influential high-level reports undertaken for, or by, the UN and leading human rights and humanitarian advocacy NGOs draw their examples and statistics overwhelmingly from a number of countries where rates of sexual violence are without a doubt very high. War-affected countries with far lower levels of reported sexual violence are not discussed.

This pervasive bias creates the misleading impression that the massive extent of conflict-related sexual violence in a relatively small number of conflicts is the norm for all of them. Mainly because there are no reliable cross-national statistics to provide a corrective, there have been virtually no challenges to this mistaken assumption.

As Dara Cohen puts it:

One of the central problems in the literature on wartime sexual violence is that the vast majority of existing research is case studies of what are thought to be particularly severe incidents ... there is little exploration of cases where sexual violence is thought to be minimal.<sup>29</sup>

For example, in 2005, the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), the UN's highly regarded humanitarian news and analysis organization, published a much-cited report, *Broken Bodies—Broken Dreams: Violence against Women Exposed*, one chapter of which focused exclusively on wartime sexual violence.<sup>30</sup> Drawing on information from 18 conflicts fought around the world between 1993 and 2005, the report described the myriad ways in which women and girls are subjected to sexual violence in wartime.

---

A pervasive bias creates the impression that most conflicts are associated with massive conflict-related sexual violence.

---

The report focused on countries that were badly afflicted by both armed conflict and conflict-related sexual violence—those in which the need for humanitarian assistance was great. This was both understandable and wholly appropriate. But in concentrating on the horrific sexual violence in just 18 of the 53 conflict-affected countries during this period, the report created the impression that the violations in the

former countries were the norm. This was not the case. The large majority of the conflict-affected countries that were completely ignored in the report suffered from minor conflicts and almost certainly had far lower levels of conflict-related sexual violence. IRIN's discussion of wartime rape was evocative and powerful, but it failed to point out anywhere that the sexual violence it reported on was atypical of most countries in conflict.

A much clearer idea of the variation in the severity of sexual violence in war-affected countries is now possible thanks to the new dataset compiled by Dara Cohen that we noted previously.<sup>31</sup>

Following a similar methodology to that used by the Political Terror Scale (PTS),<sup>32</sup> Cohen used data from the US State Department's annual reports on human rights issues to extract information on conflict-related sexual violence from 1980 to 2009. Each country was scored for each year that it was in conflict on a four-point scale providing an estimate of the extent of reported rape—from "systematic" or "massive" (Level 3) to "no reported rape" (Level 0).<sup>33</sup>

For the period 2000–2009, only 9 percent of the years of active conflict were characterized by the highest level of sexual violence. 35 percent of the years of active conflict were associated with "widespread" reports of sexual violence (Level 2). Yet in most years of active conflict during

the new millennium, the average level of reported sexual violence was at either Level 1 (very low incidence, 44 percent), or Level 0 (no reported conflict-related rape, 12 percent).<sup>34</sup>

In other words, the countries that experience extremely high levels of sexual violence, like the DRC, and receive most of the media attention are far from the norm.

Extraordinarily, little research has been undertaken to investigate why some countries at war have very low levels of conflict-related sexual violence—though notable exceptions are found s as in the pioneering work of Elisabeth Wood and Dara Cohen.<sup>35</sup>

The failure to recognize the huge variation in the incidence of sexual violence in war-affected countries, or to analyze its causes, has important, and unfortunate, policy implications. A comparison between countries with high levels of wartime sexual violence and the lack of attention on countries with low levels of wartime sexual violence may provide valuable insights into why sexual violence does or does *not* occur—knowledge that could help inform violence prevention policies.

---

Failure to analyze variation in the incidence of sexual violence has unfortunate policy implications.

---

### *There Is No Compelling Evidence that Wartime Sexual Violence Is Increasing Worldwide*

According to high-level UN reports and claims by senior UN officials during the past decade, sexual violence in armed conflicts around the world is increasing:

- In 2002 Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf claimed, “Violence against women during conflict has reached epidemic proportions.”<sup>36</sup>
- In 2005 the above-cited UN-related report *Broken Bodies—Broken Dreams* claimed, “What is especially disturbing, however, about the statistics from the past ten years is how rife the phenomenon [of sexual violence in conflict-affected states] appears to have become.”<sup>37</sup>
- In 2006 a major UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) report claimed, “Sexual violence has become an increasingly common aspect of contemporary warfare.”<sup>38</sup>
- In 2007 Jan Egeland, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, echoed Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf in asserting, “Rape in war has reached epidemic proportions.”<sup>39</sup>
- In 2008 a high-level Wilton Park conference involving UN and other experts concluded that while existing data “was generally viewed as inadequate, available trend analysis suggests a marked increase in the scale and brutality of war-related sexual violence over the past two decades.”<sup>40</sup>

Hardly any evidence has been produced to support the claim that sexual violence in wartime is increasing. However, some of the limited indirect evidence available suggests that the level of combatant-perpetrated sexual violence in war-affected countries has declined worldwide. But to the best of our knowledge, no UN report or senior official has ever hinted that this is even a possibility.

Indirect evidence suggests that the absolute level of conflict-related sexual violence has decreased, rather than increased, in recent years. This is primarily because there has been a global reduction in the number of large-scale armed conflicts. If the number and severity of conflicts decreases, we should—other things being equal—expect a decline in conflict-related sexual violence as well.

Over the past 20 years, *high-intensity* wars (i.e., those that generate 1,000 or more battle deaths a year) are down by more than 50 percent. Interstate wars, which typically have very high death tolls, have become extremely rare since the end of the Cold War.

This decline in the number of wars has helped drive down worldwide battle-death tolls: in the 1990s the worldwide toll of battle deaths was still well in excess of 400,000; in the new millennium, this figure had almost halved.<sup>41</sup>

Given this enormous decrease in conflict intensity, we believe that it is reasonable to assume that the overall level of conflict-related sexual violence has declined along with the number and deadliness of conflicts. When wars stop, rapes perpetrated by rebels, militias, and government forces may not stop completely, but their number surely declines. Some authors claim that “the nature of warfare is changing,”<sup>42</sup> resulting in increased targeting of civilians with sexual and other forms of violence. But there is little evidence to support this so-called new war thesis, which we critique in more detail in Chapter 3. We point out that the available data on deadly violence against civilians provide no support for claims that they are increasingly targeted in wartime.

Dara Cohen’s new dataset indicates that *reported* sexual violence in the average civil conflict has increased over time.<sup>43</sup> But it is important to note that this finding does not necessarily mean that sexual violence itself has increased. The change may simply result from the increased reporting of sexual violence, rather than an increase in sexual violence itself.<sup>44</sup> As Amber Peterman, Cohen, and co-authors point out in a recent *Foreign Affairs* article, “no one knows what the relationship is between increased reports and increased rape.”<sup>45</sup>

This is quite true. But we do know that the reporting of human rights violations, which of course includes cases of sexual violence, has grown dramatically since the mid-1980s. Between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s, for example, references to “human rights” in the *Economist* increased by some 300 percent.<sup>46</sup> And no one doubts that global interest in wartime sexual violence has increased substantially since the 1990s.

So, it is quite possible, indeed we believe likely, that *reporting* of sexual violence has increased sharply as interest and concern about it has grown. At the same time, the dramatic decline of conflict intensity makes it highly unlikely that the level of conflict-related sexual violence has increased globally.

Purdue University’s Ann Marie Clark and Kathryn Sikkink of the University of Minnesota have provided a telling example of how increased human rights reporting can create a misleading impression that actual violations have increased.

In their 2011 study on how changes in human rights reporting may distort our understanding of human rights abuses, the authors examined what happened in Brazil as the

country slowly began transitioning from authoritarian military rule in the mid-1970s, democratized further during the 1980s, and became fully democratic in the 1990s.<sup>47</sup>

Despite this highly positive political change, data from the PTS, which provides annual country estimates of human rights abuses, indicated that the 1990s was a period in which the human rights situation in Brazil had *deteriorated* appreciably relative to the previous authoritarian and transition decades.<sup>48</sup>

The reason for the counterintuitive PTS finding was, however, not that the human rights situation was worse in the 1990s than previously—quite the contrary. As Clark and Sikkink pointed out, an authoritative study released in Brazil in 2007 showed that the worst period in Brazil for the state killing and disappearance of political opponents was in the 1970s, not the 1990s.<sup>49</sup> What happened was that over time “increased attentiveness to and awareness of a wider variety of abuses affected the level of coding.”<sup>50</sup> The sources used for coding—including the State Department—started collecting data on violations that had not been collected previously and likely more data on violations that had been collected previously. Human rights violations had *not* increased overall; *reporting* of abuses had.

---

There has been an explosion of reporting on sexual violence since the beginning of the new millennium.

---

With respect to conflict-related sexual violence, increased attention and reporting almost certainly had a similar effect. There is no doubt that there has been an explosion of *reporting* on sexual violence since the beginning of the new millennium.

This is particularly true of the DRC, which has been the focus of extraordinary attention from the media, donor governments, international agencies, and NGOs. But as Severine Autesserre points out in a recent study:

Sexual violence has not always dominated the discourse on the Congo. During the large-scale fighting that took place between 1994 and 2003, even though sexual violence existed at higher levels than today, few people discussed it.<sup>51</sup>

Indeed, the first major report drawing attention to wartime sexual violence in the Congo—a Human Rights Watch report—was not published until 2002.<sup>52</sup>

The difficulty in determining whether or not increases in reported sexual violence reflect actual increases in sexual violence is that there is no other source of cross-national data—*independent* from the level of reporting—that can tell us whether or not the actual incidence of sexual violence is increasing. To determine the latter would require the sort of data that only high-quality population surveys can provide. Such surveys, as we have pointed out, are notable mostly by their absence.

There is, in other words, no compelling evidence to support UN claims that the *absolute* level of wartime sexual violence worldwide is increasing. And there is no reliable direct evidence to support the claim that the level of sexual violence in an average conflict has increased.

*“Strategic” Rape: Less Common than Claimed*

There is now a huge literature on strategic rape, or rape used intentionally as a weapon of war—i.e., deliberate policies, by governments as well as rebels, to use targeted rape campaigns to advance military and political goals.<sup>53</sup>

In 2002 an influential UN study, *Women, Peace and Security*, argued that:

Gender-based and sexual violence have *increasingly become weapons of warfare* and are one of the defining characteristics of contemporary armed conflict.<sup>54</sup>

In 2005 a World Bank report on gender, conflict, and development claimed that gender-based violence in wartime is “consciously planned and targeted.”<sup>55</sup>

In June 2011 Margot Wallstrom, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, stated that:

Sexual violence has become a tactic of choice for armed groups, being cheaper, more destructive and easier to get away with than other methods of warfare.<sup>56</sup>

But while strategic rape has become a subject of intense interest and debate in the policy, research, and advocacy communities, no evidence has been produced to support assertions that it has increased.

It is certainly possible to find examples of widespread sexual violence in wartime that have been perpetrated for a strategic purpose—perhaps the most notorious recent case being the Serbian rape campaign in Bosnia in the early 1990s.<sup>57</sup> Overall, however, the evidence suggests that strategic rape is the exception rather than the rule in most conflicts.

In 2011 a pilot study on the incidence of sexual violence in 20 African countries with recent or ongoing armed conflicts, undertaken by researchers at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), found that the use of rape as a *weapon of war*, i.e., as a tactic that involves selective targeting of victims, is not as pervasive as the literature suggests. Indeed, contrary to the dominant narrative, the data from Africa suggest—and nothing more than suggest—that its prevalence may be declining.<sup>58</sup>

In some African conflicts of the last decade, sexual violence has been characterized by selective targeting of victims. Yet, in most of the sample, we see fewer reports of selective targeting than during many of the wars of the 1990s. Governments, rebels and militias seemingly commit sexual violence without a clear purposeful selection of victims: the violence seems indiscriminate.<sup>59</sup>

In many cases claims that rape is being intentionally deployed as a ‘weapon of war’ are based on little more than assertion and anecdotes. On the other hand, researchers who have done extensive fieldwork and interviewed combatants in countries where “strategic rape” is reported to have occurred often have a very different understanding.<sup>60</sup>

In the DRC, for example, there have been frequent assertions, including some by high-ranking UN officials, that rape is strategically targeted. But a 2010 study by Sweden’s Nordic

Africa Institute, based on intensive interviews with government forces, noted that both soldiers and their officers had made it clear that sexual violence had not been used as part of any explicit military strategy.

Authors Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern note that in conducting their interviews:

Soldiers were always asked whether they had ever received orders to rape. Their answer was always no ... While sexual violence is often used to humiliate and intimidate, this humiliation and intimidation is also much less strategic and far more complex than a combat strategy to further military gains.<sup>61</sup>

Sexual violence perpetrated by armed groups and government forces in the DRC does not appear to be directed at selected ethnic groups as was clearly the case in Bosnia or in Rwanda. Rather, as in the case of Liberia, rape is perpetrated “against any woman, regardless of political or ethnic affinity with the perpetrator.”<sup>62</sup> This does not suggest intentional top-down strategically targeted rape campaigns.

In the absence of explicit orders, there may, of course, be the tacit approval from commanders. But the evidence suggests that it may also be the sheer inability to control the behaviour of troops that leads to sexual violence.

In the DRC, for example, a major part of the reason for the high levels of sexual violence appears to be that the military command system is too dysfunctional, disorganized, fragmented, and corrupt to prevent undisciplined, and often unpaid, troops from indulging in opportunistic looting and rape on a large scale. The fact that many government soldiers are heavy drug and alcohol users, and that their number includes poorly integrated members of former rebel groups, has meant that, even when attempted, discipline is difficult to enforce.<sup>63</sup>

Whether wartime rape is part of an organized top-down military strategy, or is rather driven by the opportunistic behaviour of undisciplined armed combatants, has obvious implications for policy that we discuss in Chapter 2.

### *Men as Victims and Women as Perpetrators*

In the mainstream narrative on wartime sexual violence, males—usually rebels, militiamen, or government soldiers—are named the perpetrators; women are the victims. There is no doubt that women suffer disproportionately from sexual violence. But the evidence suggests that things are more complex than it is generally assumed. Men are often victims and women are sometimes perpetrators.

A *gender perspective* on wartime sexual violence in practice usually means focusing on the incidence, causes, and consequences of sexual violence against women and girls. The experiences of men and boys have been mostly ignored, despite the fact that sexual violence against males in wartime has been reported in many countries around the world.<sup>64</sup>

The neglect of sexual violence against males is particularly evident in the case of the United Nations Security Council, whose 2008 Resolution 1820 that deals specifically with preventing wartime sexual violence failed to explicitly mention males at all.<sup>65</sup> The same is of course true

of landmark Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security passed in 2000, which explicitly focuses on the effect of war on women and girls.<sup>66</sup>

Lara Stemple has pointed out that, in general, international human rights instruments dealing with sexual violence largely exclude males, “reflecting and embedding the assumption that sexual violence is a phenomenon relevant only to women and girls.”<sup>67</sup>

There is extraordinarily little cross-national data on the extent of wartime sexual violence against men and boys, but what evidence there is suggests that it may be considerably greater than usually assumed.<sup>68</sup> Part of the problem is that even when sexual violence is recorded, it may not be described as such but may be labelled as “torture” with no reference to the sexual nature of the violations.<sup>69</sup>

Although understanding of the extent and variety of sexual violence directed against males in wartime is slowly growing,<sup>70</sup> relatively few of the small number of population surveys that ask questions about sexual violence against women in war-affected countries also ask about violations perpetrated against men and boys. And when such questions are asked, male victims may be even more reluctant than women to admit being violated. The paucity of reliable survey data contributes to, and reinforces, the general invisibility of males in the dominant “male perpetrator/female victim” narrative on wartime sexual violence.

---

Little cross-national data exist on wartime sexual violence against men and boys, but what we have suggests that it may be greater than assumed.

---

Although data are too scarce to permit confident generalizations about the sexual violence that is perpetrated against males, the limited evidence we have suggests that it differs from that perpetrated against females.<sup>71</sup> There may be less forced sexual intercourse—although that certainly takes place—and more sexual torture, including castration and other forms of sexual mutilation, than is the case with wartime sexual violence against women.

In these cases, as with strategic rape, sexual violence is being used primarily to achieve nonsexual ends—to assert power over the victims, to coerce information, to prevent victims from procreating, or simply to terrify and humiliate them.<sup>72</sup>

The most comprehensive survey data on the extent of sexual violence against males in wartime come from major surveys carried out in Liberia and the DRC. In both cases the findings were published in the *Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA)*. We have to keep in mind that, as pointed out above, these two countries had some of the worst records of wartime sexual violence, meaning that the findings cannot be generalized. But the studies provided information that most others failed to collect. They were highly unusual not only because they asked detailed questions about men as victims of sexual violence but one of them also inquired about women as perpetrators.

The Liberia survey, which was nationwide, was undertaken in May 2008. The sample size was substantial—1,666—and was composed of nearly equal numbers of men and women.<sup>73</sup>

A third of all respondents—representing one-third of the adult population—reported having served with fighting forces at some time.<sup>74</sup> The *JAMA* study used a very broad definition of who should be considered *combatants*. But a narrower definition would still result in a very high figure.<sup>75</sup> And fully one-third of the combatants were reportedly female—a remarkably high rate of female participation.<sup>76</sup>

Joining an armed group provided no protection against sexual violence—quite the contrary. Thirty-three percent of male combatants in Liberia were victims of sexual violence—although here the term *sexual violence* encompasses not only rape but also lesser violations.<sup>77</sup> Eighty-six percent of the perpetrators of sexual violence against male combatants were other combatants.

42 percent of female combatants were victims of sexual violence, again mostly at the hands of other combatants.<sup>78</sup>

Noncombatant males suffered a much lower level of sexual violence (circa 7 percent) than combatant males (33 percent). The same applies to women. Nine percent of noncombatant females were victimized by sexual violence, compared with 42 percent of combatant females.<sup>79</sup>

A survey of three of the most war-affected regions in the DRC that was published in 2010 also found rates of sexual violence for males that were far greater than normally assumed. 24 percent of males reported that they had experienced sexual violence compared with 40 percent of females.<sup>80</sup> Both figures are extraordinarily high and reflect the pervasive violence and breakdown of authority in the Eastern Congo.

While the reality of sexual violence against males is slowly becoming acknowledged at the UN and occasionally in the media, the fact that women may be perpetrators of sexual violence, as well as victims, is ignored almost completely in the mainstream narrative. As a consequence, female perpetration has remained largely unexamined<sup>81</sup> and few attempts have been made to address it.

Only two major population surveys have asked questions about female perpetrators. In war-affected Sierra Leone, the 2004 survey by Jana Asher and colleagues found that women participated in mixed gender groups of perpetrators in some 26 percent of the reported incidents of gang rape.<sup>82</sup>

In the Eastern DRC, the 2010 survey noted above, which was also published in *JAMA*, revealed that female survivors of conflict-related sexual violence reported that a remarkable 41 percent of their perpetrators were also female. Male victims reported that 10 percent of their perpetrators were female. In both cases, an overwhelming proportion of the female perpetrators were combatants.<sup>83</sup>

It is unlikely that female perpetration of sexual violence is common in all conflicts. Indeed, the level of female perpetration indicated by the surveys in Sierra Leone and the DRC may

---

That women may be perpetrators of sexual violence is ignored almost completely in the mainstream narrative.

---

be exceptionally high. But there is no doubt that it takes place elsewhere. There is evidence of female perpetration of sexual violence in the war in Liberia, Haiti, and during the genocide in Rwanda.<sup>84</sup>

The reason we know so little about female perpetration is that the conventional view of wartime sexual violence has ignored its very possibility. This is why questions about the gender of the perpetrator are almost never asked in surveys.

The surveys in Liberia and the DRC on sexual violence against males, and in Sierra Leone and the DRC on women as perpetrators, have attracted little attention. Yet, they suggest that the exclusive focus on men as perpetrators/women-as-victims in the dominant narrative on wartime sexual violence is highly misleading.

The failure of the international community to take the issue of wartime sexual violence against men and boys seriously and the failure to acknowledge the role that women may play as perpetrators of sexual violence reinforce the oversimplified mainstream narrative and impoverish our understanding of the complexities of conflict-related sexual violence. This has important practical consequences for the creation of effective policy, which we discuss in more detail in the next chapter.

### *Armed Combatants Are Not the Major Perpetrators of Wartime Sexual Violence*

The assumption that permeates the literature on sexual violence in war-affected countries is that it is directly related to the conflict, i.e., that it is perpetrated primarily by *combatants*—rebels, militias, and government forces. This is true of media reporting, human rights, and humanitarian advocacy reports, and major reports on wartime sexual violence undertaken by—or for—the UN and its agencies.

What is missing from this picture is domestic sexual violence. Yet, while gang rapes by combatants get the headlines, the survey data suggest that most sexual violence in war-affected countries is *domestic*—which means it takes place primarily in the family. The most frequent perpetrators are not combatants, but husbands, other partners, household members, and relatives.

Evidence for this is both compelling and largely ignored. For example, a series of survey-based studies using the neighbourhood method undertaken in war-affected countries found that:<sup>85</sup>

- In Sri Lanka a 2008 survey of sexual violence in two IDP camps and one resettlement village revealed that “in the vast majority of cases the perpetrators were known by victims and were overwhelmingly husbands.”<sup>86</sup>
- In two Somali refugee camps and a nearby village in the Somali area of Ethiopia, more than 70 percent of rapes were perpetrated by husbands or other intimate partners. Strangers were responsible for less than 15 percent of the violations.<sup>87</sup>
- In a survey of sexual violence carried out in refugee camps in Northern Uganda, 5 percent of women reported being raped by someone outside of the household, while 30 percent experienced forced sex with intimate partners.<sup>88</sup>

## WHY DOMESTIC SEXUAL VIOLENCE IS INVISIBLE IN WARTIME

In 2011 a major study on sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) revealed that more than 400,000 women had been raped nationwide within a 12-month period between 2006 and 2007. In the worst affected region, Nord-Kivu, 20 percent of women of reproductive age reported to have been raped in their lifetime.<sup>89</sup>

Horrible accounts of savage sexual assaults by rebels, militias, and government forces, particularly in the war-affected eastern part of the DRC, have become the focus of intense media scrutiny, numerous advocacy reports by NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), investigations by international agencies, and resolutions in the UN (United Nations) Security Council.

Unsurprisingly, the DRC has been described by the UN as “the rape capital of the world.”<sup>90</sup> But population surveys carried out over the past decade suggest that there are at least two other war-affected countries for which a more compelling claim to this title could be made. Thirty-nine percent of women in Uganda have been victims of sexual violence in their lifetime,<sup>91</sup> and in parts of Ethiopia, 44 percent of women reported to have experienced sexual violence.<sup>92</sup>

This raises an obvious question. Why do high levels of sexual violence in the DRC receive so much attention from the international community, while what appear to be substantially higher levels of sexual violence in war-affected Uganda and Ethiopia receive so little?

Part of the answer is that the overwhelming majority of sexual violence in Uganda and Ethiopia takes place “in the family”; only a very small portion of the sexual violence appears to have been perpetrated by armed groups.

In Uganda, where 39 percent of women aged 15–49 were victims of sexual violence, 75 percent of them reported that the violence was perpetrated by current or former partners and boyfriends, another 11 percent by other relatives, friends, and acquaintances. Police and soldiers were perpetrators of less than 1 percent of the sexual violence.<sup>93</sup>

The major WHO survey undertaken in Ethiopia at the beginning of the new millennium was not nationwide but taken in a largely rural district south of the capital, Addis Ababa. It found that while 44 percent of women experienced intimate-partner sexual violence, less than 1 percent experienced sexual violence by nonpartners.<sup>94</sup>

None of these war-affected countries have been labelled a “rape capital,” even though their rates of sexual violence are substantially higher than those in the DRC. This is in large part because domestic sexual violence is inherently unnewsworthy. It is part of an unchanging backdrop of quiet human suffering, mostly hidden from public view. It remains a taboo subject in many countries—one rarely discussed and even more rarely reported to the authorities. Its public invisibility helps explain the absence of media coverage.

Sexual violence perpetrated by intimate partners is also by far the most common type of sexual violence in the DRC.<sup>95</sup> Yet, unlike in Uganda or Ethiopia, sexual violence in the DRC has been associated in the media and by advocacy groups, almost exclusively, with armed conflict. The brutal rapes perpetrated, often in public by rebel, militia, and government forces, have been portrayed as the most common forms of sexual violence in the DRC.

Media coverage of “conflict rape” has been huge and this is not surprising: gang rapes have been numerous, victims have been mutilated and sometimes killed, and the world’s biggest peacekeeping force has done little to prevent the assaults. Yet, the prevalence of domestic sexual violence, which is almost twice as high as that of conflict-related sexual violence, has received relatively little attention.

The shocking excesses are not the only reason that sexual violence in the DRC—similar to that in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rwanda, the Sudan, and Bosnia—has received more attention than that in Uganda and Ethiopia. The former countries have all hosted major UN peace operations; the latter have not.

Peace operations typically include not only thousands of peacekeepers but large numbers of civilian personnel from a range of UN agencies, and from other international organizations, donor countries, and humanitarian NGOs. With them come the international media.

Staff in these agencies have been remarkably effective in advocating on behalf of the victims of conflict-related sexual violence—and other humanitarian causes. Advocacy reports from the field are often amplified by UN agencies, complemented by NGO advocacy efforts in donor government capitals, and given further momentum by sympathetic media coverage. Efforts on behalf of the victims of domestic sexual violence in war-affected countries have not had the same success.

While the UN addresses domestic sexual violence in its development programming, it also bears some responsibility for the relative invisibility of domestic sexual violence on the agenda of the international community in conflict-affected countries. Over the past five years, an effective campaign has been waged within the world body to persuade the Security Council that conflict-related sexual violence is a “threat to international peace and security.”<sup>96</sup> But domestic sexual violence is conspicuously absent from this agenda.

Framing sexual violence as a military security issue calls for security policy responses, namely the provision of physical protection from combatant sexual assaults. While important, these measures do little for the victims of domestic sexual violence.

Getting conflict-related sexual violence recognized as an international security issue has helped raise its political salience on the Council’s agenda and mobilize resources to combat it. But it has marginalized domestic sexual violence in war-affected countries still further.

Overall, the Learning Network reported that in the five countries surveyed using the neighbourhood method:

rates of rape by a spouse or friend were far higher than rates of rape by a stranger. Such evidence contradicts common understanding of the kinds of GBV [Gender-Based Violence] that are experienced by women in communities affected by crisis.<sup>97</sup>

Even in the war-affected countries that are the worst affected by combatant-perpetrated sexual violence, the evidence indicates that the nationwide incidence of domestic sexual violence is higher than rape by rebels, militias, government troops, or other strangers.

In the DRC, which is one of the countries worst affected by sexual violence, a new study, using data from the 2007 nationwide Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) was undertaken by Amber Peterman and colleagues. It found that the number of women who experienced *intimate partner sexual violence* (IPSV)—i.e., marital rape—in their lifetime was almost twice as high as the number of women who were raped by other individuals—the latter, of course, include the rebels, militias, and government troops whose sexual violence generates so much media coverage.<sup>98</sup>

Why should rape perpetrated by combatants in countries like the DRC be the source of so much attention from the international community, while domestic sexual violence, which appears to be far more prevalent, receives so little?

We examine this question in greater detail in Chapter 2. Here we simply note that the sexual violence perpetrated by rebels and other combatants is often horrifically brutal and frequently takes place in public. Gang rapes by multiple perpetrators are not uncommon, and victims are often mutilated and sometimes killed. Media coverage of the worst excesses, from Bosnia to the Congo, has understandably been extensive.

Domestic sexual violence, by contrast, remains a taboo subject—one very rarely discussed openly or reported to the authorities. It is largely hidden from public view and far fewer of its victims are killed or mutilated than is the case with conflict-related rape. It is, in other words, inherently less newsworthy.

No one doubts that the sexual violence associated *directly* with warfare—i.e., that perpetrated by combatants—is a huge challenge needing urgent attention. It certainly differs from domestic sexual violence in its nature and likely also in its causes,<sup>99</sup> but if the international community is serious about reducing sexual violence in war-affected countries, then far greater attention needs to be paid to the largely ignored problem of domestic sexual violence than has been the case to date.

Based on the available data, domestic sexual violence seems to be the most pervasive, though not normally the most extreme, threat to women and children—boys as well as girls—in war-affected countries. It is also by far the most common source of sexual danger in peacetime—far more so than stranger rape.<sup>100</sup>

Combatant-perpetrated sexual violence decreases substantially when wars come to an end. There is, however, little reason to expect that the incidence of domestic sexual violence

will decline when the fighting stops—nor is there any evidence to suggest that it does. Indeed, in cases where male fighters are demobilized and return home—often to destroyed homes and the frustrations and privations of unemployment—domestic violence, sexual as well as physical, may increase.

This chapter has examined a number of pervasive biases in the mainstream narrative on sexual violence in war-affected countries. It has argued that these biases not only preclude a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of what drives wartime sexual violence but they also divert attention from important policy options.

In Chapter 2 we analyze what drives the biases that permeate so much of the literature on sexual violence in war-affected countries and examine the implications for policy.

## PART I

# ENDNOTES

## OVERVIEW

- 1 References for all statistics and quotations in the Overview are found in the main body of the *Report* unless otherwise indicated.
- 2 Note that while conflict-related sexual violence declines when wars end, it may take significantly longer to stop completely.
- 3 For women aged 18 and above, the CDC found the rate for women was 18.3 percent—meaning that nearly one in five women had been victimized by sexual violence in their lifetimes. See Michele Black et al., *The National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey: 2010 Summary Report* (Atlanta: National Center for Injury Prevention and Control; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011), 18, [http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/NISVS\\_Report2010-a.pdf](http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/NISVS_Report2010-a.pdf) (accessed 3 September 2012).
- 4 Scott Gates et al., “Development Consequences of Armed Conflict,” *World Development* 40, no. 9 (2012): 1713–1722, 1718, doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.04.031 (accessed 2 September 2012).
- 5 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), “The Difficulty and Perils of Education in Afghanistan,” [http://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/focus\\_on/afghanistan/afghanistan\\_3.html](http://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/focus_on/afghanistan/afghanistan_3.html) (accessed 3 September 2012).
- 6 The particular measure of fragility that the PRIO researchers used did not, as do others, include conflict as one of its elements.

## CHAPTER 1

- 7 Elisabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, *Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts’ Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role in Peace Building* (New York: UNIFEM, 2002), 9, <http://www.ucm.es/cont/descargas/documento7201.pdf> (accessed 8 June 2012).
- 8 For a detailed description of the “narrative” concept, see Severine Autesserre, “Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and Their Unintended Consequences,” *African Affairs* (2012): 6–9, doi: 10.1093/afraf/adr080 (accessed 8 June 2012).
- 9 Anne M. Goetz, “Introduction” (presented at the Wilton Park Conference, *Women Targeted or Affected by Armed Conflict: What Role for Military Peacekeepers?*, Sussex, UK, 27 May 2008), 1, [http://www.unifem.org/attachments/events/WiltonParkConference\\_Presentations\\_200805.pdf](http://www.unifem.org/attachments/events/WiltonParkConference_Presentations_200805.pdf) (accessed 29 January 2012).
- 10 Wood’s definition is based on that used by the International Criminal Court, see Elisabeth J. Wood, “Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare?” *Politics & Society* 37, no. 1 (2009): 5, doi: 10.1177/0032329208329755 (accessed 8 June 2012).
- 11 We do not include female genital cutting under this rubric since its motivation is very different.

- 12 Wynne Russell, who studies sexual violence against males, notes that although obtaining reliable data remains a major challenge, “the greatest difference between the male and female experiences appears to revolve around whether sexual violence is perpetrated with the body of the perpetrator, or with an object. The homosexuality taboo means that many captors of men will use objects to penetrate their victims, while captors of women are more likely to engage in penile penetration. Both are rape, by Wood’s definition; both are also torture ... Also, men appear to be more likely to be subjected to pain to the genitals or genital mutilation that does not involve a sexual assault, but that is designed to interfere with future sexual function or reproduction.” Personal e-mail communication with Andrew Mack, 19 February 2012.
- 13 Because many studies do not clearly identify perpetrators as combatants, this will sometimes also include other cases of stranger rape perpetrated by civilians unknown to the victim. We note throughout the chapter where this is the case.
- 14 When presenting survey results, standard statistical practice is to provide not only the single best estimate but also some measure that indicates the degree of certainty about its accuracy. The conventional approach is to provide *95-percent confidence intervals* for the point estimate. Put simply, this means that if one were to sample the same population repeatedly, then the range within which 95 percent of the samples fall would constitute the confidence interval.
- 15 Dara Cohen, “Causes of Rape During Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009),” University of Minnesota, 29 January 2012, unpublished manuscript, 50, table S1.
- 16 As we argue below, there is compelling evidence that reporting of human rights violations in general has increased over the last two decades, but no compelling independent evidence exists that actual violations have increased in this period.
- 17 United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, “Beijing and its Follow-up,” <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/> (accessed 15 March 2012).
- 18 Domestic sexual violence that is perpetrated by intimate partners is sometimes treated as a separate category and referred to as intimate-partner sexual violence.
- 19 Domestic sexual violence is prevalent in wartime as well as in peacetime; indeed, it is often argued that its incidence increases in conflict and post-conflict environments. Such war-exacerbated rates of domestic sexual violence could, in principle, be included in a very broad definition of *conflict-related sexual violence*. However, since it would be very difficult to identify elevated levels of domestic sexual violence in war-affected countries or attribute them to armed conflict given the dearth of data, our discussion of conflict-related sexual violence is limited to that perpetrated by combatants.
- 20 Note that by using the term “war-affected,” we do *not* limit the analysis to only those countries that experience *war* as defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), whose data we use in this report, i.e., a conflict with 1,000 or more battle deaths per year. We specify wherever we refer to a particular battle-death threshold.

- 21 As a recent study by the International Peace Research Institute Oslo, notes:  
“In the first five post-conflict years, there were reports of sexual violence by one-quarter of state armies and about one-third of all rebel groups and militias.”  
See Ragnhild Nordås, “Sexual Violence in African Conflicts,” Peace Research Institute Oslo, January 2011, <http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-1641546546/SVAC-CSCW-Policy-Brief-01-2011.pdf> (accessed 13 August 2012).
- 22 In many surveys only women between 15 and 49 were questioned.
- 23 The lifetime prevalence rate of sexual violence is not a measure of the *wartime* prevalence, because it includes individuals that have experienced sexual violence in peacetime. The lifetime prevalence rate is, however, often the only available measure to estimate the extent of sexual violence in war-affected countries.  
  
In some surveys, respondents are asked if they have been victimized in the past 12 months—providing data to compute *annual* prevalence rates. This is not particularly useful with respect to understanding wartime sexual violence, however, since surveys are very rarely taken *during* a war. Post-war retrospective surveys could, in principle, ask respondents if they had been victimized by sexual violence during the conflict and if so in what year. But responses are likely to be affected by recall bias, and questions that require respondents to indicate in which year they were violated are rarely asked.
- 24 Claudia García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-Country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence against Women: Initial Results on Prevalence, Health Outcomes and Women’s Responses* (Geneva: WHO Press, 2005), [http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who\\_multicountry\\_study/en/](http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_study/en/) (accessed 18 July 2012).
- 25 United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations Statistical Division, *Indicators to measure violence against women: Report of the Expert Group Meeting* (Geneva: United Nations, 2007), 21, [http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/IndicatorsVAW/IndicatorsVAW\\_EGM\\_report.pdf](http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/IndicatorsVAW/IndicatorsVAW_EGM_report.pdf) (accessed 14 August 2012). This report notes, “There are different understandings associated with prevalence and incidents of violence against women. There is no difference between them if each victim suffers just one incident in the given time period” (21). Many surveys include estimates of lifetime prevalence and prevalence over the past 12 months. Since the surveys are rarely taken during a conflict, the latter measure is of little value for measuring prevalence in wartime.
- 26 See, for example, the results of a survey in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) for data on the number of times that married, separated, or divorced women had been victims of physical or sexual violence in the 12 months preceding the survey. Ministère du Plan and Macro International, *Enquête Démographique et de Santé: République Démocratique du Congo 2007* (Calverton, MD: Ministère du Plan and Macro International, 2008), 308, <http://www.minisanterdc.cd/fr/documents/eds.pdf> (accessed 14 August 2012).

- 27 See World Health Organization (WHO), *WHO Ethical and Safety Recommendations for Researching, Documenting and Monitoring Sexual Violence in Emergencies* (Geneva, Switzerland: WHO, 2007), [http://www.who.int/gender/documents/OMS\\_Ethics&Safety10Aug07.pdf](http://www.who.int/gender/documents/OMS_Ethics&Safety10Aug07.pdf) (accessed 15 March 2012) and Shana Swiss and Peggy J. Jennings, "Documenting the Impact of Conflict on Women Living in Internally Displaced Persons Camps in Sri Lanka: Some Ethical Considerations," Women's Rights International, 2007, [http://www.womens-rights.org/Publications/Ethics\\_IDPSurvey.pdf/](http://www.womens-rights.org/Publications/Ethics_IDPSurvey.pdf/) (accessed 16 March 2012).
- 28 Indeed, as we point out in Chapter 3, unless surveys can provide respondents with the option of anonymously answering highly sensitive questions about being victimized by sexual violence, their responses can substantially underestimate the actual prevalence of sexual violence.
- 29 Dara Cohen, "The Incidence and Intensity of Wartime Sexual Violence," 6 March 2010, unpublished background paper prepared for the Human Security Report Project (HSRP), 3.
- 30 Jeanne Ward, Jackie Kirk, and Lisa Ernst, *Broken Bodies, Broken Dreams: Violence against Women Exposed* (Nairobi, Kenya: OCHA/IRIN, 2005), <http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=59&ReportId=72831> (accessed 16 March 2012).
- 31 Cohen, "Causes of Rape During Civil War."
- 32 *Ibid.*, 20.
- 33 The four levels were:
- Level 0: no reported cases of rape related to the conflict.
  - Level 1: "some" reports, "isolated" reports of conflict-related rape.
  - Level 2: "widespread," "extensive," "common" reports of conflict-related rape.
  - Level 3: "systematic" and "massive" reports of sexual violence and references to rape being used as a "weapon," "tactic," or "tool" of war.
- See *ibid.*, 50, table S1. As with all datasets, this one is subject to a number of limitations. These are discussed on pages 21–23 of the paper.
- 34 The data are provided by Dara Cohen. The dataset covers the years 1980–2009 and the respective figures for the entire period are 5 percent (Level 3), 19 percent (Level 2), 25 percent (Level 1), and 51 percent (Level 0). We, however, chose figures from the most recent decade because the Cohen data indicate that in the earlier years covered, especially the 1980s, there was little or no reported sexual violence in the large majority of years of active conflict, despite the fact that conflicts were far deadlier than in the 2000–2009 period. We believe that there is a strong possibility that the low levels of reported sexual violence in this period were almost certainly a function of low levels of reporting, *not* low levels of sexual violence. For this reason, we believe that the 2000–2009 period, where there is no doubt that reporting of wartime sexual violence had been far higher than in earlier periods, is likely to provide a more accurate picture of the cross-national variation in the intensity of sexual violence than the data from the 1980s and 1990s.

- 35 See Elisabeth Wood, "Variation in Sexual Violence during War," *Politics & Society* 34, no. 3 (2006): 307–341, doi: 10.1177/0032329206290426 (accessed 8 June 2012); Wood, "Armed Groups and Sexual Violence"; and Cohen, "Causes of Rape During Civil War."
- 36 Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf, *Women, War and Peace*, 10.
- 37 Ward, Kirk, and Ernst, *Broken Bodies, Broken Dreams*.
- 38 Office of the SRSG (Special Representative of the Secretary-General) for Children and Armed Conflict and UNICEF, "Ending Gender-Based Violence and Sexual Exploitation," in *Children and Conflict in a Changing World: Machel Study 10-Year Strategic Review* (New York: Office of the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict and UNICEF, 2009), <http://www.un.org/children/conflict/machel/english/811-ending-gender-based-violence-and-sexual-exploitation.html> (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 39 Jan Egeland, "International Responsibilities," in "Sexual Violence: Weapon of War, Impediment to Peace," ed. Marion Couldrey and Tim Morris, special issue, *Forced Migration Review* 27 (January 2007): 8, <http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR27/full.pdf> (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 40 Wilton Park Conference, ed., *Women Targeted or Affected by Armed Conflict: What Role for Military Peacekeepers? Conference Summary* (2008).
- 41 For a broad discussion of global trends in state-based armed conflict, see Chapter 5 of this *Report*.
- 42 Ward, Kirk, and Ernst, *Broken Bodies, Broken Dreams*.
- 43 Cohen, "Causes of Rape During Civil War," 31.
- 44 A third possibility is that both have increased.
- 45 Amber Peterman et al., "Rape Reporting During War: Why the Numbers Don't Mean What You Think They Do," *Foreign Affairs*, 1 August 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68008/amber-peterman-dara-kay-cohen-tia-palermo-and-amelia-hoover-gree/rape-reporting-during-war?page=show> (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 46 Howard Ramos, James Ron, and Oskar N.T. Thoms, "Shaping the Northern Media's Human Rights Coverage, 1986–2000," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 4 (2007): fig. 1, 387, doi: 10.1177/0022343307078943 (accessed 6 March 2012). Reporting on human rights showed significant increases in other papers as well, ranging from 20 percent to 200 percent over the same period.
- 47 Ann Marie Clark and Kathryn Sikkink, "Information Effects and Human Rights Data: Is the Good News about Increased Human Rights Information Bad News for Human Rights Measures?" January 2011, unpublished manuscript.
- 48 *Ibid.*, 24. The PTS relies in large part on the US State Department's human rights reporting, which Dara Cohen also uses in her study.
- 49 Clark and Sikkink, "Information Effects and Human Rights Data," 23–27.
- 50 *Ibid.*, 27.

- 51 Severine Autesserre, "Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and their Unintended Consequences," *African Affairs* (2012): 13, doi: 10.1093/afraf/adr080 (accessed 15 March 2012).
- 52 Ibid., 13.
- 53 Tara Gingerich and Jennifer Leaning have described some of the factors that may motivate strategic rape:
- It creates a sense of fear in the civilian population and restricts freedom of movement and economic activity.
  - It can instill flight which facilitates the capture of land and killing of male civilians who are left more vulnerable to attack when fleeing.
  - It demoralises the population and reduces their will to resist and prolongs their forced exit from the land.
  - It tears apart communities by breaking family and community bonds (thus diminishing the reproductive capacity of the community) and by "polluting" the blood line.
- See Gingerich and Leaning, "The Use of Rape as a Weapon of War in the Conflict in Darfur, Sudan" (Boston, MA: Program on Humanitarian Crises and Human Rights, Harvard School of Public Health, 2004), 17–18, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/B119C9EFB7DCAA2DC1256F5F004FBEA9-hu-sud-31oct.pdf> (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 54 See Kofi A. Annan, *Women, Peace and Security: Study Submitted by the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)* (New York: UN, 2002), 2, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/eWPS.pdf> (accessed 26 February 2012). Emphasis added.
- 55 Tsjeard Bouta, Georg Frerks, and Ian Bannon, *Gender, Conflict, and Development* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), 35, [http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/11/15/000090341\\_20041115142901/Rendered/PDF/30494.pdf](http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/11/15/000090341_20041115142901/Rendered/PDF/30494.pdf) (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 56 Cited in Stephanie Nebehay, "Rape Used as Weapon in Libya and Elsewhere: U.N.," *Reuters Health News*, 10 June 2011, [http://reuters\\_th.adam.com/content.aspx?productId=16&pid=16&gid=45497](http://reuters_th.adam.com/content.aspx?productId=16&pid=16&gid=45497) (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 57 See Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed., *Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011).
- 58 The 20 countries were not randomly selected, which means that the findings are not necessarily representative of all of sub-Saharan Africa, let alone the rest of the world. See Ragnhild Nordås, "Sexual violence in African conflicts," in *CSCW Policy Brief 01* (Oslo, Norway: Centre for the Study of Civil War, PRIO, 2011), 3, [http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-782981433/SVAC\\_policy\\_brief\\_Sexual%20Violence%20in%20African%20Conflicts.pdf](http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-782981433/SVAC_policy_brief_Sexual%20Violence%20in%20African%20Conflicts.pdf) (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 59 See *ibid.*, 3.

- 60 Dara Cohen, for example, notes that in Sierra Leone many NGOs argued that wartime rape was an integral part of the military and political campaigns pursued by the rebels, particularly the notorious Revolutionary United Front (RUF). But in her own extensive interviews she found that while former rebels were quite frank about the fact that they had perpetrated sexual violence, there was little evidence of strategic rape. See Dara Kay Cohen, "Explaining Sexual Violence During War" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 2010), 95.
- 61 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, "The Complexity of Violence: A Critical Analysis of Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)" (working paper, Uppsala: Nordika Afrikainstitutet, 2010), 15–16, <http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?page=statistics&pid=diva2:319527> (accessed 27 February 2012). See also Maria E. Baaz and Maria Stern, "Why Do Soldiers Rape? Masculinity, Violence, and Sexuality in the Armed Forces in the Congo (DRC)," *International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 2 (2009), doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00543.x (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 62 Baaz and Stern, "The Complexity of Violence," 14.
- 63 Ibid., 17–24.
- 64 Wynne Russell, "A Silence as Deep as Death: Sexual Violence against Men and Boys During Armed Conflicts" (background paper prepared for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Expert Meeting, "Use of Sexual Violence in Conflict," New York, 26 June 2008), 1. This paper provides a concise overview of the key issues and a lengthy bibliography.
- 65 UN Security Council, S/RES/1820(2008), <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/391/44/PDF/N0839144.pdf> (accessed 18 May 2012). The resolution often referred to "civilians," which of course includes males, but in various instances limited the focus specifically to women and girls.
- 66 UN Security Council, S/RES/1325 (2000), [http://www.un.org/events/res\\_1325e.pdf](http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf) (accessed 16 May 2012).
- 67 Ibid., 619. See also Russell, "A Silence as Deep as Death."
- 68 See Lara Stemple, "Male Rape and Human Rights," *Hastings Law Journal* 60 (2009): 605–647.
- 69 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "The Nature, Scope and Motivation for Sexual Violence against Men and Boys in Armed Conflict" (background paper prepared for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Expert Meeting, "Use of Sexual Violence in Conflict," New York, 26 June 2008), <http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1092305> (accessed 16 March 2012).
- 70 See, for example, UN Population Fund, *The State of World Population 2010: From Conflict and Crisis to Renewal: Generations of Change* (New York: UN Population Fund, 2010), Chapter 4, [http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2010/web/en/pdf/EN\\_SOWP10.pdf](http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2010/web/en/pdf/EN_SOWP10.pdf) (accessed 27 February 2012); and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *The Nature, Scope and Motivation for Sexual Violence*.

- 71 Michele Leiby, "Principals, Agents, and Wartime Sexual Violence," (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 2 September, 2010), 17. See also Pauline Oosterhoff, Prisca Zwanikken, and Evert Ketting, "Sexual Torture of Men in Croatia and Other Conflict Situations: An Open Secret," *Reproductive Health Matters* 12, no. 23 (2004), [http://pramudithrupasinghe.weebly.com/uploads/4/2/1/8/4218922/sexual\\_torture\\_of\\_men\\_in\\_croatia\\_and\\_other\\_conflict.pdf](http://pramudithrupasinghe.weebly.com/uploads/4/2/1/8/4218922/sexual_torture_of_men_in_croatia_and_other_conflict.pdf) (accessed 16 March 2012).
- 72 Lara Stemple points out that the abuse of males in wartime often takes place in prisoner of war camps and interrogation centres. The UN, for example, "reported that out of 5,000 male concentration camp detainees held near Sarajevo during the Bosnian conflict, 80 percent acknowledged having been abused sexually. In El Salvador 76 percent of male political prisoners told researchers they had experienced sexual torture." Lara Stemple, "The Hidden Victims of Wartime Rape," *New York Times*, 1 March 2011, [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/opinion/02stemple.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/opinion/02stemple.html?_r=1) (accessed 27 February 2012). For more details, see Stemple, "Male Rape and Human Rights."
- 73 Kirsten Johnson et al., "Association of Combatant Status and Sexual Violence With Health and Mental Health Outcomes in Postconflict Liberia," *JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association* 300, no. 6 (2008): 680, doi: 10.1001/jama.300.6.676, <http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/300/6/676.full.pdf+html?sid=ae0751d1-ac0b-4f88-b7c7-2ced65a80382> (accessed 27 February 2012).
- 74 This extraordinarily high number may reflect the fact that many individuals served with government or rebel forces for a relatively short period of time—it does not mean that one-third of the population were serving as fighters or supporters all the time.
- 75 If only those who participated in combat are considered, the figure would be 14 percent. Note that in none of these figures, the combatants would be all serving at the same time, of course.
- 76 Johnson et al., "Association of Combatant Status and Sexual Violence," 681. The term *combatant* includes roles in the military that do not necessarily involve fighting—cooks, porters, messengers, etc.
- 77 These included "being forced to undress or being stripped of clothing." See *ibid.*, 680.
- 78 *Ibid.*, 683.
- 79 *Ibid.*
- 80 K. Johnson et al., "Association of Sexual Violence and Human Rights Violations With Physical and Mental Health in Territories of the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo," *JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association* 304, no. 5 (2010): 557 doi: 10.1001/jama.2010.1086, <http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/304/5/553.full.pdf+html?sid=3b1ab62a-616d-4232-816a-073af2b5a505>, 557 (accessed 6 March 2012). The rape category excluded lesser forms of sexual violence, but the most commonly reported type of sexual violence was rape. Almost two-thirds of the male cases of sexual violence and three-fourths of the female cases of sexual violence were conflict-related, but the authors do not specify how this is measured.

- 81 This is beginning to change. A major new study on this issue is being undertaken by University of Florida, Laura Sjoberg. Entitled *Rape Among Women: Genocidal Rape and Sex Subordination*, it will be published by New York University Press.
- 82 Cohen, "Explaining Sexual Violence During War," 165.
- 83 Johnson et al., "Association of Sexual Violence and Human Rights Violations," 557.
- 84 Dara Cohen, "Female Combatants and the Perpetration of Violence: The Case of Wartime Rape in the Sierra Leone Civil War," (unpublished manuscript), 2, 30.
- 85 The *neighbourhood method* uses household interviews to ask women not only about their own experiences of sexual violence but also those of others in their home and among their immediate neighbours. This method creates what is effectively a bigger sample size than is possible by questioning a single respondent about her own household. One obvious potential problem with the neighbourhood method is that the primary respondent may be misinformed about the prevalence of sexual violence among her neighbours. There is evidence from some of the surveys that this is in fact the case. See Ann Warner, "Incidence of Violence against Women and Girls in Liberia: A Quantitative Study Using the 'Neighborhood Method,'" International Rescue Committee and the Program on Forced Migration and Health, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, 4, 19, [http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/IRCRReportonNeighborhoodStudy\\_10-1-07.pdf](http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/IRCRReportonNeighborhoodStudy_10-1-07.pdf) (accessed 27 February 2012).
- 86 Care and Protection of Children in Crisis-Affected Countries (CPC) Learning Network, "Rethinking Gender-Based Violence," 7, [http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/GBV\\_Brief\\_winter\\_2010.pdf](http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/GBV_Brief_winter_2010.pdf) (accessed 27 February 2012).
- 87 Ibid.
- 88 Lindsay Stark et al., "Measuring Violence against Women Amidst War and Displacement in Northern Uganda Using the 'Neighborhood Method,'" Program on Forced Migration and Health, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University; ChildFund International, 10–11, <http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/StarkRobertsAchamBoothbyAger2009MeasuringVioAgainstWomenJEpidemiolCommunityHealth.pdf> (accessed 27 February 2012).
- 89 The rate at the national level was 12 percent. See Amber Peterman, Tia Palermo, and Caryn Bredenkamp, "Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence against Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *American Journal of Public Health* 101, no. 6 (2011): 1060–1067, doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2010.300070 (accessed 1 March 2012). The data for this study came from a 2007 study by the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). See DRC Ministry of Planning (MoP) and Macro International Inc., *Democratic Republic of the Congo Demographic and Health Survey 2007: Key Finding* (Calverton, MD: DRC MoP and Macro International Inc., 2007), <http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/SR141/SR141.pdf> (accessed 1 March 2012); UN Women, *Violence against Women Prevalence Data: Surveys by Country* (New York: UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, 2011), [http://www.endvawnow.org/uploads/browser/files/vaw\\_prevalence\\_matrix\\_15april\\_2011.pdf](http://www.endvawnow.org/uploads/browser/files/vaw_prevalence_matrix_15april_2011.pdf) (accessed 1 March 2012).

- 90 Inter Press Service News Agency, "Q&A: 'There Is Almost Total Impunity for Rape in Congo,'" 28 June 2010, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/06/qa-there-is-almost-total-impunity-for-rape-in-congo/> (accessed 1 March 2012).
- 91 Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) and Macro International Inc., *Uganda Demographic and Health Survey 2006* (Calverton, MD: UBOS and Macro International Inc., 2007), 290, <http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR194/FR194.pdf> (accessed 1 March 2012).
- 92 Unpublished data provided by the WHO (World Health Organization) based on Claudia García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-Country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence against Women: Initial Results on Prevalence, Health Outcomes and Women's Responses*, (Geneva: WHO Press, 2005), [http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who\\_multicountry\\_study/en/](http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_study/en/) (accessed 15 August 2012). The survey undertaken in Ethiopia as part of the WHO's multi-country global survey of sexual violence was carried out in a largely rural district deemed "broadly representative of the country as a whole." See Yemane Berhane, "Ending Domestic Violence against Women in Ethiopia," *Ethiopian Journal of Health Development* 18, no. 4 (2004), 131–132.
- 93 UBOS and Macro International Inc., *Uganda Demographic and Health Survey 2006*, 290, 292.
- Even the notoriously violent Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) that abducted large numbers of girls and young women had a strictly enforced code governing sexual behaviour among its fighters. Sex was only permitted in forced "marriages" arranged between female abductees and LRA fighters. Sexual violence against other abductees and nonabducted civilians was strictly prohibited and rare, "and violations were severely punished, often with death." From Jeannie Annan et al., "Women and Girls at War: 'Wives,' Mothers, and Fighters in the Lord's Resistance Army," 10–11, <http://www.prio.no/sptrans/185286780/blattman-women@war.1009.pdf> (accessed 1 March 2012).
- 94 Unpublished data provided by the WHO based on Claudia García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-Country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence against Women: Summary Report of Initial Results on Prevalence, Health Outcomes and Women's Responses* (Geneva: WHO, 2005), 12, [http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who\\_multicountry\\_study/summary\\_report/summary\\_report\\_English2.pdf](http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_study/summary_report/summary_report_English2.pdf) (accessed 29 January 2012). A 2009 survey undertaken in seven regions of Ethiopia by the Population Council and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) of some 8,000 women aged 15 and 49 asked who the perpetrators were when a woman's first experience of sexual intercourse was forcefully coerced. It found that "92 percent were husbands, 6 percent were boyfriends or fiancés, and 2 percent were acquaintances or classmates."
- See Population Council and UNFPA, *Ethiopia Gender Survey: A Study in Seven Regions* (New York: Population Council, 2010), 60, [http://www.popcouncil.org/pdfs/2010PGY\\_EthiopiaGenderSurvey.pdf](http://www.popcouncil.org/pdfs/2010PGY_EthiopiaGenderSurvey.pdf) (accessed 6 May 2012).
- 95 Amber Peterman, Tia Palermo, and Caryn Bredenkamp, "Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence against Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *American Journal of Public Health* 101, no. 6 (2011), 1060–1067, doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2010.300070 (accessed 1 March 2012).

- 96 Pan African News Agency, "UN Chief Says Sexual Violence a Threat to Peace, Security," 23 September 2011, <http://www.panapress.com/UN-chief-says-sexual-violence-a-threat-to-peace,-security--12-796358-25-lang2-index.html> (accessed 1 March 2012).
- 97 Care and Protection of Children in Crisis-Affected Countries (CPC) Learning Network, "Rethinking Gender-Based Violence," 3.
- 98 Amber Peterman, Tia Palermo, and Caryn Bredekamp, "Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence against Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *American Journal of Public Health* 101, no. 6 (2011): 1065. This stands in contrast to the results of the JAMA study cited above, which found that in 72 (females) and 86 (males) percent of the cases, combatants were reported as perpetrators. The study was, however, based on a much smaller sample than the DHS data and undertaken in some of the regions worst affected by the civil war.
- 99 Dara Cohen, for example, stresses that gang rapes are used to build cohesion among combatants, something that obviously has little relevance for explaining domestic violence. Cohen, "Causes of Rape During Civil War," 4.
- 100 Peterman, Palermo, and Bredekamp, "Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence." Lori Handrahan, "Conflict, Gender, Ethnicity and Post-Conflict Reconstruction," *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 4 (2004): 429–445.

## CHAPTER 2

- 101 LaShawn R. Jefferson, "In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and Women's Status," in *Human Rights and Armed Conflict: Human Rights Watch World Report 2004* (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2004), 324–350, <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/download/wr2k4.pdf> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 102 For a more comprehensive analysis of how these incentive structures shape narratives and, as a result, policy-making, see Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill, eds., *Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).
- 103 According to OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and UN data, \$6.7 billion was raised from governments around the world in 2000; by 2010 this had risen to an estimated \$12.4 billion. Development Initiatives, *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2011* (Wells, U.K.: Development Initiatives, 2011), fig. 3, 12, <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/gha-report-2011.pdf> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 104 *Ibid.*, fig. 3, 55.

- 105 In 2010, for example, only 63 percent of the CAP request was actually allocated. Since the beginning of the new millennium, on average, 33 percent of annual requests have gone unfunded. *Ibid.*, figs. 8–9, 60–61. The CAP is not the only source of humanitarian funding, of course, but the pattern it exhibits—of demand exceeding supply—is typical of almost all funding exercises.
- 106 Ian Smillie and Larry Minear, *The Charity of Nations: Humanitarian action in a calculating world* (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2004), 207.
- 107 Humanitarian Policy Group, “According to Need? Needs Assessment and Decision-Making in the Humanitarian Sector,” *Overseas Development Institute Report* (London, U.K.: Overseas Development Institute, 2003), 56, <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/285.pdf> (accessed 7 June 2012). Also cited in Smillie and Minear, *The Charity of Nations*, 204.
- 108 See Smillie and Minear, *The Charity of Nations*, 207. See also David Rieff, “Millions May Die ... Or Not: How Disaster Hype Became a Big Global Business,” *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2011, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/millions\\_may\\_die\\_or\\_not?page=full](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/millions_may_die_or_not?page=full) (accessed 14 April 2012), and Human Security Report Project (HSRP), *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 126.
- 109 Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill, “Conclusion: The Numbers in Politics,” in *Sex, Drugs and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict*, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 265.
- 110 Nicholas D. Kristof, “After Wars, Mass Rapes Persist,” *New York Times*, 20 May 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/opinion/21kristof.html> (accessed 16 August 2012). Kristof was not the first to cite a prevalence rate in the order of 75 percent for Liberia. A paper by Dara Cohen and Amelia Hoover Green investigates the questionable claim made by Kristof and others in more detail. See Dara Kay Cohen and Amelia Hoover Green, “Dueling Incentives: Sexual Violence in Liberia and the Politics of Human Rights Advocacy,” *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 3 (2012): 445–458, doi: 10.1177/0022343312436769 (accessed 16 August 2012). See also the review posted on the blog *Feminist Critics*, “Have 75% of Women in Liberia Been Raped? (NoH),” 8 June 2012, <http://www.feministcritics.org/blog/2009/06/08/have-75-of-women-in-liberia-been-raped-noh/> (accessed 31 July 2012).
- 111 Marie-Claire O. Omanyondo, “Sexual Gender-Based Violence and Health Facility Needs Assessment,” WHO, September 2004, [http://www.who.int/hac/crises/lbr/Liberia\\_GBV\\_2004\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.who.int/hac/crises/lbr/Liberia_GBV_2004_FINAL.pdf) (accessed 15 August 2012). There are a number of other possible sources for Kristof’s extraordinary claim, but none can be used to support it.
- 112 *Ibid.*, 6, 16.
- 113 Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services (LISGIS), Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, National AIDS Control Program, Macro International, *Liberia Demographic and Health Survey 2007*, 230, <http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/fr201/fr201.pdf> (accessed 16 August 2012).

- 114 Kelly M. Greenhill, "Counting the Cost: The Politics of Numbers in Armed Conflict," in *Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts*, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 128. Greenhill argues that unreliable statistics can prove counterproductive from "political, humanitarian, juridical and scholarly perspectives" (127).
- 115 Kelly M. Greenhill, "Counting the Cost: The Politics of Numbers in Armed Conflict," in *Sex, Drugs and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict*, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 136.
- 116 See Rieff, "Millions May Die," (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 117 For a discussion of donor skepticism towards inflated humanitarian claims, see Smillie and Minear, *The Charity of Nations*.
- 118 Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill, "Conclusion: The Numbers in Politics," *Sex, Drugs and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict*, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 268.
- 119 See, for example, Elisabeth Wood, "Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare?" *Politics & Society* 37, no. 1 (2009): 131–161, doi: 10.1177/0032329208329755 (accessed 13 July 2012); Dara Cohen, "Causes of Rape During Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009)," University of Minnesota, January 2012: 1–45; and Ragnhild Nordas, "Sexual Violence in African Conflicts," in *CSCW Policy Brief 01* (Oslo, Norway: Centre for the Study of Civil War, Peace Research Institute Oslo [PRIO], 2011): 1–4, [http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-782981433/SVAC\\_policy\\_brief\\_Sexual%20Violence%20in%20African%20Conflicts.pdf](http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-782981433/SVAC_policy_brief_Sexual%20Violence%20in%20African%20Conflicts.pdf) (accessed 26 February 2012).
- 120 We pointed out that this assumption is at odds with the data on reported sexual violence compiled by Dara Cohen, based on US State Department reports and other reports. These data do indeed show that reported conflict-related sexual violence has increased over the past three decades. But, as we argued in Chapter 1, this increase is likely a function of better and more extensive reporting, rather than an increase in sexual violence.
- 121 In 2010 Jordan Ryan, assistant administrator of the United Nations Development Programme and director of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, stated, with what was an uncharacteristic candour for a senior UN official, that "we have not anywhere prevented sexual violence." See United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), "Chapter Eight: And the Next 10 Years?" *State of the World Population 2010: From Conflict and Crisis to Renewal: Generations of Change* (New York, NY: United Nations, 2010), 82, <http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2010/web/en/ch8.shtml> (accessed 18 June 2012).
- 122 In practice, however, the Security Council has shown little enthusiasm for imposing sanctions on known perpetrators of sexual violence in armed conflict. Security Council Report, "Cross-cutting Report on Women, Peace and Security," 2010, 25, 28, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/XCutting%20WPS%202010.pdf> (accessed 27 February 2012).

- 123 Kathryn Sikkink argues that this may be an effective strategy for reducing rights abuses over the long term. Kathryn Sikkink, *The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics*, 1st ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2011).
- 124 For a comprehensive review of the UN's neglect of sexual violence against males, see Sandesh Sivakumaran, "Lost in Translation: UN Responses to Sexual Violence against Men and Boys in Situations of Armed Conflict," *International Review of the Red Cross* 92, no. 877 (2010): 259–277, doi: 10.1017/S1816383110000020 (accessed 13 July 2012).
- 125 United Nations, *Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Report of the Secretary-General*, United Nations General Assembly and Security Council (New York, NY: United Nations, 2012), 2, [http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/UNSC\\_ReportoftheSecretaryGeneral\\_ConflictRelatedSexualViolence\\_A66657.pdf](http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/UNSC_ReportoftheSecretaryGeneral_ConflictRelatedSexualViolence_A66657.pdf) (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 126 *Ibid.*, 3. Emphasis added.
- 127 The omission of males from the Women, Peace and Security agenda 1325 is not surprising given that senior UN officials have argued strongly against including sexual violence against males as part of the 1325 policy agenda. See Anne M. Goetz, "Introduction" (paper presented at the Wilton Park Conference, *Women Targeted or Affected by Armed Conflict: What Role for Military Peacekeepers?* Steyning, UK, 27 May 2008), 3–4, [http://www.unifem.org/attachments/events/WiltonParkConference\\_Presentations\\_200805.pdf](http://www.unifem.org/attachments/events/WiltonParkConference_Presentations_200805.pdf) (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 128 Study cited in Lara Stemple, "Male Rape and Human Rights," *Hastings Law Journal* 60, no. 3 (2009): 612, [http://devhector.uchastings.edu/hlj/archive/vol60/Stemple\\_60-HLJ-605.pdf](http://devhector.uchastings.edu/hlj/archive/vol60/Stemple_60-HLJ-605.pdf) (accessed 27 February 2012). See also Wynne Russell et al., "Care and Support of Male Survivors of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence," Sexual Violence Research Initiative, [http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/SVRI\\_CareandSupportofMaleSurvivorsofConflictRelatedSV.pdf](http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/SVRI_CareandSupportofMaleSurvivorsofConflictRelatedSV.pdf) (accessed 27 February 2012).
- 129 R. Charli Carpenter, "Recognizing Gender-Based Violence against Civilian Men and Boys in Conflict Situations," *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 1 (2006): 95, doi: 10.1177/0967010606064139 (accessed 27 February 2012).
- 130 The subsequent Council resolutions were 1820 (2008); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2009); and 1960 (2010). See UN Women, "Resolutions & Instruments," [http://www.unifem.org/gender\\_issues/women\\_war\\_peace/resolutions\\_instruments.php](http://www.unifem.org/gender_issues/women_war_peace/resolutions_instruments.php) (accessed 19 June 2012).
- 131 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1325 (2000)," United Nations, 31 October 2000, 2, [http://www.unfpa.org/women/docs/res\\_1325e.pdf](http://www.unfpa.org/women/docs/res_1325e.pdf) (accessed 19 June 2012).
- 132 UN Security Council, *Women and Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General* (New York, NY: United Nations, 2010), 1, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/173](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/173) (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 133 *Ibid.*, 4.
- 134 *Ibid.*, 14.

- 135 Ibid., 11.
- 136 UN Security Council, "Resolution 1960 (2010)," 4, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/698/34/PDF/N1069834.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 137 UN, *Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*, 2. Emphasis added.
- 138 Ibid., 3.
- 139 Ibid. Aside from the information that UN field offices gather about incidents, the data collected may also include reports from rape survivors who present at clinics and hospitals.
- 140 Tia Palermo and Amber Peterman, "Undercounting, overcounting and the longevity of flawed estimates: statistics on sexual violence in conflict," *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 89, no. 12 (2011), 925, doi: 10.2471/BLT.11.089888, <http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/89/12/11-089888/en/index.html> (accessed 14 April 2012). Emphasis added. Note that the DHS data on the number of rapes over a 12-month period likely include some cases of intimate-partner sexual violence (which are also measured separately with specific questions). But even with this caveat, the rate of rape indicated by the DHS data was clearly many times higher than that which the UN reported.
- 141 UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: S/1999/957* (New York, NY: United Nations, 1999), paragraph 68, <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/sanctions/s99957.pdf> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 142 Victoria Holt, Glyn Taylor, and Max Kelly, "Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges," (New York, NY: United Nations, 2009), 4, <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Protecting%20Civilians%20in%20the%20Context%20of%20UN%20PKO.pdf> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 143 Ibid., 8–9.
- 144 See Victoria Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), 12, [http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Complete\\_Document-TheImpossible\\_Mandate-Holt\\_Berkman.pdf](http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Complete_Document-TheImpossible_Mandate-Holt_Berkman.pdf) (accessed 14 April 2012). It took three years for this report to go through the UN's vetting process and be published as the Holt, Taylor, and Kelly paper cited above.
- 145 Goetz, "Introduction," 5. Emphasis added. UN peacekeepers have themselves been guilty of sexual abuse of civilians. But the UN states that reports of such cases have declined. UN News Centre, "Sexual Abuse Allegations Decline against UN Peacekeepers in DR Congo and Liberia," 27 July 2011, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39164&Cr=peacekeeping&Cr1> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 146 The Cohen data, for example, indicate that government forces are reported as perpetrators in more than three-quarters of the coded conflicts. In roughly 15 percent of conflicts government actors were reported to be solely responsible for very high levels of sexual violence. See Cohen, "Causes of Rape During Civil War," 51–52.

- 147 In her new book, *The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics*, Kathryn Sikkink discusses statistical data to support her claims that prosecutions of past human rights violations deter future violations.
- 148 For further details, see UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict, and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), *Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice* (New York: United Nations, 2010), [http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/Analytical\\_Inventory\\_of\\_Peacekeeping\\_Practice\\_online.pdf](http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/Analytical_Inventory_of_Peacekeeping_Practice_online.pdf) (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 149 UN DPKO, "Protection of Civilians," <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/civilians.html> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 150 See Chapter 4 in HSRP, *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), <http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/text.aspx> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 151 Ibid.
- 152 See, for example, Say NO—UNiTE to End Violence against Women, a social mobilization platform on ending violence against women and girls launched by UN Women. Say NO—UNiTE, "About Say NO," <http://saynotoviolence.org/about-say-no> (accessed 19 June 2012); WHO, *Addressing Violence against Women and Achieving the Millennium Development Goals* (Geneva, Switzerland: WHO, 2005), <http://www.who.int/gender/documents/MDGs&VAWSept05.pdf> (accessed 19 June 2012); and WHO, "Violence against Women: Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence against Women," factsheet, September 2011, <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs239/en/> (accessed 19 June 2012).
- 153 Goetz, "Introduction," 3. Emphasis in original.
- 154 Ibid., Emphasis added.
- 155 UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), "Progress of the World's Women 2011–2012: In Pursuit of Justice: Executive Summary," (New York, NY: United Nations), 33, <http://progress.unwomen.org/pdfs/EN-Report-Progress.pdf> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 156 UN Development Programme, *Third Consolidated Annual Progress Report on Activities Implemented under the UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict Fund*, Report of the Administrative Agent of the UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict Fund for the period 1 January—31 December 2011 (New York, NY: United Nations, 31 May 2012), 7, [mdtf.undp.org/document/download/9099](http://mdtf.undp.org/document/download/9099) (accessed 19 June 2012).
- 157 Physicians for Human Rights, *War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone: A Population-Based Assessment* (Boston, MA: Physicians for Human Rights, 2002), 61, [https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR\\_Reports/sierra-leone-sexual-violence-2002.pdf](https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/sierra-leone-sexual-violence-2002.pdf) (14 April 2012).
- 158 WHO (World Health Organization), Claudia García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence against Women*, (Geneva: WHO, 2005), 40, [http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who\\_multicountry\\_study/en/](http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_study/en/) (accessed 23 August 2012).

- 159 Claudia García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence against Women: Initial Results on Prevalence, Health Outcomes and Women's Responses*, (WHO, 2005), 28, [http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who\\_multicountry\\_study/en/](http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_study/en/) (accessed 18 July 2012).
- 160 WHO, "Preventing Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence against Women: Taking Action and Generating Evidence," (Geneva: WHO, 2010), 29, [http://www.who.int/violence\\_injury\\_prevention/publications/violence/9789241564007\\_eng.pdf](http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/publications/violence/9789241564007_eng.pdf), (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 161 Ibid.
- 162 For more detail, see *ibid.*, 30–31.
- 163 The idea that rape is hard-wired into male psychology was the central focus of a controversial study by Randy Thornhill and Craig T. Palmer. See Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer, *A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). For a critique, see Jerry A. Coyne and Andrew Berry, "Rape as an Adaptation: Is This Contentious Hypothesis Advocacy, Not Science?" *Nature* 404, no. 6774 (2000): 121–122, doi: 10.1038/35004636 (accessed 13 July 2012). Note that even though Thornhill and Palmer believe that males have an innate predisposition to rape, they believe that the incidence of rape can be reduced through strategies that stress education and deterrence.
- 164 See, for example, WHO, "Changing Cultural and Social Norms that Support Violence," (Geneva: WHO, 2009), 8, [http://www.who.int/violence\\_injury\\_prevention/violence/norms.pdf](http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/norms.pdf) (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 165 *Ibid.*, 3.
- 166 Celia W. Dugger, "Senegal Curbs a Bloody Rite for Girls and Women," *New York Times*, 15 October 2011, [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/world/africa/movement-to-end-genital-cutting-spreads-in-senegal.html?\\_r=1&ref=senegal](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/world/africa/movement-to-end-genital-cutting-spreads-in-senegal.html?_r=1&ref=senegal) (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 167 *Ibid.*
- 168 There is, in fact, some evidence to suggest that the ban in 1999 led to higher numbers of cuttings, at least in the short run, and may have damaged the community-driven efforts. See Monica Antonazzo, "Problems with Criminalizing Female Genital Cutting," *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 15, no. 4, (2003): 474, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1040265032000156663> (accessed 13 June 2012).
- 169 Dugger, "Senegal Curbs a Bloody Rite for Girls and Women."
- 170 Lori L. Heise, "What Works to Prevent Partner Violence? An Evidence Overview," STRIVE Research Consortium, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (London: LSHTM, 2011), 27–28, <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/R4D/PDF/Outputs/Gender/60887-PartnerViolenceEvidenceOverview.pdf> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 171 *Ibid.*, 28.
- 172 *Ibid.*, 29.

- 173 WHO, "Promoting Gender Equality to Prevent Violence against Women: Overview," (Geneva: WHO, 2009), 1, [http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/9789241597883\\_eng.pdf](http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/9789241597883_eng.pdf) (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 174 M. Caprioli, "Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict," *International Studies Quarterly* 49, no. 2 (2005): 161–178, doi: 10.1111/j.0020-8833.2005.00340.x (accessed 13 July 2012); and Erik Melander, "Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict," *International Studies Quarterly* 49, no. 4 (2005): 695–714, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00384.x (accessed 13 July 2012).
- 175 Caprioli, "Primed for Violence," 171.
- 176 Melander, "Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict," 695.
- 177 James D. Fearon, "Governance and Civil War Onset: World Development Report 2011 Background Paper," (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2010), 35, [http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/WDR%20Background%20Paper\\_Fearon\\_0.pdf?keepThis=true&TB\\_iframe=true&height=600&width=800](http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/WDR%20Background%20Paper_Fearon_0.pdf?keepThis=true&TB_iframe=true&height=600&width=800) (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 178 Ibid., 36.
- 179 WHO, "Promoting Gender Equality," 1, 4.
- 180 World Bank, "Achieving Gender Equality at the Heart of MDGs," (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2010), <http://data.worldbank.org/news/achieving-gender-equality-at-the-heart-of-mdgs> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 181 Heise, "What Works to Prevent Partner Violence?"
- 182 WHO, "Promoting Gender Equality," 4. See also R. B. Whaley and S. F. Messner, "Gender Equality and Gendered Homicides," *Homicide Studies* 6, no. 3 (2002): 188–210, doi: 10.1177/108876790200600302 (accessed 14 July 2012).
- 183 WHO, "Promoting Gender Equality," 9.
- 184 Heise, "What Works to Prevent Partner Violence?"
- 185 Heise, "What Works to Prevent Partner Violence?" 57–58; and Seema Vyas and Charlotte Watt, "How does economic empowerment affect women's risk of intimate partner violence in low and middle income countries? A systematic review of published evidence," *Journal of International Development* 21, no. 5, 577–602, doi: 10.1002/jid.1500 (accessed 14 July 2012).
- 186 See Chapter 4 in HSRP, *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), <http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/text.aspx> (accessed 14 April 2012).
- 187 For a wide-ranging and comprehensive analysis of other campaigns to reduce partner violence, including sexual violence, see Heise, "What Works to Prevent Partner Violence?"

## CHAPTER 3

- 188 Dyan Mazurana and Khristopher Carlson, “The Girl Child and Armed Conflict: Recognizing and Addressing Grave Violations of Girls’ Human Rights,” United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) in collaboration with UNICEF, 3, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/elim-disc-viol-girlchild/ExpertPapers/EP.12%20Mazurana.pdf> (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 189 Note that Mazurana and Carlson claimed that their figures were for the “last decade,” when the source of their data—a UNICEF report—actually refers to the time period 1986–1996. Kelly Greenhill, in her revealing essay that we cited in the previous chapter, refers to similar figures as one example of the kinds of myths that surround the impact of armed conflict. See Kelly M. Greenhill, “Counting the Cost: The Politics of Numbers in Armed Conflict,” in *Sex, Drugs and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict*, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 128–130.
- 190 Definitions of sexual violence against children are, in principle, the same as those against adults. We use the same definition for sexual violence used in Chapter 1 (see the box on page 23). But in some instances, particularly in advocacy reports, it is not always clear which definition is being used.
- 191 Jeanne Ward, Jackie Kirk, and Lisa Ernst, *Broken Bodies, Broken Dreams: Violence against Women Exposed* (Nairobi, Kenya: OCHA/IRIN, 2005), 19, <http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=59&ReportId=72831> (accessed 16 March 2012).
- 192 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Convention on the Rights of the Child, Part I, Article 1, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm> (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 193 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, “The Changing Nature of Conflict,” <http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/the-changing-nature-of-conflict.html> (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 194 United Nations Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development (DPCSD), *Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of War on Children*, Note by the Secretary-General United Nations DPCSD, [http://www.unicef.org/graca/a51-306\\_en.pdf](http://www.unicef.org/graca/a51-306_en.pdf) (accessed 18 June 2012). The formal title of the Machel report was *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Report of the expert of the Secretary-General, Ms. Graça Machel, submitted pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 48/157*, UN document A/51/306, New York, 26 August 1996.
- 195 The term “new war” derived from Mary Kaldor’s *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge [England]; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2006).
- 196 DPCSD, “Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children,” 5. The Machel report foreshadowed the claims of so-called new war scholars that there had been a fundamental change in the nature of armed conflict.

- 197 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, "Introduction," <http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/issues.html> (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 198 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, "Engagement of Security Council on Children and Armed Conflict," <http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/security-council.html> (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 199 Alastair Ager, Neil Boothby, and Megan Bremer, "Using the 'protective environment' framework to analyse children's protection needs in Darfur," *Disasters* 33, no. 4 (2009): 567, doi: 10.1111/j.0361-3666.2008.01087.x (accessed 20 August 2012).
- 200 See Care and Protection of Children in Crisis Affected Countries Initiative Program on Forced Migration and Health, *Care and Protection of Children in Crisis Affected Countries: A Good Practice—Policy Change Initiative* (New York: CPC, 2006), 17, <http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/CPCSynthesisReport2008.pdf> (accessed 22 August 2012).
- 201 Cited in *ibid.*, 17.
- 202 See Greenhill, "Counting the Cost," 128–130.
- 203 See UNICEF, *Machel Study 10-Year Strategic Review: Children and Conflict in a Changing World* (New York: Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict; UNICEF, 2009), [http://www.un.org/children/conflict/\\_documents/machel/msr2\\_en.pdf](http://www.un.org/children/conflict/_documents/machel/msr2_en.pdf) (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 204 *Ibid.*, 8.
- 205 The overall level of violence declined substantially, which—all else equal—should result in a lesser impact on children. From the 1990s to the 2000s, total death tolls from state-based conflict, non-state conflict, and one-sided violence decreased by 45, 24, and 49 percent, respectively (we exclude one-sided violence in Rwanda here to avoid skewing the result).
- 206 For example, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict continues to refer to the "new wars" on its website. See "The Changing Nature of Conflict," (accessed 13 July 2012).
- 207 Kaldor, *New & Old Wars*.
- 208 *Ibid.*, 107.
- 209 UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision*, <http://esa.un.org/wpp/Excel-Date/population.htm> (accessed 11 June 2012).
- 210 Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 75, <http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/2005/text.aspx> (accessed 7 June 2012).

- 211 Erik Melander, Magnus Oberg, and Jonathan Hall, "Are 'New Wars' More Atrocious? Battle Severity, Civilians Killed and Forced Migration before and after the End of the Cold War," *European Journal of International Relations* 15, no. 3 (2009), 529, doi: 10.1177/1354066109338243 (accessed 22 August 2012).
- 212 Notable critiques of the new wars thesis include Mats Berdal, "How 'New' are 'New Wars'? Global Economic Change and the Study of Civil War," *Global Governance* 9 (2003); Stathis N. Kalyvas, "'New' and 'Old' Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?" *World Politics* 54, no. 01 (2001), doi: 10.1353/wp.2001.0022 (accessed 7 June 2012); and Edward Newman, "The 'New Wars' Debate: A Historical Perspective Is Needed," *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 2 (2004), doi: 10.1177/0967010604044975 (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 213 For data on the decline in genocides, see Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report 2005*, 41.
- 214 See endnote 18.
- 215 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, "Rape and Other Grave Sexual Violence against Children," <http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/sexualviolence.html> (accessed 7 June 2012). Emphasis added.
- 216 There will clearly be individual conflicts in which levels of sexual violence have increased; our concern, however, is with overall trends.
- 217 UN Security Council, "Security Council Establishes Monitoring, Reporting Mechanism on Use of Child Soldiers, Unanimously Adopting Security Council Resolution 1612 (2005)," news release, 26 July 2005, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8458.doc.htm> (accessed 31 July 2012).
- 218 Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, *Getting It Done and Doing It Right: A Global Study on the United Nations-led Monitoring & Reporting Mechanism on Children and Armed Conflict* (New York: Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, 2008), 18, <http://www.watchlist.org/reports/pdf/global-v8-web.pdf> (accessed 31 July 2012).
- 219 Even well-run surveys will underestimate the extent of sexual violence, especially if respondents are not given the opportunity of answering questions anonymously. But the degree of underestimation is still far less than with the type of reporting undertaken by the MRM task forces.
- 220 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, UNICEF, and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), *Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on Grave Violations against Children in Situations of Armed Conflict: MRM Field Manual*, [http://s3.amazonaws.com/tdh\\_e-platform/assets/147/original/MRM\\_Field\\_Manual\\_16-04-10.pdf?1309159505](http://s3.amazonaws.com/tdh_e-platform/assets/147/original/MRM_Field_Manual_16-04-10.pdf?1309159505) (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 221 Because these studies have recall periods of 10 years or more, some of the adult respondents may have been children when they were violated, but the data are not disaggregated to reveal the prevalence of sexual violence against children.

- 222 Two questions in the module are critical here for information on sexual violence against children in wartime. First, women respondents are asked, “How old were you the first time you were forced to have sexual intercourse or perform any other sexual acts?” Answers to this question will determine what percentage of females experienced sexual violence while still children—and at what age. A follow-up question asks about the identity of the perpetrator. These data could be used to derive a conservative estimate of the percentage of the under-age population that had experienced sexual violence, and who the perpetrators were—family members or acquaintances (most likely), or soldiers and other members of the security forces. This would, however, still underestimate the extent of sexual violence, especially if respondents were not given the opportunity to answer questions anonymously. See DHS, “Domestic Violence Module: Questionnaire and Interviewer’s Manual,” 3 January 2011, 5, [http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/DHSQM/DHS6\\_Module\\_Domestic\\_Violence\\_3Jan2011.pdf](http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/DHSQM/DHS6_Module_Domestic_Violence_3Jan2011.pdf) (accessed 23 August 2012).
- 223 The UNICEF surveys can include optional modules that collect data on *child discipline*—i.e., physical violence against young children—and on adult *attitudes* towards the use of disciplinary force against children, but nothing on sexual violence. See UNICEF, “Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys: Questionnaires and Indicator List,” April 2012, [http://www.childinfo.org/mics4\\_questionnaire.html](http://www.childinfo.org/mics4_questionnaire.html) (accessed 23 August 12).
- 224 See Marije Stoltenborgh et al., “A Global Perspective on Child Sexual Abuse: Meta-Analysis of Prevalence Around the World,” *Child Maltreatment* 16, no. 2 (2011): 79–101, doi: 10.1177/1077559511403920 (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 225 See *ibid.*, 84.
- 226 *Ibid.*, 83, 88.
- 227 See Stoltenborgh et al., “A Global Perspective on Child Sexual Abuse,” 87, 89.
- 228 Claudia García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-Country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence against Women: Initial Results on Prevalence, Health Outcomes and Women’s Responses* (Geneva: WHO, 2005), 3, xiv, [http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who\\_multicountry\\_study/en/](http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_study/en/) (accessed 18 July 2012)
- 229 *Ibid.*, 50.
- 230 In addition to being asked directly if they had experienced sexual violence before they were 15, the women could respond anonymously by placing the answer in a sealed envelope.
- 231 WHO (World Health Organization), Claudia García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence against Women*, (Geneva: WHO, 2005), 50, [http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who\\_multicountry\\_study/en/](http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_study/en/) (accessed 23 August 2012).
- 232 UNICEF, *Machel Study 10-Year Strategic Review*, 161.
- 233 Unpublished data provided by the WHO based on García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-Country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence against Women*.

- 234 There are only two sites where the rate of sexual violence against children was shown to be higher than that against adults.
- 235 Ibid., 50. The 33-percent figure for adults is high. We should, however, expect that the data broadly reflect the difference in prevalence rates between adults and children.
- 236 Unpublished data provided by the WHO (World Health Organization) based on García-Moreno et al., *WHO Multi-Country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence against Women*.
- 237 *Neighbourhood surveys* are so called because interviewers solicit information from female heads of households, not only about their own experience of sexual violence and that of other females in the household but also of the experience of women in three neighbouring households. This has the effect of increasing the sample size of the population being surveyed, but there is no guarantee that the single respondent's estimate of sexual violence in other households will be correct. For more information on neighbourhood surveys, see Child Protection in Crisis Network for Research, Learning and Action, "Neighbourhood Method," <http://www.cpcnetwork.org/neighborhood-method.php> (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 238 Birthe Steiner et al., "Sexual Violence in the Protracted Conflict of DRC Programming for Rape Survivors in South Kivu," *Conflict and Health* 3, no. 1 (2009) doi: 10.1186/1752-1505-3-3 (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 239 UN Population Division, *World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, Population Database*, [http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel\\_population.htm](http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm) (accessed 18 July 2012) and <http://esa.un.org/wpp/Excel-Data/population.htm> (accessed 11 June 2012).
- 240 This was done only for a short period from October to December 2005.
- 241 Luc Malemo Kalisya et al., "Sexual Violence toward Children and Youth in War-Torn Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo," *PLoS ONE* 6, no. 1 (2011), Table 1, doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0015911 (accessed 19 July 2012).
- 242 For the very small number of adult victims included in the Kalisya et al. study, the data show a high share of rape by strangers and perpetrators in military uniform (70 percent and 48 percent, respectively). Note that these figures are based on a total of only 54 adult cases, as opposed to the 440 "pediatric victims." See *ibid.*, 3.
- 243 Child Protection in Crisis Network, "Neighbourhood Method."
- 244 Birthe Steiner et al., "Sexual Violence in the Protracted Conflict of DRC Programming for Rape Survivors in South Kivu," *Conflict and Health* 3, no. 3 (2009): 7, doi: 10.1186/1752-1505-3-3 (accessed 7 June 2012).
- 245 Braeden Rogers et al., "Estimating the Incidence of Physical and Sexual Violence against Children and Women in Trincomalee District, Sri Lanka: The Neighbourhood Method," 14 January 2009, Heilbrunn Department of Population and Family Health, Program on Forced Migration and Health, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University/Save The Children, 18, <http://www.cpcnetwork.org/learning-details.php?ID=1> (accessed 21 June 2012).

- 246 Ibid., 27. The two cases of rape of girls recorded in the survey were both perpetrated by family members, but the total number is too low to be meaningful. See *ibid.*, 23.
- 247 Angela Parcesepe, Lindsay Stark, and Les Roberts, "Using the Neighbourhood Method to Measure Violence and Rape in Ethiopia," Heilbrunn Department of Population and Family Health, Program on Forced Migration and Health, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, 11, <http://www.cpcnetwork.org/neighborhood-method.php> (accessed 18 July 2012).
- 248 Ibid., 17.
- 249 Ann Warner, "Incidence of Violence against Women and Girls in Liberia: A Quantitative Study Using the 'Neighborhood Method,'" International Rescue Committee; Program on Forced Migration and Health, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, 7, [http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/IRCReportonNeighborhoodStudy\\_10-1-07.pdf](http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/IRCReportonNeighborhoodStudy_10-1-07.pdf) (accessed 18 June 2012).
- 250 Ibid., 11–12.
- 251 Kathleen Myer, Alina Potts, and Les Roberts, "Grave Violations of Children's Rights and Mortality in the Central African Republic: Results of a Nationwide Survey," Heilbrunn Department of Population and Family Health, Program on Forced Migration and Health, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, 13, [http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/CAR\\_1612\\_Survey\\_Report\\_17Sep09\\_FOR\\_DISTRIBUTION.pdf](http://www.forcedmigration.columbia.edu/research/documents/CAR_1612_Survey_Report_17Sep09_FOR_DISTRIBUTION.pdf) (accessed 18 June 2012).
- 252 Ibid.
- 253 See Lindsay Stark et al., "Measuring Violence against Women amidst War and Displacement in Northern Uganda Using the 'Neighborhood Method,'" *Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health* 64 (2010): 1056–1061, doi: 10.1136/jech.2009.093799 (accessed 20 July 2012).
- 254 As Elisabeth Wood has argued, differences in the rate of rape committed by armed groups may also be determined by antisexual violence policies pursued by military authorities. However, there is insufficient cross-national data to determine the extent to which such policies have been implemented outside the relatively small number of case studies that have been carried out thus far. See Elisabeth J. Wood, "Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare?" *Politics & Society* 37, no. 1 (2009): 131–161, doi: 10.1177/0032329208329755 (accessed 22 August 2012).
- 255 See Stoltenborgh et al., "A Global Perspective on Child Sexual Abuse," 89.
- 256 This is not to say that the MRM has no utility—simply that it is not useful for measuring trends in conflict-related sexual violence against children. For a description of the MRM and some of its roles, see Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, *Getting It Done and Doing It Right* (accessed 18 June 2012).
- 257 UN Statistical Commission, "Proposed Draft Outline for the Guidelines for Producing Statistics on Violence against Women, Part I: Statistical Survey," 3, <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/meetings/vaw/docs/Item13.pdf> (accessed 18 June 2012).

## CHAPTER 4

- 258 Brian Lai and Clayton Thyne, "The Effect of Civil War on Education, 1980–97," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 3 (2007): 289, doi: 10.1177/0022343307076631 (accessed 18 July 2012).
- 259 Marc Sommers, *Children, Education, and War: Reaching Education for All (EFA) Objectives in Countries Affected by Conflict*, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (CPR) Working Papers 1 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002), Introduction, [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/278200-1099079877269/547664-1099079993288/children\\_edu\\_war\\_efa02.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/278200-1099079877269/547664-1099079993288/children_edu_war_efa02.pdf) (accessed 18 July 2012).
- 260 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Education for All (EFA) Global Monitoring Report Team, *The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education* (Paris: UNESCO, 2011), 13, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001907/190743e.pdf> (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 261 See Paul Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington, DC; New York: World Bank; Oxford University Press, 2003).
- 262 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," UIS technical paper no. 7 (Montreal: UIS, 2011), <http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/tp7-quantitative-armed-conflict-impact-education-2011-en.pdf> (accessed 18 July 2012).
- 263 EPDC, "How Do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment? Analysis of Sub-National Evidence from 19 Countries" (Geneva: UNESCO, 2010), background paper prepared for the *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011—The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001912/191248e.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 264 See Chapter 6 of Human Security Report Project (HSRP), *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War* (New York: Oxford University, 2011), <http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/overview.aspx> (accessed 13 September 2012). Note that the period studied was 1970 to 2008.
- 265 Scott Gates et al., "Consequences of Civil Conflict," *World Development Report 2011* Input Paper, World Bank, <http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/PRI0> (accessed 19 July 2012). A shortened and revised version of this study was published in September 2012. See Scott Gates et al., "Development Consequences of Armed Conflict," *World Development* 40, no. 9: 1713–1722, doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.04.031 (accessed 14 September 2012).
- 266 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education; EPDC, How Do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment?"
- 267 Gates et al., "Consequences of Civil Conflict."
- 268 "Descriptive statistics" include the tables, charts and graphics used to describe, summarize and graphically present raw statistical data. They help summarize and support factual claims and are much easier to understand than the raw data.

- 269 Econometric studies may choose to exclude select countries where including them in the analysis would distort the results. The PRIO study, for example, excluded a number of developed countries, such as the UK, which experienced a small conflict in Northern Ireland. Development indicators in such highly industrialized countries are unlikely to improve significantly. See Scott Gates et al., “Consequences of Civil Conflict,” 5.
- 270 *Regression analysis* seeks to determine associations between different phenomena, with the assumption usually being that the association indicates an “average” causal effect.
- 271 Gates et al., “Consequences of Civil Conflict,” 13.
- 272 Most of these statistics are from the Households in Conflict Network (HiCN), which has published studies on education and conflict in Burundi, Tajikistan, Nepal, Timor Leste, and Bosnia. See HiCN, “About,” <http://www.hicn.org/papers.html/> (accessed 21 July 2012). See also Francis Akena Adyanga, *The Catastrophe of Education in Civil War Areas, Uganda: The Impact of Civil War on Education: A Case Study of Acholiland, Northern Uganda* (Saarbrücken, Germany: Lambert Academic Pub., 2010); Avis Sri-Jayantha, “Impact of War on Children in Sri Lanka,” Association of Tamils of Sri Lanka in the USA, [http://www.sangam.org/ANALYSIS/Children\\_1\\_28\\_03.htm](http://www.sangam.org/ANALYSIS/Children_1_28_03.htm) (accessed 21 July 2012); and Kate Wharton and Ruth U. Oyeler, “Conflict and Its Impact on Educational Accumulation and Enrollment in Colombia: What We Can Learn from Recent IDPs,” Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), [http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/papers/viewAbstract?dp\\_id=5939](http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/papers/viewAbstract?dp_id=5939) (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 273 World Bank, *Reshaping the Future: Education and Postconflict Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), xi, [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/Resources/Reshaping\\_the\\_Future.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/Resources/Reshaping_the_Future.pdf) (accessed 21 July 2012). Note that no sources were provided for these claims.
- 274 World Bank, *Reshaping the Future*, 13.
- 275 *Ibid.*, 13, 22.
- 276 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), “Internally Displaced Children,” [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004D404D/\(httpPages\)/6E780F0E0FE6BA1AC1257214003D980E?OpenDocument](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004D404D/(httpPages)/6E780F0E0FE6BA1AC1257214003D980E?OpenDocument) (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 277 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Global Trends 2010: 60 Years and Still Counting* (Geneva: United Nations, 2011), <http://www.unhcr.org/4dfa11499.html> (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 278 UNESCO, “Conflict Is Robbing 28 Million Children of a Future, UNESCO Report Warns,” News Release, 1 March 2011, <http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/ED/pdf/gmr2011-press-release-main.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 279 UNESCO, “Education Under Attack 2010—Iraq,” <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b7aa9df5.html> (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 280 Brendan O’Malley, *Education Under Attack 2010* (Paris: UNESCO, 2010), 43, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001868/186809e.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012).

- 281 Ibid.
- 282 World Bank, *Reshaping the Future*, 17.
- 283 Bede Sheppard and Kyle Knight, "Disarming Schools: Strategies for Ending the Military Use of Schools during Armed Conflict," *Disarmament Forum* 2011, no. 3 (2011): 23, [http://unidir.org/bdd/fiche-periodique.php?ref\\_periodique=1020-7287-2011-3-en#biblio](http://unidir.org/bdd/fiche-periodique.php?ref_periodique=1020-7287-2011-3-en#biblio) (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 284 Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan, "The Consequences of Child Soldiering," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 92, no. 4 (2010): 882–898, doi: 10.1162/REST\_a\_00036 (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 285 World Bank, *Reshaping the Future*, 18–19.
- 286 UN, "Millennium Development Goals: Goal 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education—Fact Sheet," [http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG\\_FS\\_2\\_EN.pdf](http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG_FS_2_EN.pdf) (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 287 Julia Paulson and Jeremy Rappleye, "Education and Conflict: Essay Review," *International Journal of Educational Development* 27, no. 3 (2007): 341, doi: 10.1016/j.ijedudev.2006.10.010 (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 288 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education."
- 289 Note that the study does not measure directly a country's overall national attainment rate but rather the educational attainments of cohorts of 15-year-olds at given points in time. We describe this indicator more fully below.
- 290 See UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," 13, for a detailed description of the methodology used by the UIS researchers—and some cautions about the conclusions that can be drawn from the data analysis. The conflict data come from PRIO and the Uppsala University Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The graphics in the study show periods of both minor conflict (in yellow) and major conflict (referred to as "war" here). *Major conflicts* or *wars* are those that incur 1,000 or more battle deaths in a calendar year.
- 291 In addition, the researchers also grouped the respondents in cohorts of 13- to 17-year-olds to smooth year-to-year fluctuations.
- 292 The data used in the UIS report can serve as an indicator of the effect of conflict on education, but as the authors note, they do not directly "reveal the educational attainment of 15 year-olds... at any time in the past." See UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," 13 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 293 Ibid., 7.
- 294 Ibid.

- 295 The figures derived from the UIS study that are presented here do not extend as far in time as the UIS graphics. This is because, as the UIS report's authors explain, data immediately prior to the time of the survey are distorted. This is very evident in the UIS graphics, which all reveal a sharp decline in educational outcomes prior to, and following, the survey date. To avoid misinterpretation, the graphics used here only extend the year that is nine years *prior* to the year in which the survey was undertaken. This is the maximum period over which the UIS researchers believe the distortion will be evident.
- 296 To be more precise, the Kurdish areas had a greater percentage of individuals with no formal education than the rest of Turkey.
- 297 By the time the conflict started, only a very small percentage of those living in the areas of Turkey not directly affected by war had received no education at all, which means that there was little room for improvement on this measure. But the counterintuitive process of educational attainments improving more rapidly in war-affected areas than in those that are not directly affected is evident in other graphs in the UIS study.
- 298 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," 27 (Figure 4.6) (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 299 The UIS study did not examine the differences between war-affected and non-war-affected areas in all the countries it reviewed.
- 300 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," UIS technical paper no. 7 (Montreal: UIS, 2011), <http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/tp7-quantitative-armed-conflict-impact-education-2011-en.pdf> (accessed 18 July 2012).
- 301 Attainment rates for women were broadly similar but from a lower base than males, and the attainment rate for women in the conflict zones, unlike for males, lagged somewhat behind the attainment rate for women in the non-conflict zones. UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," 38–40 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 302 Exceptions were periods of violence in the 1960s and 1980s, during which the average years of education followed an unsteady, but largely stagnant, pre-war trend.
- 303 See UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education," 45 (Figure 8.5) (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 304 The data for the male population without formal education represented an exception here, as it deteriorated during the 1970s but then caught up again with the trend in the rest of the country.
- 305 It could also mean that the negative impact of conflict on the rate of educational attainment is being offset by the positive impact of some other factor—e.g., rising incomes or improved educational attainment among girls.

- 306 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), “The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education,” UIS technical paper no. 7 (Montreal: UIS, 2011), <http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/tp7-quantitative-armed-conflict-impact-education-2011-en.pdf> (accessed 18 July 2012).
- 307 Andrew Mack, “Armed Conflicts,” Perspective Paper, Copenhagen Consensus 2012, [http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/Files/Filer/CC12%20perspective%20papers/Armed%20Conflicts\\_\\_Mack.pdf](http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/Files/Filer/CC12%20perspective%20papers/Armed%20Conflicts__Mack.pdf) (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 308 See UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education,” 66 (Figure 9.20) (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 309 EPDC, “How Do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment?”
- 310 This refers to 10 countries that experienced conflict in 2010 and for which conflict-affected as well as peaceful regions could be identified. See *ibid.*, 2 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 311 *Ibid.*, 1 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 312 *Ibid.* (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 313 *Ibid.*, 2 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 314 See the methodology section of *ibid.*, 6–8 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 315 The countries in question are Burma, Burundi, Chad, Indonesia, Liberia, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. In the case of Sierra Leone, there was trend data but no period of conflict; in the case of Chad, trend data existed only for the nonconflict region.
- 316 Note that for most of these countries, only two data points are available, or there are only data for the conflict period, which means that we cannot compare values for all periods, i.e., before, after, and during the conflict.
- 317 EPDC, “How Do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment?” 27 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 318 In addition, Ethiopia also shows increases in attendance rates. The EPDC does not show conflict periods in its Ethiopia graph covering the years 2000–2009. According to UCDP/PRIODATA, however, the country continuously experienced conflict during that time period.
- 319 The countries in question are Burma, Burundi, Chad, Indonesia, Liberia, the Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Uganda.
- 320 Gross attendance rates can be more than 100 percent, because in addition to the regular cohort of children, they include children older than the cohort who previously missed a year or more of education.
- 321 Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC), *How do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment? Analysis of Sub-National Evidence from 19 Countries* (Geneva: UNESCO, 2010), Background paper prepared for the *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011—The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 12, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001912/191248e.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012); Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/Center for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute Oslo, (PRIO).

- 322 See Ray Rivera and Taimoor Shah, "Taliban Attacks on Afghan Schools Lessen," *SFGate*, 9 June 2011, <http://www.sfgate.com/world/article/Taliban-attacks-on-Afghan-schools-lessen-2368869.php> (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 323 Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC), *How do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment? Analysis of Sub-National Evidence from 19 Countries* (Geneva: UNESCO, 2010), Background paper prepared for the *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011 - The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 21, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001912/191248e.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012); Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/Center for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute Oslo, (PRIO).
- 324 World Bank, "In Afghanistan, Out of Conflict and Into School," <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTEDUCATION/0,,contentMDK:20279607~menuPK:617572~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:282386,00.html> (accessed 30 August 2012).
- 325 However, as we pointed out previously, the limited evidence we have suggests that these outcomes usually precede the conflict.
- 326 Adding deaths caused by the intentional killing of civilians for the period covered by the survey does not significantly alter the average. If death tolls in minor conflicts are so low that the impact that they make on educational outcomes is not discernible, it might be useful to focus on high-intensity conflicts only. This is what we did in our analysis of under-five mortality in the last *Human Security Report*, where only *wars*—conflicts in which there were a reported 1,000 or more battle deaths in a calendar year—were included. The findings were very similar for both intensity levels. This time we include minor conflicts, primarily because the UIS and EPDC studies that we review include minor conflicts as well as wars in their analyses.
- 327 Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC), *How do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment? Analysis of Sub-National Evidence from 19 Countries* (Geneva: UNESCO, 2010), Background paper prepared for the *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011—The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 15, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001912/191248e.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012); Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/Center for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute Oslo, (PRIO).
- 328 Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC), *How do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment? Analysis of Sub-national Evidence from 19 Countries*, (Geneva: UNESCO, 2010), Background paper prepared for the *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011—The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*, 15, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001912/191248e.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012); Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden/ Human Security Report Project, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada.

- 329 Gratien Mokonzi Bambanota and Mwindi Kadongo, *Democratic Republic of Congo: Effective Delivery of Public Services in the Education Sector: A Study* (Johannesburg, South Africa: Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 2010), 4, doi: 10.1177/00223433030405006 (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 330 Bambanota and Kadongo, *Democratic Republic of Congo: Effective Delivery of Public Services in the Education Sector*, 19 (accessed 30 August 2012).
- 331 Ibid. (accessed 30 August 2012).
- 332 The light blue South Kivu trend line is that which has the highest attendance rate in 2007 of the three secondary conflict region trend lines.
- 333 Lisa Bender, *Innovations in Emergency Education: The IRC in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Geneva: UNESCO, 2009), commissioned background report prepared for the *Global Monitoring Report*, 3, <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/EdStats/ZARgmrpap10.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2012).
- 334 IDMC, “Democratic Republic of Congo: IDPs Need Further Assistance in Context of Continued Attacks and Insecurity,” <http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/drcongo> (accessed 22 July 2012).
- 335 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “The Quantitative Impact of Conflict on Education,” 7 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 336 EPDC, “How Do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment?” 31 (accessed 4 September 2012). Emphasis added.
- 337 See *ibid.*, 6–8 (accessed 4 September 2012) for a discussion of all EPDC’s methodological concerns.
- 338 *Ibid.*, 7 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 339 In the Central African Republic there are only data for the two secondary conflict regions. In 2006 the primary conflict region was not surveyed. It is possible that the primary conflict region saw a decline, but both of the secondary conflict areas witnessed an appreciable *improvement* in educational outcomes in this period, as seems to be the case for all the other regions. In Uganda parts of the Northern and Western regions were omitted from the survey in 2001. However, this is unlikely to change the main finding much, since the data already show a decline in educational attainments for most of the period. Several areas of Indonesia were missed from the survey, but there were only data for one year on Indonesia so they are not discussed here. The same is the case with Sudan. In the cases of Pakistan and Colombia, there were missing data, but the EPDC states that the omission is unlikely to have affected the overall results in either case.
- 340 EPDC, “How Do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment?” 6 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 341 The terms *effect* and *impact*—which imply causality—are used both in this *Report* and in most other studies. Strictly speaking, we should be referring to an *association* between conflict and educational outcomes.

- 342 The PRIO study uses both cross-section and fixed-effects models, but the authors believe the latter are more appropriate (HSRP correspondence with Håvard Mogleiv Nygård, 29 May 2012). See Gates et al., “Consequences of Civil Conflict,” 1. Cited earlier in the chapter, the updated Gates et al., “Development Consequences of Armed Conflict” corrects a minor error in the version that is cited here.
- 343 Gates et al., “Consequences of Civil Conflict,” 40.
- 344 Ibid., 43.
- 345 Scott Gates et al., “Consequences of Civil Conflict,” *World Development Report 2011* Input Paper (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2010): 41, <http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/PRIO> (accessed 19 July 2012).
- 346 Siyan Chen, Norman V. Loayza, and Marta Reynal-Querol, “The Aftermath of Civil War,” *The World Bank Economic Review* 22, no. 1 (2008): 63–85, doi: 10.1093/wber/lhn001 (accessed 14 September 2012). In this study, conflict periods sometimes included shorter interwar peace periods (fewer than 10 years).
- 347 Lai and Thyne, “The Effect of Civil War on Education,” 277 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 348 Ibid., 284 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 349 EPDC, “How Do Violent Conflicts Affect School Enrolment?” 6 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 350 The *World Bank Economic Review* study has a considerable smaller number of countries than the PRIO and Lai and Thyne studies, meaning that its findings are likely a less reliable guide of the overall effect of war on education.
- 351 There is also the possibility, canvassed by Lai and Thyne themselves, that the positive relationship that they find between conflict and low educational outcomes is affected by the omitted variable bias discussed above—i.e., that the association between war and educational outcomes that they report could be caused by factors that were not included in their statistical models. See Lai and Thyne, “The Effect of Civil War on Education,” 277 (accessed 4 September 2012) 289.
- 352 For a discussion of the differences in results in the literature on civil war onset, see Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 4 (2006): 508–535, doi: 10.1177/0022002706289303 (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 353 We reiterate a cautionary note here. The trends that we have been describing are averages—what is *generally* the case and certainly not what is *always* the case. The averages will, of course, include many cases where war does indeed have disastrous impacts on educational outcomes. These cases are the ones that receive the most attention from policy-makers, that generate the headlines, and that inform the mainstream narrative. Those cases where educational outcomes improve in conflicts at a more rapid rate than the average get no attention.
- 354 UNESCO EFA Global Monitoring Report Team, *The Hidden Crisis*, 126.

- 355 Ibid., 159.
- 356 Ibid.
- 357 However, even if conflict is *not* the primary cause of low educational outcomes in war-affected countries, it may well exacerbate them.
- 358 The nonconflict fragile states in the PRIO study have consistently lower educational attainments than those in conflict. See Gates et al., “Consequences of Civil Conflict,” 41.
- 359 See INEE, <http://www.ineesite.org/> (accessed 4 September 2012) and INCAF, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflictandfragility/44282247.pdf> (accessed 4 September 2012).
- 360 Some of the research of the INEE focuses on fragility in explaining educational and other development outcomes. See INEE, <http://www.ineesite.org/> (accessed 4 September 2012). For an overview of the concept of state fragility as it applies to education, see Jacqueline Mosselson, Wendy Wheaton, and Paul St. John Frisoli, “Education and Fragility: A Synthesis of the Literature,” *Journal of Education for International Development* 4, no. 1 (2009).
- 361 Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, *Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility* (Vienna, VA: CSP, 2011), 21, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/GlobalReport2011.pdf> (accessed 4 September 2012). The total global fragility score hides considerable variation between individual countries, of course. The CSP’s 2011 *Global Report* points out that from 1995 to 2010, state fragility ratings improved for 115—or 72 percent—of the 161 countries on its list. For 27 countries (17 percent), the ratings stayed the same, while 19 (12 percent) showed a deterioration (23). Different fragility measures provide somewhat different results. The CSP index includes OECD countries, as well as developing states. On the other hand, Carleton University’s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) shows data for developing countries only and finds that fragility increased from 1980 to 1997 and then stopped rising and stayed at about the same level until 2006. See David Carment and Yiagadeesen (Teddy) Samy, “Extent and Sources of State Fragility and Failure: Core Factors in Fragility and Failure,” PowerPoint presentation, <http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1243.pdf> (accessed 4 September 2012). Over an overlapping period (1995 to 2010), the CSP dataset shows a global decline in fragility of some 20 percent.
- 362 Note that the implications of the descriptive statistics in the PRIO study are not exactly the same as the findings of the econometric analysis. In the former case, the PRIO graphics simply show the net trend for a range of development indicators. These graphs—like Figure 4.7 above, for example—show how development outcomes differ between countries affected by conflict and nonconflict countries. But they do *not* tell us whether conflict has an impact on these development indicators that may be overridden by other factors.